Anita Landry

Colautti Landry Partners Professional Corporation (CLP) brought a motion to be removed as solicitors of record for the Plaintiffs, Correct Group Inc. and Correct Building Corporation, citing a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship and failure to pay for legal services.

The Plaintiffs opposed the motion and sought an adjournment, which was denied due to lack of medical evidence and ample prior notice.

The court granted CLP's motion, finding an irreparable breakdown in the relationship due to a significant billing dispute and the Plaintiffs' refusal to sign a new retainer agreement and pay funds.

The court determined that the Plaintiffs would not be seriously prejudiced by the removal at this stage of the proceedings and had sufficient time to retain new counsel, upholding the principles for solicitor withdrawal.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from successful summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, Jeffrey Lehman et al. and the Corporation of the City of Barrie, against Correct Building Corporation and Correct Group Inc. The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the individual defendants, finding the claims against them frivolous, baseless, and an abuse of process.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the City of Barrie, with a reduction for an abandoned counterclaim and an unrecoverable disbursement for an unproduced expert report.

The total costs awarded were $1,066,412.62.

This motion concerned an application by two members of a co-operative housing enterprise, Saffia Abdul-Haqq and Masbal Abokar, for an advance payment of $46,000 in legal fees from the co-op's funds.

The purpose of these funds was to oppose a pending motion by the City of Toronto to extend the appointment of an interim receiver over the co-op's business and affairs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to satisfy the "highly exceptional" test for advance interim costs, specifically failing to establish a prima facie meritorious case or special circumstances, despite their impecuniosity.

The court found no conflict between the Housing Services Act and the Co-operative Corporations Act regarding receivership, nor any infringement of Charter rights.

The co-op's funds were deemed necessary for essential repairs and financial rehabilitation, not for funding the applicants' opposition.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $30,326.95 claim for construction materials on summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of over $47,000.

The plaintiff had also incurred costs exceeding the claim amount.

The court criticized the disproportionate legal fees expended by both parties for a modest liquidated claim.

Applying the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the defendants fixed costs of $21,766.56.

The appellant subcontractor supplied materials to a construction project but was not paid by the contractor, who subsequently went bankrupt.

Having failed to register a construction lien, the appellant sued the owner for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act and unjust enrichment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Act requires privity of trust for a trust claim and that the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Act provides a juristic reason precluding an unjust enrichment claim against the owner.

The plaintiffs brought an action for damages arising from the flooding of their greenhouse, alleging the defendants negligently altered their adjacent property and caused the flood.

The parties had previously entered into Minutes of Settlement regarding the dispute, which the defendants subsequently breached by failing to construct a berm.

The court held that the plaintiffs could not rescind the settlement to resurrect their tort claim, as they had contracted it away.

Furthermore, the court found the plaintiffs failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendants caused the flooding.

However, the court granted a declaration that the defendants breached the Minutes of Settlement, entitling the plaintiffs to damages for that breach.

A case management conference was held to schedule the hearing of an appeal from a final order.

The court directed that the appeal proceed before a three-judge panel via ZOOM videoconference and set out a timetable for the exchange of materials, including the establishment of an electronic drop box for document sharing.

The plaintiff subcontractor, Tremblar Building Supplies Ltd., brought an action against the owner defendants (The Lighting Boutique Defendants) for breach of trust under the Construction Act and unjust enrichment, seeking payment for materials supplied to a general contractor (Keystone) that subsequently declared bankruptcy.

The owner defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that no statutory trust existed between the owner and the subcontractor due to a lack of privity of contract, as established by prior Divisional Court rulings.

Furthermore, the court determined that the existing contractual arrangements and the comprehensive scheme of the Construction Act constituted juristic reasons, thereby precluding any claim for unjust enrichment.

The plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought an action for wrongful dismissal against the defendants, a restaurant corporation and its majority financial backer.

The wife also claimed a remedy for shareholder oppression under s. 248 of the OBCA.

The court found that the wife was not expressly or constructively dismissed, but rather had resigned from her employment.

The husband's wrongful dismissal claim was also dismissed as he had received adequate payment in lieu of notice.

On the oppression claim, the court found that the defendants' failure to provide annual audited financial statements and the majority backer's post-litigation correspondence violated the wife's reasonable expectations as a shareholder.

The court ordered the purchase of the wife's shares, valuing them at $1.00 as of the date of the original oppressive conduct in 2010, given the corporation's significant debt at that time.

Claims for unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation were dismissed, as was the defendants' counterclaim for defamation.

