Heather Burnett

The Representative Plaintiff in a class action regarding youth segregation brought a motion for directions concerning the interpretation of the Claims Procedure in the approved Settlement Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether the Claims Administrator and Adjudicator could consider youth segregation placements documented in a claimant's Youth Records but not explicitly listed in their Claim Form.

The court applied principles of contract interpretation and concluded that the Settlement Agreement did not restrict the use of Youth Records to merely corroborating the Claim Form.

The court directed that the Administrator and Adjudicator may award compensation for all eligible placements documented in the Youth Records, regardless of whether they were referred to in the Claim Form.

The Crown sought a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act for currency previously seized by police.

The respondent argued the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on a prior Disposition Order under s. 490 of the Criminal Code that had ordered the funds returned to him.

The court rejected this argument, finding that an order under s. 490 only establishes the right to regain property after a criminal investigation and does not preclude civil forfeiture proceedings.

The preservation order was granted.

The plaintiff brought an action against 28 physicians, a hospital, and the provincial and federal governments, alleging negligence and misrepresentation leading to a delayed diagnosis of Lyme disease.

The defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim.

The court struck the claims against the provincial and federal governments without leave to amend, finding the plaintiff failed to provide statutory notice to Ontario and failed to plead material facts establishing a duty of care by the governments.

The court also struck several paragraphs of the claim against the physicians and hospital, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend to properly plead material facts supporting his claims in negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The moving parties sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that lifted an earlier stay and dismissed their application for judicial review.

The moving parties had been selected in a lottery to apply for retail cannabis store licences but were disqualified by the Registrar for failing to provide an irrevocable letter of credit within five days of notification.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-part test for granting a stay: serious issue to be determined, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

While the court found a serious issue existed and acknowledged potential irreparable harm, it determined that the balance of convenience strongly favoured denying the stay due to interference with government policy, public interest in expanding cannabis retail access, and the fact that the moving parties' position had already been rejected by the Divisional Court.

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.

The Attorney General defendants were entirely successful on a Rule 21 motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's action.

They sought costs of $4,100, despite incurring $12,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court noted that the fact costs are sought by salaried Crown Counsel does not affect the quantum.

The court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded costs of $4,100 to the Attorney General defendants.

The plaintiff, Mohamed Abdullahi, along with Faiza Ali, sued the Children's Aid Society, Toronto Police Service Board, and the Ministry of the Attorney General and various employees after Abdullahi's acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The defendants brought motions to strike portions of the Amended Statement of Claim.

The Police Defendants sought to strike the libel claim for failure to provide timely notice and for being statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The Attorney General Defendants sought to strike the action against them entirely, arguing that the Ministry was not a suable entity, Crown Attorneys were immune from personal liability, and no reasonable cause of action was pleaded, particularly lacking material facts to support intentional misconduct beyond negligence.

The court dismissed the libel action against the Police Defendants and dismissed the entire action against the Attorney General Defendants, while allowing other claims against the Police and Society Defendants to proceed.

The court also cancelled a scheduled summary judgment motion, deeming a trial necessary.

Police officers appealed a motion judge's decision striking their negligence claim against the Crown while allowing their misfeasance in public office claim to proceed.

The officers alleged that Crown attorneys negligently and misfeasantly failed to adequately investigate assault allegations against them during criminal prosecutions, resulting in reputational harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the negligence claim based on established Crown immunity principles, but affirmed that Crown attorneys are not immune from claims of misfeasance in public office.

The court also upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the Crown's motion to strike the action as time-barred, finding that limitations issues should not be determined under Rule 21.01(1)(a) unless pleadings are closed and facts are undisputed.

A reporter for the Toronto Star requested access to the names of the top 100 physician billers to the Ontario Health Insurance Program for fiscal years 2008 to 2012, along with their medical specialties and billing amounts.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner's adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that physicians' names in this context were not personal information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Ontario Medical Association and two groups of physicians appealed, arguing that physicians' names constitute personal information and are therefore exempt from disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's decision was reasonable and that the billing information, representing gross professional revenue before business expenses, did not reveal something of a personal nature about the physicians.

Appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and Charter damages arising from the respondents' investigation of a fire at a rental house.

The fire was intentionally set by a resident, but spread rapidly due to Fire Code violations.

The appellants were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code.

The charge against one appellant was withdrawn; the other was discharged at preliminary inquiry.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges and acted in good faith without malice.

The appellants appealed, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because they lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that under the modified objective test for negligence-based offences, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the marked departure from the standard of care inferred from Fire Code violations.

The applicant, a licensed paralegal, applied for a declaration that licensed paralegals are 'officers of a court of justice' under s. 3(1)(6) of the Juries Act and are therefore ineligible to serve as jurors.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither the Juries Act nor the Law Society Act explicitly designates licensed paralegals as officers of the court, unlike barristers and solicitors.

The court concluded that it is up to the legislature to clarify whether policy considerations warrant making licensed paralegals ineligible for jury duty.

The applicant, a self-represented defendant in a defamation action, brought a Rowbotham application seeking publicly funded counsel to defend against a civil contempt motion for allegedly breaching an injunction.

The Attorney General opposed the application, arguing that Rowbotham principles do not apply to civil contempt proceedings between private parties and that the applicant did not meet the test.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issues in the contempt motion were not legally complex and the applicant had the necessary factual knowledge to defend herself, meaning her Charter rights would not be violated without counsel.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a 2002 dismissal order for non-appearance and to reinstate the action.

Several defendants requested an adjournment to retrieve their files, which the plaintiff opposed.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, noting that the plaintiff failed to serve all relevant defendants, did not include the dismissal order in the motion materials, and provided little evidence explaining the delay since a vexatious litigant order against him was rescinded in 2010.

The applicants, Rupert Folkard and Joseph Goldfinger, jointly charged with fraud over $5000, sought a Rowbotham Order for state-funded legal counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The court applied the three-part test for a Rowbotham Order, finding that while the applicants were indigent despite exceeding Legal Aid thresholds, their right to a fair trial would not be materially compromised if unrepresented.

The charges were serious, but the facts were not overly complex, and both applicants, despite lacking legal training, were intelligent, educated, and accustomed to financial documents.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that they possessed the necessary skills to represent themselves and that logistical issues with disclosure could be resolved without state-funded counsel.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

A plaintiff, unsuccessfully prosecuted for murder, sued police investigators and Crown attorneys for various torts.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Crown due to prosecutorial immunity and struck a cross-claim for contribution, but allowed a cross-claim for indemnity based on negligent legal advice to proceed.

The Crown defendants sought leave to appeal this decision.

Leave to appeal was granted, as the motion judge failed to adequately consider policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care from Crown attorneys to police, which raised doubts about the correctness of the order.

The respondent Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Superior Court order requiring the appellant to produce Youth Records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to produce specified Youth Records or face a stay of his proposed class action proceeding.

The appellant challenged the order as final rather than interlocutory, arguing the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory in nature—a production order with a sanction for non-compliance—and therefore any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the Crown.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim regarding his sponsorship of his former spouse as a permanent resident.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that his former spouse was not entitled to social assistance she received and a return of monies confiscated due to his sponsorship obligation, arguing an implied term that repayment only applied to rightful payments and that estoppel applied.

The court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, held that a sponsor's statutory obligation to reimburse social assistance is absolute, regardless of whether the sponsoree obtained benefits fraudulently, and that estoppel does not apply against a statute.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action against Ontario was dismissed.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.

The defendant tribunal brought a motion to dismiss a civil action alleging bias, denial of a fair hearing, and procedural unfairness in prior tenancy proceedings.

The court held that a statutory tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions is not a suable entity absent express legislative authority.

The action was also found to constitute an impermissible collateral attack on tribunal decisions that could only be challenged through internal review or judicial review.

In the alternative, the court held that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action under Rule 21.01(1)(b) because it failed to plead material facts or recognized legal causes of action.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend and the action dismissed.