Jeremy Glick

This case concerns a s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay in a sexual assault prosecution.

The court found the net delay of approximately 20 months exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, after accounting for defence waivers and partially deducting delay caused by a mistrial.

The Crown failed to adequately mitigate the delay following the mistrial.

A stay of proceedings was ordered.

The parties settled this litigation, and the defendants brought a motion on consent to dismiss the claim without costs.

The court granted the order, dismissing the action on a without costs basis, noting that the reasons for decision were deemed an operative and enforceable order due to the Covid-19 emergency.

The appellants, the Chief of the Durham Regional Police Service and the Durham Regional Police Services Board, sought judicial review of an interim order made by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Commission had appointed an Administrator to oversee disciplinary proceedings, promotions, and secondary employment within the Service, citing an emergency and a crisis of confidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission had the jurisdiction to make the interim order without notice or a hearing under section 24(1) of the Police Services Act.

The Court held that the decision was reasonable, did not breach procedural fairness, and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order granting the defendants' motion for security for costs in an action for negligent investigation, wrongful arrest, and malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff argued the Master erred in granting leave to bring the motion after the action was set down for trial and in ordering security for costs.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's decision to grant leave or in the conclusion that the defendants had a good defence on the merits and the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets to satisfy a costs award.

In a group of six child protection appeals, the appellant J.B. brought a motion to reconstitute the panel, seeking to replace one of the judges due to her involvement in a prior unanimous decision that had reinstated a no-access order against J.B. The appellant argued for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion, reaffirming the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the high burden on the party alleging bias.

The court held that a judge's prior ruling against a party on a legal issue in a different case does not create a reasonable apprehension of bias for a new case involving different legal issues, even if the parties are the same.

This appeal concerned the liability of Children's Aid Societies (CAS) and the Ontario government for damages arising from flawed hair follicle drug and alcohol test results from the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory (MDTL) used in child protection proceedings.

Family members (parents and siblings) of children apprehended by CASs sued for negligence, negligent investigation/supervision, intentional infliction of mental distress, bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches.

The motions judge dismissed these claims, finding that CASs and Ontario did not owe a private law duty of care to parents or family members, as their primary duty is to the child's best interests, creating an untenable conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision, affirming that the CAS's duty is solely to the child, and Ontario's duties are general public duties, not private law duties to individuals in child protection matters or related to laboratory oversight.

The court also rejected claims of bad faith and Charter breaches as being disguised negligence claims, and dismissed claims for breach of fiduciary duty and s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, finding these duties are owed to the Indigenous child, not the Indigenous parent.

The defendants, a police officer and the Crown, brought motions for security for costs against the plaintiffs, who were suing for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution following their acquittals on sexual assault charges.

The court first determined that leave was required under Rule 48.04(1) to bring the motions after the actions were set down for trial, and granted leave.

The court then found that the defendants had a good defence on the merits, as the plaintiffs' committal to trial after a preliminary inquiry provided strong evidence of reasonable and probable grounds for the charges.

Concluding that the plaintiffs had insufficient assets in Ontario and that an order would not prevent them from proceeding to trial, the court ordered the plaintiffs to post security for costs in the amounts of $40,000 and $30,000.

The court heard multiple motions to strike claims against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ), various Children's Aid Societies (CAS), and an expert witness (Julia Klein).

These claims arose from the use of unreliable hair follicle drug testing by the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory in child welfare investigations and proceedings, leading to children's apprehension and, in some cases, Crown wardship.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of Charter rights, bad faith, and other torts against the defendants.

The court granted all motions to strike, finding that HMQ and the CAS did not owe a private law duty of care to the parents or children in their supervisory or investigative roles, as their paramount duty was to the child's best interests.

Many claims were also deemed impermissible collateral attacks on existing court orders.

The claim against the expert witness, Julia Klein, was struck due to witness immunity and a lack of causal connection between her testimony and the alleged damages.

