Paul B. Schabas

A reporter for the Toronto Star requested access to the names of the top 100 physician billers to the Ontario Health Insurance Program for fiscal years 2008 to 2012, along with their medical specialties and billing amounts.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner's adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that physicians' names in this context were not personal information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Ontario Medical Association and two groups of physicians appealed, arguing that physicians' names constitute personal information and are therefore exempt from disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's decision was reasonable and that the billing information, representing gross professional revenue before business expenses, did not reveal something of a personal nature about the physicians.

The defendants, having been entirely successful, sought partial indemnity costs of $65,981.09.

The court found the plaintiff's claim improper and vexatious, constituting a collateral attack on prior Italian and Ontario enforcement judgments.

The court accepted the defendants' claimed time and hourly rates, finding minor duplication between senior and junior counsel necessary and not warranting a discount.

The court deemed the defendants' overall costs claim reasonable and within the reasonable expectations of the parties, fixing costs at $65,981.09, payable by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Gregory King, brought claims against Italian lawyers and their firm (the Italian Defendants) alleging conflict of interest and misconduct in prior Italian legal proceedings that resulted in a judgment against King.

The Italian Defendants moved to dismiss King's claims for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and, alternatively, on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court found no real and substantial connection between King's claims and Ontario, as the alleged conduct occurred in Italy, the defendants did not carry on business in Ontario, and any related contract was primarily Italian.

The court also determined that Italy was clearly the more convenient forum, given the location of witnesses, applicable Italian law, and the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions.

Consequently, the court dismissed King's entire action against the Italian Defendants.

The applicant, who was separately indicted for first-degree murder, sought a partial or delayed publication ban on her anticipated testimony at her co-accused's trial.

She argued that pre-trial publicity and media reports of her evidence would taint the jury pool for her upcoming trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding no real and substantial risk to her fair trial rights.

The court held that reasonable alternative measures, such as the challenge for cause process and strong judicial directions to the jury, were sufficient to ensure an impartial jury.

In six Ontario libel actions tied to statements posted by a U.S. company and later republished in Ontario newspapers, the appellants argued Ontario lacked jurisdiction or should defer to Illinois.

The Court held that defamation was presumptively connected to Ontario because publication occurred there through reading, downloading, and republication.

It concluded the appellants did not rebut jurisdiction and did not prove Illinois was clearly the more appropriate forum under forum non conveniens.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent, Conrad Black, brought libel actions in Ontario against the directors and advisors of a U.S. company for statements posted on the company's website.

The appellants moved to stay the actions, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Van Breda test and upheld the motion judge's finding that the alleged tort was committed in Ontario, establishing a presumptive real and substantial connection.

The court found no unfairness in requiring the appellants to defend the actions in Ontario, as the statements were targeted at Canadian media and the respondent's reputation was damaged there.

The appeal was dismissed.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellants brought a defamation action against the respondent newspaper and reporter over an article concerning a proposed private golf course development and alleged political influence.

At trial, the jury found for the appellants and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, recognizing a new defence of responsible journalism.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, formally recognizing the new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

The Court held that the traditional strict liability regime for defamatory statements of fact failed to adequately protect freedom of expression under the Charter.

The new defence applies where the publication is on a matter of public interest and the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations.

A new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to leave this defence to the jury and errors in the fair comment instruction.

Media organizations appealed orders upholding a mandatory publication ban imposed under s. 517 of the Criminal Code during terrorism-related bail proceedings and interpreting the ban to apply to all jointly charged accused when requested by one accused.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal should be heard despite mootness because the issue was recurring, evasive of review, and remained adversarial.

A majority held that the mandatory ban infringed s. 2(b) of the Charter and was justified under s. 1 only where the charges may be tried by a jury; the provision was therefore read down to that extent.

The interpretation ruling applying the ban to all jointly charged accused was upheld, and no costs were awarded.

The defendants appealed a jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs $1.475 million in damages for a defamatory newspaper article about the plaintiff's proposed golf course expansion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the emerging defence of public interest responsible journalism by conflating it with qualified privilege and failing to have the jury determine the article's meaning first.

The trial judge also made reversible errors in his jury charge regarding the defence of fair comment, malice, and the presumption of falsity.

The plaintiff franchisor sued the defendant franchisees for breach of contract.

The motion judge struck large portions of the defendants' statement of defence and stayed portions of their counterclaim, finding the defence pleadings unnecessary for a 'reasonable defence' and the counterclaim duplicative of an intended class action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a defendant is entitled to plead any relevant material facts of at least marginal probative value, and that it was premature to stay the counterclaim based on an uncertified class action to which the defendants were not parties.

In the context of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice regarding a 1959 murder conviction, the Crown applied for a production order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code against third-party journalists.

The journalists had produced a documentary about the case and interviewed several witnesses who were now providing fresh evidence.

The journalists resisted, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a production order against a third party for investigative purposes.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to order production where it is in the interests of justice to assist in determining the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The court ordered the production of two of the three retained video recordings.

The appellants were previously successful in their appeal to stay a libel action brought by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the motion judge on a partial indemnity scale.

The parties could not agree on the quantum of costs for the motion.

The appellants sought $32,773.37.

Noting that the case involved a novel application of the real and substantial connection test in a libel context and was a matter of public interest, the court fixed the costs of the motion at a modest $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $90,000 in general damages for defamation arising from a newspaper article.

The article reported on a mistrial in a murder case, suggesting the respondent, a senior government official, had improperly pressured a forensic scientist to change his evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the article was defamatory and that the defence of absolute privilege under s. 4(1) of the Libel and Slander Act did not apply because the report was not a fair and accurate account of the proceedings.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal seeking increased and punitive damages, finding the damage award appropriate and no malice established.

The respondent sued the Washington Post and three of its reporters for defamation regarding two articles published in 1997.

At the time of publication, the respondent lived in Kenya and the newspaper had minimal circulation in Ontario.

The respondent moved to Ontario three years later and commenced the action.

The appellants brought a motion to stay the action on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Muscutt factors and found no real and substantial connection between the action and Ontario.

The appeal was allowed and the action was stayed.

The Crown obtained search warrants under the Provincial Offences Act relating to a meat packing business.

The Crown subsequently obtained an ex parte sealing order for the warrants and informations, arguing disclosure could identify a confidential informant and interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation.

Media outlets successfully applied to quash the sealing order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to all discretionary court orders that limit freedom of expression and freedom of the press, including sealing orders at the investigative stage.

The Court found the Crown failed to meet its burden, as it relied only on a generalized assertion that publicity could compromise the investigation rather than demonstrating a serious and specific risk.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a sealing order on search warrants and informations related to an investigation into a meat packing plant.

The Court of Appeal found that the original judge committed a jurisdictional error by denying a media representative an adjournment to seek counsel.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck framework, the Court held that a sealing order was not justified merely to prevent the potential tainting of witness statements, but was necessary to protect the identity of a confidential informant.

The appeal was allowed to a very limited extent to permit further redactions to the informations before their public release.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission appealed a Board of Inquiry decision dismissing complaints against Ford Motor Company and a union alleging constructive discrimination based on religion.

The complainants, adherents of the Worldwide Church of God, sought to be excused from Friday night shifts to observe the Sabbath.

The Board found that accommodating the complainants would cause undue hardship to Ford due to high absenteeism, quality, and safety concerns, and to the union due to significant interference with the seniority rights of other workers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Assistant Commissioner applied for leave to appeal, raising issues regarding the standard of review by the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash the application, arguing the Assistant Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and adjourned the motion to quash to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.