8 total
Urgent motion granted ordering children to attend in-person school during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the parties' two children attend in-person learning rather than remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The respondent father opposed, preferring remote learning due to health risks.
Applying the framework from recent jurisprudence, the court found that the government's plan for returning to school should be presumed reasonable absent specific evidence to the contrary.
Given the children's need for social interaction, one child's learning difficulties, and the mother's inability to supervise remote learning during her parenting weeks, the court concluded that in-person learning was in the children's best interests.
The motion was granted.
Costs of successful motion to amend pleadings fixed at $6,500 payable in the cause.
The plaintiffs and the defendant police officer provided written submissions on costs following the plaintiffs' successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.
The defendant argued the plaintiffs' submissions were late, but the court found them timely under the Rules of Civil Procedure as the deadline fell on a weekend.
Although the plaintiffs were successful on the motion, the court expressed concern over the timing of the new, more serious allegations of battery and sexual assault, which the defendant argued were an attempt to circumvent the Limitations Act.
Consequently, the court declined to award costs immediately to the successful plaintiffs, instead fixing costs at $6,500 payable in the cause.
Leave to amend pleadings to add sexual assault claims granted; publication ban ordered.
The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to add causes of action for battery and sexual assault, and sought a publication ban to protect their identities.
The defendant police officer opposed the timing of the amendment, arguing his outstanding summary judgment motion should be heard first, and sought costs thrown away.
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend immediately, finding no non-compensable prejudice, and ordered a publication ban due to the sexual nature of the allegations.
The court also awarded the defendant $2,000 in costs thrown away for the need to redraft his pleadings.
The court granted the respondent an adjournment to obtain counsel but imposed conditions prohibiting him from commencing new actions.
The respondent sought an adjournment of an application hearing to obtain counsel.
The applicant agreed to the adjournment but requested conditions to prevent the respondent from initiating new actions or taking further steps in existing litigation during the adjournment period.
The court granted the adjournment with the requested conditions, citing the allegations in the application and the respondent's litigation history as reasons for the restrictions and for making the next hearing date peremptory.
An insurer's duty to defend continues into a subsequent action where the underlying negligence claim was never fully resolved and new contractual exposure arose from the insurer's settlement strategy.
Homeowners sued the Town of Huntsville after basement flooding due to Building Code non-compliance and deficient building inspections.
A first action was settled with a payment from the Town's insurer (Lloyd's) and an agreement for repairs, with releases held in escrow.
When the repairs failed, homeowners brought a second action.
The Town applied for a declaration that its insurers (Lloyd's and AIG) had a duty to defend the second action.
The court found that Lloyd's had a duty to defend because the first action was not fully settled, the second action was a continuation of the first, and the Town's exposure to contractual claims arose from counsel retained by Lloyd's.
AIG had no duty to defend as the damage was manifest before its policy period and the second action was primarily contractual.
Action against government entities over 2010 involuntary committal dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and statute-barred.
The defendants requested a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.
The plaintiff, who had commenced multiple similar actions, sued various government entities and a legal clinic over his involuntary committal to a hospital in 2010.
The court found the statement of claim lacked material facts, contained grandiose and legally baseless claims, and was barred by the six-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.
The action was dismissed against all defendants.
Tribunal findings on structural defect created issue estoppel; liability determined on summary judgment.
Homeowners brought motions to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim to particularize defective installation of a radiant in‑floor heating system and to obtain summary judgment based on findings from the Licence Appeal Tribunal under the Ontario New Home Warranties Act.
The court held the amendment was not a new cause of action but merely a particularization of negligence already pleaded concerning the concrete foundation and construction defects.
Applying issue estoppel principles, the court found the Tribunal’s determination that the heating system constituted a major structural defect was a final judicial decision between the same parties and resolved the same issue.
Summary judgment was therefore granted on liability for breach of contract relating to the heating system, but damages were left for determination at trial.
Consent order creating restrictive covenant struck from title for exceeding court's jurisdiction and failing equity requirements.
The applicants brought an application and cross-application to strike a 1991 consent order from the parcel register of their lands.
The consent order purported to create a restrictive covenant preventing the storage of derelict vehicles and materials, binding the original defendants and their successors in title.
The court held that the original consent order was invalid because a court order cannot bind non-parties (successors in title) based solely on the agreement of the parties.
Furthermore, the restrictive covenant failed to adequately identify the dominant tenement.
The court also found that even if valid, the covenant should be discharged under s. 61 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act because a subsequent municipal property standards by-law rendered it redundant.
The order was struck from the register.