The Attorney General for Ontario (AGO) brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim, which sought $4.5 million in damages.

The plaintiff's action alleged wrongful non-disclosure, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, false imprisonment, and various Charter breaches against the AGO, arising from his arrest, conviction, and subsequent appeal and acquittal for firearms-related offences.

The court granted the AGO's motion, striking all claims against the AGO without leave to amend.

The court found that the plaintiff's allegations confused legal conclusions (e.g., the unlawfulness of a search, determined on appeal) with facts that the Crown should have disclosed or known at the time of trial.

It also determined that the plaintiff failed to plead the necessary elements for the asserted torts, such as malice or improper purpose, and that the Crown's role includes advancing legal theories, even if ultimately unsuccessful.

The appellant, a former employee of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, appealed an order from the Superior Court that restricted her ability to commence legal proceedings.

The order prohibited her from initiating or continuing any civil or criminal proceedings without prior authorization from a Superior Court judge.

The appellant had engaged in extensive litigation across multiple forums, filing numerous civil actions, private informations, and peace bond applications, all of which were dismissed or withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the restriction on civil proceedings under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act but struck down the restriction on criminal proceedings, finding that the Superior Court lacked the inherent jurisdiction to prevent access to justices of the peace for private informations and peace bond applications.

Appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and Charter damages arising from the respondents' investigation of a fire at a rental house.

The fire was intentionally set by a resident, but spread rapidly due to Fire Code violations.

The appellants were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code.

The charge against one appellant was withdrawn; the other was discharged at preliminary inquiry.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges and acted in good faith without malice.

The appellants appealed, arguing the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because they lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that under the modified objective test for negligence-based offences, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the marked departure from the standard of care inferred from Fire Code violations.

The defendant, Ontario, brought a motion to transfer the plaintiff's civil action for wrongful conviction from Toronto to Woodstock.

The plaintiff had been wrongfully convicted of manslaughter in Woodstock in 1971 and spent over three years in prison before being exonerated in 2015.

The court applied the holistic balancing test under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the plaintiff's damages were sustained outside Woodstock and that forcing him to return to the site of his wrongful conviction would be unjust, the court dismissed the motion, preserving the plaintiff's presumptive right to choose the venue.

The plaintiffs sought leave to extend the time for service of their statement of claim almost two years after the deadline.

The action alleged breach of a 1993 agreement regarding timber harvesting buffer zones.

The Crown argued the action was a nullity for failure to provide notice under s. 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The court found the plaintiffs' prior correspondence did not constitute proper notice to the Crown.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the delay in service.

The motion was dismissed and the action against both defendants was dismissed.

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The appellants sued the police and the Crown for negligence and other torts related to a criminal investigation and prosecution.

The action was administratively dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

The appellants unsuccessfully moved before a Master to set aside the dismissal.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's application of the test to set aside an administrative dismissal, noting the appellants failed to adequately explain the delay, were not prompt in moving to set aside the order, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the respondents.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The original action alleged negligence by police and Crown attorneys, and claims of terror, intimidation, assault, and unauthorized searches by police, stemming from a private prosecution that resulted in an acquittal.

The Master's decision was based on the appellants' failure to explain the delay, their lack of promptness in moving to set aside the dismissal, and the presumption of prejudice to the respondents.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's discretionary decision, noting that the appellants' action was also unlikely to succeed due to prosecutorial immunity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent sought an adjournment of an application hearing to obtain counsel.

The applicant agreed to the adjournment but requested conditions to prevent the respondent from initiating new actions or taking further steps in existing litigation during the adjournment period.

The court granted the adjournment with the requested conditions, citing the allegations in the application and the respondent's litigation history as reasons for the restrictions and for making the next hearing date peremptory.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner denying a fee waiver for a freedom of information request made to the Ministry of the Environment.

The Adjudicator had reduced the fee but found it was not fair and equitable to waive it entirely, noting the applicant did not work with the Ministry to narrow the request.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.