Heather Burnett

The Representative Plaintiff in a class action regarding youth segregation brought a motion for directions concerning the interpretation of the Claims Procedure in the approved Settlement Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether the Claims Administrator and Adjudicator could consider youth segregation placements documented in a claimant's Youth Records but not explicitly listed in their Claim Form.

The court applied principles of contract interpretation and concluded that the Settlement Agreement did not restrict the use of Youth Records to merely corroborating the Claim Form.

The court directed that the Administrator and Adjudicator may award compensation for all eligible placements documented in the Youth Records, regardless of whether they were referred to in the Claim Form.

The Crown sought a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act for currency previously seized by police.

The respondent argued the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on a prior Disposition Order under s. 490 of the Criminal Code that had ordered the funds returned to him.

The court rejected this argument, finding that an order under s. 490 only establishes the right to regain property after a criminal investigation and does not preclude civil forfeiture proceedings.

The preservation order was granted.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision confirming the Registrar's refusal to issue him a cannabis retail manager licence.

The refusal was based on the appellant's past conduct, including his involvement in an illegal dispensary, a prior conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, and ongoing civil litigation involving allegations of bad faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal did not err in law in its factual findings and that the appellant was afforded procedural fairness during the hearing de novo.

The applicants commenced a judicial review application in Brampton concerning a Small Claims Court action originating in Timmins.

The Regional Senior Judge, on his own motion, raised the issue of whether the application should be transferred to Sudbury in the Northeast Region.

The applicants opposed the transfer, alleging institutional bias in the Northeast Region.

The court rejected the bias allegations, finding no cogent evidence to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

Exercising its inherent jurisdiction to control its own process, the court ordered the application transferred to Sudbury, as the underlying litigation, parties, and community interest were all located in the Northeast Region.

The respondent Registrar successfully resisted an application for judicial review regarding the cannabis retail lottery and sought costs.

The applicants argued that costs should not be awarded to a decision-maker that successfully resists judicial review, relying on an alleged overriding principle.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting that in Ontario, costs are awarded to administrative tribunals acting in an adversarial role to defend their decisions.

The court awarded the Registrar costs of the stay motion and the application, fixing the quantum at $40,000.

The plaintiff brought an action against 28 physicians, a hospital, and the provincial and federal governments, alleging negligence and misrepresentation leading to a delayed diagnosis of Lyme disease.

The defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim.

The court struck the claims against the provincial and federal governments without leave to amend, finding the plaintiff failed to provide statutory notice to Ontario and failed to plead material facts establishing a duty of care by the governments.

The court also struck several paragraphs of the claim against the physicians and hospital, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend to properly plead material facts supporting his claims in negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Registrar's decision to disqualify them from the cannabis retail store lottery process for failing to provide original copies of a standby letter of credit by the specified deadline.

The applicants argued the disqualification was unreasonable, the lottery rules were ultra vires, and they were denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Registrar's decision was reasonable given the applicants' failure to provide functional contact information and their failure to meet the clear deadline.

The Court also held the rules requiring a letter of credit and permitting its drawdown were intra vires, and there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The moving parties sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that lifted an earlier stay and dismissed their application for judicial review.

The moving parties had been selected in a lottery to apply for retail cannabis store licences but were disqualified by the Registrar for failing to provide an irrevocable letter of credit within five days of notification.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-part test for granting a stay: serious issue to be determined, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

While the court found a serious issue existed and acknowledged potential irreparable harm, it determined that the balance of convenience strongly favoured denying the stay due to interference with government policy, public interest in expanding cannabis retail access, and the fact that the moving parties' position had already been rejected by the Divisional Court.

Police officers sued Crown Attorneys for negligent legal advice provided during a "Mr. Big" undercover investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest and eventual acquittal.

The police crossclaimed against the Crown Attorneys for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal held that prosecutorial immunity barred the crossclaim and that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police in respect of legal advice provided.

The court emphasized the separate and independent roles of police and Crown Attorneys in the administration of justice and rejected arguments that immunity should not apply to pre-charge conduct or claims by police.

The Attorney General defendants were entirely successful on a Rule 21 motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's action.

They sought costs of $4,100, despite incurring $12,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court noted that the fact costs are sought by salaried Crown Counsel does not affect the quantum.

The court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded costs of $4,100 to the Attorney General defendants.

The plaintiff, Mohamed Abdullahi, along with Faiza Ali, sued the Children's Aid Society, Toronto Police Service Board, and the Ministry of the Attorney General and various employees after Abdullahi's acquittal on sexual assault charges.

The defendants brought motions to strike portions of the Amended Statement of Claim.

