David Zeldin

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the parties' two children attend in-person learning rather than remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondent father opposed, preferring remote learning due to health risks.

Applying the framework from recent jurisprudence, the court found that the government's plan for returning to school should be presumed reasonable absent specific evidence to the contrary.

Given the children's need for social interaction, one child's learning difficulties, and the mother's inability to supervise remote learning during her parenting weeks, the court concluded that in-person learning was in the children's best interests.

The motion was granted.

A children’s aid society brought a summary judgment motion seeking findings that three children were in need of protection and requesting Crown wardship without access.

The evidence included parental drug use, repeated domestic violence, criminal involvement, neglect of medical and dental needs, inappropriate discipline, lack of supervision, unstable housing, and failure to cooperate with services.

The parents filed no responding material and failed to meaningfully participate in the proceedings.

Applying Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, the court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded the children were in need of protection under multiple provisions of the Child and Family Services Act.

Crown wardship without access was ordered to permit permanency planning.

On an amended temporary care motion in a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought to vary an existing temporary order and place two children in its care pending trial.

The matter involved concerns about unexplained injuries to a child, repeated medical issues affecting the children, domestic violence between caregivers, and unsafe living conditions including drug paraphernalia and unsanitary housing.

The court considered the statutory framework under s. 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act and rejected the necessity of a strict two‑stage “material change in circumstances” analysis, emphasizing the court’s ongoing obligation to assess risk of harm to the children.

The court found that the cumulative events and health concerns established that the children faced risks that could not be adequately addressed by supervision alone.

The temporary order was varied to place the twins in the society’s care, while another child remained in kinship placement with supervised parental access.