Samantha Bondoux

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual assault.

The application judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, concluding that net delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

On appeal, the Crown argued that the adjournment of the first trial to await the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. J.J. constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge was not functus officio after the jury's verdict for purposes of a s. 11(b) application, distinguishing prior authorities.

The court further held that adjourning a trial to await guidance from a higher court in a different proceeding does not constitute a discrete exceptional event under the Jordan framework, but rather is a factor in assessing case complexity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, B.B., appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged error by the trial judge in finding a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and giving a prejudicial jury instruction, and an error in the jury instruction regarding the use of the complainant's prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the Browne v. Dunn rule, as there was no unfairness or prejudice to the witness or the trial process, and the resulting jury instruction was prejudicial to the appellant.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The second ground regarding prior consistent statements was not decided but the court reiterated important principles on their admissibility and proper jury instructions.

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and sought leave to appeal his life sentence.

The appeal primarily concerned the trial judge's decision to revisit an earlier ruling on similar act evidence (related to triple murders) for cross-examination, despite initially excluding it due to prejudicial effect.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in revisiting the ruling without a material change in circumstances and without re-engaging in the probative value/prejudicial effect analysis.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice as the appellant ultimately did not testify, and the potential prejudice from the similar act evidence therefore disappeared.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the life sentence was not demonstrably unfit, despite minor errors in identifying aggravating factors.