The Police Defendants sought to strike the libel claim for failure to provide timely notice and for being statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The Attorney General Defendants sought to strike the action against them entirely, arguing that the Ministry was not a suable entity, Crown Attorneys were immune from personal liability, and no reasonable cause of action was pleaded, particularly lacking material facts to support intentional misconduct beyond negligence.

The court dismissed the libel action against the Police Defendants and dismissed the entire action against the Attorney General Defendants, while allowing other claims against the Police and Society Defendants to proceed.

The court also cancelled a scheduled summary judgment motion, deeming a trial necessary.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Physician Payment Review Board which found that five claims submitted by a physician were not stale-dated.

The Divisional Court held that while the Board has jurisdiction to determine the true basis for a denial of claims, its finding that the claims were not denied under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act was unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's decision was set aside, and a declaration was issued that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review decisions made under s. 18(3).

Police officers appealed a motion judge's decision striking their negligence claim against the Crown while allowing their misfeasance in public office claim to proceed.

The officers alleged that Crown attorneys negligently and misfeasantly failed to adequately investigate assault allegations against them during criminal prosecutions, resulting in reputational harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the negligence claim based on established Crown immunity principles, but affirmed that Crown attorneys are not immune from claims of misfeasance in public office.

The court also upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the Crown's motion to strike the action as time-barred, finding that limitations issues should not be determined under Rule 21.01(1)(a) unless pleadings are closed and facts are undisputed.

A reporter for the Toronto Star requested access to the names of the top 100 physician billers to the Ontario Health Insurance Program for fiscal years 2008 to 2012, along with their medical specialties and billing amounts.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner's adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that physicians' names in this context were not personal information under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Ontario Medical Association and two groups of physicians appealed, arguing that physicians' names constitute personal information and are therefore exempt from disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's decision was reasonable and that the billing information, representing gross professional revenue before business expenses, did not reveal something of a personal nature about the physicians.

Appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and Charter damages arising from the respondents' investigation of a fire at a rental house.

The fire was intentionally set by a resident, but spread rapidly due to Fire Code violations.

The appellants were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code.

The charge against one appellant was withdrawn; the other was discharged at preliminary inquiry.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges and acted in good faith without malice.

The appellants appealed, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because they lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that under the modified objective test for negligence-based offences, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the marked departure from the standard of care inferred from Fire Code violations.

The applicant, a licensed paralegal, applied for a declaration that licensed paralegals are 'officers of a court of justice' under s. 3(1)(6) of the Juries Act and are therefore ineligible to serve as jurors.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither the Juries Act nor the Law Society Act explicitly designates licensed paralegals as officers of the court, unlike barristers and solicitors.

The court concluded that it is up to the legislature to clarify whether policy considerations warrant making licensed paralegals ineligible for jury duty.

The applicant physician appealed the General Manager's denial of five claims for surgical procedures.

The General Manager argued the claims were stale dated under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act because the applicant failed to submit requested operating room notes within six months of the service date.

The Physician Payment Review Board found that the claims were submitted within the prescribed time and that the request for operating room notes constituted an interim assessment under s. 18(2), not a prescribed requirement under s. 18(3).

The Board ordered the applicant to resubmit the claims with the notes for a fresh assessment by the General Manager.

The plaintiff was acquitted of murder following a 'Mr. Big' sting and sued the police for negligent investigation, as well as the Crown attorneys who provided legal advice to the police.

The police defendants cross-claimed against the Crown attorneys for contribution and indemnity based on negligent legal advice.

The Crown attorneys moved to strike the cross-claim under Rule 21.

The motion judge declined to strike the cross-claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that prosecutorial immunity applied to claims by police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the cross-claim, holding that Crown attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits in negligence arising from the exercise of their official functions, including providing legal advice to police during an investigation.

The applicant, a self-represented defendant in a defamation action, brought a Rowbotham application seeking publicly funded counsel to defend against a civil contempt motion for allegedly breaching an injunction.

The Attorney General opposed the application, arguing that Rowbotham principles do not apply to civil contempt proceedings between private parties and that the applicant did not meet the test.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issues in the contempt motion were not legally complex and the applicant had the necessary factual knowledge to defend herself, meaning her Charter rights would not be violated without counsel.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a 2002 dismissal order for non-appearance and to reinstate the action.

Several defendants requested an adjournment to retrieve their files, which the plaintiff opposed.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, noting that the plaintiff failed to serve all relevant defendants, did not include the dismissal order in the motion materials, and provided little evidence explaining the delay since a vexatious litigant order against him was rescinded in 2010.