The appellant, owner of a commercial property in Windsor, Ontario, sought leave to amend its statement of claim in a second action to add a claim for breach of statutory duty under the Environmental Protection Act.

The motion judge refused the amendment on the grounds that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the claim was clearly statute-barred and that the proposed amendment would constitute an entirely new cause of action against different parties.

The court noted that the appellant had the option to amend its statement of claim in the first action instead.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were fixed at $30,000 inclusive.

An appeal from a trial judgment upholding the validity of a codicil executed by an 87-year-old mother that changed her will to leave the residue of her estate to one son instead of dividing it equally between two sons.

The appellant son challenged the codicil on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and coercion.

The trial judge found the codicil valid after a 10-day trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings regarding testamentary capacity, knowledge of assets, and the absence of undue influence or coercion.

Strathan Corporation sought leave to amend its statement of claim in a second action (Second Strathan Action) to include a new claim for breach of statutory duty causing environmental contamination under the Environmental Protection Act.

The defendants opposed, arguing the proposed amendments were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, untenable at law, and an abuse of process given a prior action (First Strathan Action) already addressing environmental contamination.

The court dismissed Strathan's motion, finding the new claim was a distinct cause of action, statute-barred by the two-year limitation period (as Strathan knew of the environmental claim since 2009 when it commenced the First Strathan Action), and constituted an abuse of process by attempting to graft a duplicative claim onto a separate action.

The court also rejected the argument that the Real Property Limitations Act applied.

Appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and Charter damages arising from the respondents' investigation of a fire at a rental house.

The fire was intentionally set by a resident, but spread rapidly due to Fire Code violations.

The appellants were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code.

The charge against one appellant was withdrawn; the other was discharged at preliminary inquiry.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges and acted in good faith without malice.

The appellants appealed, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because they lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that under the modified objective test for negligence-based offences, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the marked departure from the standard of care inferred from Fire Code violations.

The appellant sought to appeal the dismissal of his summary judgment motion regarding fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that the underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy and the appellant had failed to follow the correct procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not determine the substantive rights of the parties.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

A landlord leased land to a tenant for construction and operation of a driving range.

Upon the tenant's default in rent payments, the landlord terminated the lease and prevented the tenant from removing trade fixtures and chattels from the premises.

The tenant sued for damages for unlawful distraint and conversion.

The trial judge found the assets were trade fixtures and awarded compensatory and exemplary damages.

On appeal, the court upheld the finding of liability for conversion but set aside the exemplary damages award, finding it resulted in double recovery for the tenant.

The appellant's driver's licence was suspended by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles after he voluntarily admitted himself to a hospital for alcohol dependence.

The appellant appealed the suspension.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the appellant had abstained from alcohol for over six months, completed treatment programs, and had the support of his doctors and family.

The Tribunal concluded that the appellant's alcohol addiction was no longer likely to significantly interfere with his ability to drive safely and set aside the licence suspension.

The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant debtor and subsequently brought an action alleging the debtor fraudulently conveyed properties to the other defendants.

The debtor later declared bankruptcy and was discharged.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages against the transferees.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to follow the correct procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the claim belonged to the bankruptcy estate and the plaintiff should have pursued remedies in bankruptcy court rather than seeking damages in civil court.

This endorsement clarifies that the presiding judge is not seized of the plaintiff's intended motion to pursue personal causes of action, following a successful partial summary judgment motion and subsequent appeal.

The judge explains that his previous decision was final and that he has since been assigned to the Criminal division.

The parties are advised to obtain a new hearing date for the motion from the Civil Practice Court (CPC) or pursue the Fraudulent Conveyances Act claim through the bankruptcy court.

The plaintiff, Dan Bailey, brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer, Milo-Food & Agricultural Infrastructure & Services Inc., and its CEO, Geetu Pathak, after receiving two years' working notice of termination.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing that the wrongful dismissal and severance pay claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date notice was given (March 18, 2013), not the last day worked (March 22, 2015).

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the wrongful dismissal and severance pay claims were indeed statute-barred, consistent with established jurisprudence that the limitation period begins when notice of termination is received.

However, claims for intentional infliction of mental distress and human rights violations were not struck, as they were based on ongoing conduct throughout the notice period and thus fell within the limitation period.

The successful respondent on an appeal sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $93,000 for the action, various motions, and the appeal, in addition to the $75,000 already awarded for the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal applied principles of reasonableness and proportionality, noting that both sides had unnecessarily complicated a simple collection case.

The court reduced the requested costs to $64,500 and then applied a further reduction for overall disproportionality, ultimately awarding the respondent $44,500 in costs.