David Zeldin

The applicant father brought a motion for an order compelling family therapy for his 16-year-old daughter, D, to support their relationship, which had deteriorated significantly.

The respondent mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer, representing the child, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the father's motion, giving considerable weight to the mature minor's strong and consistent opposition to forced therapy.

The court found that while it had jurisdiction to order therapy, the potential benefits did not outweigh the risks of exacerbating the child's physical and mental health issues, and that such an order would be practically unenforceable given the child's age and maturity.

The applicant father brought a motion to change the parenting schedule for their 10-year-old child from a week-about arrangement to primary residence with the father.

The child had consistently expressed a desire to live with the father, amidst ongoing high conflict between the parents and concerns regarding the mother's physical discipline.

The court considered the views and preferences of the child, the evidence from the Office of the Children's Lawyer, and the history of conflict.

The court granted the motion, ordering primary residence with the father and alternate weekend parenting time for the mother, along with mandatory counselling for the child and parents.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking an order that the parties' two children attend in-person learning rather than remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondent father opposed, preferring remote learning due to health risks.

Applying the framework from recent jurisprudence, the court found that the government's plan for returning to school should be presumed reasonable absent specific evidence to the contrary.

Given the children's need for social interaction, one child's learning difficulties, and the mother's inability to supervise remote learning during her parenting weeks, the court concluded that in-person learning was in the children's best interests.

The motion was granted.

The appellant appealed an order changing her indefinite spousal support to a three-year step-down order.

She argued the motions judge erred by failing to consider pre-marriage cohabitation and by terminating an indefinite order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the cohabitation issue was not properly raised before the motions judge and that the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines permit the termination of indefinite support where the recipient has had an opportunity to become self-supporting.

The step-down order was upheld.

The maternal grandmother moved to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding involving her 20-month-old granddaughter.

The child's parents supported the grandmother's plan of care but were not in a position to care for the child themselves.

The Society opposed the motion, arguing it would cause delay and was unnecessary since the parents could advocate for the grandmother's plan.

The court granted the motion, finding that the grandmother had a legal interest in the case under the Child and Family Services Act and that her independent advocacy was in the child's best interests.

The respondent brought a motion to vary a prior order by reducing child support, while the applicant sought an increase based on reassessment of the respondent’s income.

The court addressed admissibility of expert accounting reports, struck a portion of the applicant’s affidavit lacking a proper source of information, and interpreted a prior order providing for “without prejudice differential” support pending determination of actual incomes.

After reviewing competing expert reports, the court accepted the respondent’s expert evidence regarding corporate losses and determined the respondent’s guideline incomes for 2012, 2013, and 2014.

The court also found the applicant intentionally underemployed and imputed income to her.

Child support was recalculated on a set‑off basis due to the shared parenting arrangement.

The respondent father brought motions to find the applicant mother in contempt of court for breaching a temporary order prohibiting her from moving the children out of Simcoe County, and to restrain her from moving to Niagara Falls pending a motion to change.

The court found the mother in contempt for wilfully disobeying the order, but imposed no penalty as she had purged her contempt by returning the children.

The court dismissed the motion to restrain the move, finding that the mother's relocation to Niagara Falls was in the best interests of the children, provided she facilitate the father's access.

The respondent father brought motions to find the applicant mother in contempt of court for breaching a temporary order prohibiting her from moving the children out of Simcoe County, and to restrain her from moving to Niagara Falls pending a motion to change.

The court found the mother in contempt for wilfully disobeying the order, but imposed no penalty as she had purged her contempt by returning the children.

The court dismissed the motion to restrain the move, finding that the mother's relocation to Niagara Falls was in the best interests of the children due to safety, housing, and family support factors.

A children’s aid society brought a summary judgment motion seeking findings that three children were in need of protection and requesting Crown wardship without access.

The evidence included parental drug use, repeated domestic violence, criminal involvement, neglect of medical and dental needs, inappropriate discipline, lack of supervision, unstable housing, and failure to cooperate with services.

The parents filed no responding material and failed to meaningfully participate in the proceedings.

Applying Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, the court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded the children were in need of protection under multiple provisions of the Child and Family Services Act.

Crown wardship without access was ordered to permit permanency planning.

On an amended temporary care motion in a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought to vary an existing temporary order and place two children in its care pending trial.

The matter involved concerns about unexplained injuries to a child, repeated medical issues affecting the children, domestic violence between caregivers, and unsafe living conditions including drug paraphernalia and unsanitary housing.

The court considered the statutory framework under s. 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act and rejected the necessity of a strict two‑stage “material change in circumstances” analysis, emphasizing the court’s ongoing obligation to assess risk of harm to the children.

The court found that the cumulative events and health concerns established that the children faced risks that could not be adequately addressed by supervision alone.

The temporary order was varied to place the twins in the society’s care, while another child remained in kinship placement with supervised parental access.