Martin J. Prost

The defendant brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte by the plaintiff.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts, including that the original Agreement of Purchase and Sale had lapsed, that the defendant had not initialed key changes, and that the defendant's lawyer had explicitly denied the existence of a binding agreement.

The court concluded that the material non-disclosure alone warranted discharging the certificate, and further found that the evidence did not establish the plaintiff had an interest in the land.

The motion was granted and the certificate was discharged.

The parties reached a settlement on the second day of a family law trial, leaving the issues of costs and minor chattel disputes to the court.

The respondent sought $1,000 in damages for damaged or missing chattels, which the court largely dismissed as petty, save for $150 for a missing video game.

On costs, the court applied Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, finding the applicant unreasonably delayed accepting the respondent's reasonable settlement offer made months prior.

The respondent was awarded full recovery costs from the date of the offer, fixed at $17,500.

The appellant mother appealed a contempt finding by the motion judge for withholding the children from the respondent father in violation of a parenting schedule.

The motion judge found the mother in contempt and imposed double make-up time as a penalty, which the mother subsequently complied with.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding the penalty was found to be moot as it had been completed.

The court also upheld the motion judge's continued jurisdiction over the matter in this high-conflict family law case, citing best practice principles.

The applicant wife sought an unequal division of net family property or compensatory spousal support, while the respondent husband sought to exclude his share of a lawsuit settlement from his net family property calculation.

The court found that the husband successfully rebutted the presumption of joint ownership regarding the settlement funds deposited into a joint investment account, allowing him to exclude the majority of the funds on a pro rata basis.

The court dismissed the wife's claims for an unequal division of net family property and spousal support, finding no unconscionability or economic disadvantage.

The defendant Town achieved divided success on its summary judgment motion against the plaintiff.

Both parties sought costs of the motion.

The plaintiff had submitted an offer to settle that exactly matched the outcome of the motion.

The court awarded the defendant its costs up to the date of the offer, and the plaintiff its partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court ordered a net costs award of $2,500 in favour of the plaintiff.

The defendant Town brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss parts of the plaintiff's claim: damages for alleged breach of a mural maintenance contract and declaratory relief regarding a heritage building designation.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment on the damages claim, finding no efficiency in partial summary judgment in a simplified procedure case with conflicting affidavits and no cross-examination.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the declaratory relief, holding that the Ontario Heritage Act provides a complete code for such matters, which the plaintiff had not followed.

The mother brought a motion to stay a contempt order that granted the father make-up access time after she unilaterally suspended his access to their children.

The court first determined that jurisdiction for the appeal of the final contempt order lies with the Court of Appeal, not the Divisional Court.

In the alternative, applying the three-part test for a stay pending appeal, the court found the mother failed to establish that the contempt order was wrong, that the children would suffer irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant brought a contempt motion alleging that the respondent failed to comply with a consent order implementing the parties’ property division following separation.

The order required the transfer of properties, release of mortgage liabilities, transfer of a vehicle, and payment of an equalization amount.

The court held that the equalization payment constituted a “payment order” under the Family Law Rules and could not be enforced through contempt.

However, the remaining provisions concerning transfers of property, assumption of debts, and transfer of a vehicle were obligations to perform acts and were capable of enforcement through contempt.

Because the affidavit evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent’s breaches were wilful, the court directed a focused one‑day trial to determine whether the non‑compliance was intentional.

Following earlier reasons directing that each party bear their own costs except those generated by counsel for the respondent necessitated by the applicant’s self-represented status, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The respondent filed a bill of costs seeking fees and disbursements totalling $2,767.03 including HST.

The applicant disputed certain entries and the inclusion of work allegedly outside the permitted category.

The court accepted that some interactions could not fully be attributed to costs caused by the self-represented status and reduced the claim.

Costs were fixed at $2,300.

The applicant father and respondent mother engaged in a high-conflict family law trial regarding parenting, child support, and property division.

The court found that the mother's unrelenting insistence on her methods and values, and her pursuit of confrontation, caused the children to be in need of protection.

Despite the father's request for shared custody based on parental alienation, the court ordered joint custody with primary residence to the mother, but carved out final decision-making for extracurricular sports to the father to prevent his exclusion.

The court imposed a strict parenting schedule, mandated reconciliation counselling and a parenting coach, and ordered child support and equalization payments.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion in a status review application regarding two children who had been placed with their maternal grandparents.

The Society sought a final custody order for the grandparents, a continuation of a restraining order prohibiting the parents from contacting the children, and an order denying parental access.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing that access and their involvement in monitoring the grandparents' care should be determined at trial.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing conflictual behaviour and the parents' lack of insight as established by a recent parenting capacity assessment.

Summary judgment was granted, placing the children in the grandparents' custody and denying the parents access.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order for child and spousal support, arguing the judge erred in allowing a late amendment to claim spousal support, imputing too little income to the respondent, and creating undue hardship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The trial judge properly exercised discretion in allowing the amendment, had an evidentiary basis for the imputed income given the respondent's mental health issues, and the undue hardship argument was not raised at trial and could be addressed at an upcoming review.

Following a family law trial involving issues of custody, access, and support, the court determined the appropriate costs award under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party had been successful on the issue of care and control of the children, while the responding party had been successful on spousal support.

The court considered the parties’ relative success, the reasonableness of their conduct, and the effect of settlement offers.

Finding the moving party more successful overall, the court ordered costs in the amount of $12,500 plus HST, subject to set-off against a retroactive support award.

The court also issued supplementary reasons correcting an omission in the earlier judgment and confirming the parenting arrangement of alternating weekly residence under joint custody.

The parents appealed a summary judgment finding their newborn child in need of protection and making the child a Crown Ward without access.

The child was apprehended at birth due to the parents' extensive history with the children's aid society, which included four other children being removed from their care.

The motions judge relied on past parenting evidence and found no genuine issue for trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motions judge's application of the summary judgment rules or reliance on past judicial findings.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without access under the Child and Family Services Act.

The agency relied on extensive findings from earlier proceedings in which four older siblings had been removed from the parents due to serious protection concerns, including inflicted injuries, failure to thrive, and inability of the father to protect the children.

The parents relied primarily on a psychological assessment suggesting some potential for improvement but did not provide evidence of rehabilitation, counselling, or parenting programs.

The court held that the report did not raise a triable issue capable of rebutting the strong prima facie case arising from the parents’ past conduct.

The child was found to be in need of protection and made a Crown ward without access, as the parents failed to demonstrate that access would be beneficial and meaningful or consistent with the child’s permanency planning.

A mother applied under the Child and Family Services Act seeking to resume access to her child and ultimately pursue an openness order following the Children’s Aid Society’s termination of access.

The child had been made a Crown ward with access, but a lengthy hiatus in visits occurred after the mother ceased exercising access for over a year.

The court considered whether the relationship remained “beneficial and meaningful” to the child, a prerequisite for access or openness arrangements under the statutory scheme.

Given the extended lapse in contact, the child’s developmental needs, and the absence of an ongoing relationship, the court found the statutory threshold was not met.

The application to resume access was dismissed.

The appellant brought a motion to transfer a family law appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was from an order made under section 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act at a Family Court branch.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the order was final and should be heard by the Court of Appeal.

The court applied the statutory provisions and precedent, concluding that appeals of such orders lie to the Divisional Court.

The motion was granted and the appeal was transferred.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship without access for two young children due to the mother's chronic cocaine addiction.

Despite completing a rehabilitation program and demonstrating good parenting skills during supervised access, the mother continued to relapse and use cocaine, as evidenced by multiple hair follicle and urine tests.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm from the mother's substance abuse and lifestyle.

Concluding that the mother could not control her addiction in the foreseeable future, the court ordered Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption.

During a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act, the society brought a mid‑trial motion seeking to admit documents from another society’s file relating to a prior protection proceeding involving a different child of the respondent.

The court considered whether the documents qualified as business records under s. 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act.

Documents containing summaries of anonymous allegations and an agreed statement of facts from the earlier proceeding were excluded because they contained prejudicial hearsay and lacked reliability.

However, assessment and service plan documents prepared by a caseworker in the ordinary course of child protection work were admitted as business records.

The excluded materials could still be used for cross‑examination of the respondent.

On an amended temporary care motion in a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought to vary an existing temporary order and place two children in its care pending trial.

The matter involved concerns about unexplained injuries to a child, repeated medical issues affecting the children, domestic violence between caregivers, and unsafe living conditions including drug paraphernalia and unsanitary housing.

The court considered the statutory framework under s. 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act and rejected the necessity of a strict two‑stage “material change in circumstances” analysis, emphasizing the court’s ongoing obligation to assess risk of harm to the children.

The court found that the cumulative events and health concerns established that the children faced risks that could not be adequately addressed by supervision alone.

The temporary order was varied to place the twins in the society’s care, while another child remained in kinship placement with supervised parental access.