Dr. McMaster

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review of the accused's Conditional Discharge.

The accused, who was found not criminally responsible for assault and failing to comply with a recognizance, has schizophrenia and a history of violence.

The Board accepted the joint recommendation of the parties and the uncontroverted expert evidence that the accused remains a significant threat to public safety without professional support in place.

The Board ordered the continuation of the Conditional Discharge, with the removal of the requirement to submit urine and breath samples, pending the accused's transition to a non-forensic psychiatric team.

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review of the accused's disposition pursuant to s. 672.81(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, who was previously found not criminally responsible for various assault and weapons charges, suffers from treatment-resistant schizophrenia.

The clinical team testified that while the accused has made progress living in the community in supervised housing, he continues to experience rapid fluctuations in his mental state and ongoing psychotic symptoms.

The Board accepted the joint submission of the parties, finding that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Board ordered that his care continue under the terms of his current Disposition.

The offender, Jonathan Weir, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after killing his best friend with an unlawfully possessed, prohibited machine gun.

The court considered the appropriate sentence, including the four-year minimum for manslaughter with a firearm, and arguments regarding police misconduct during arrest and detention.

The judge found Weir's moral blameworthiness to be high, closer to criminal negligence than a "near accident" due to his reckless handling and storage of firearms and ammunition while intoxicated.

While acknowledging some police misconduct (improper strip searches), the court found it not egregious enough to justify a sentence below the statutory minimum.

The final sentence was 51 months (4¼ years) after credits for pre-sentence custody, rights violations, and strict bail conditions.

Ala Al Safi pleaded guilty to ten counts of aggravated sexual assault or attempted aggravated sexual assault and breaching a recognizance condition related to his HIV status and sexual encounters.

The court imposed a ten-year sentence, reduced by enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, and declared him a Long-Term Offender, imposing a ten-year Long-Term Supervision Order with specific conditions aimed at public safety and rehabilitation, particularly regarding HIV disclosure and medication adherence.

This is a costs endorsement following a ten-day family law trial.

The trial addressed decision-making responsibility and parenting schedules for two children, and the winding up of a family trust.

The respondent achieved substantial success on the primary issues of decision-making and residency for one child, and a shared parenting schedule for the other.

The applicant's conduct was deemed unreasonable, particularly her refusal to communicate and make settlement offers.

The court awarded the respondent 75% of his actual costs, totaling $78,768.00, finding the amount reasonable and proportionate given the respondent's success and the applicant's unreasonable behaviour.

The 82-year-old accused was found guilty of manslaughter for the domestic homicide of his wife.

At the time of the offence, the accused was experiencing a major depressive episode and subsequently entered a catatonic state.

The court weighed the gravity of domestic homicide against the accused's age, mental illness, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the global pandemic.

The accused was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, reduced to 14 months and 26 days after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdowns, followed by 3 years of probation.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order requiring him to attend an examination for discovery with accommodations, arguing his medical condition (vascular malformation and conversion disorder) made him physically unable to attend without serious risk of harm.

The plaintiff also appealed the Master's costs award, arguing the Master was functus officio when extending the time for the defendant's costs submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the medical evidence and had the discretion to extend the time for costs submissions before a formal order was entered.

The defendant, RBC Life Insurance Company, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Michael Scuglia, to attend an examination for discovery and cross-examination on an affidavit.

The plaintiff resisted, arguing that any form of examination would be harmful to his physical and mental health due to existing medical conditions, including a vascular malformation and conversion disorder.

The court reviewed medical evidence from both parties, finding the plaintiff's medical evidence unpersuasive regarding the risk of serious harm.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet the high onus to be relieved from discovery obligations and granted the defendant's motion, ordering the plaintiff to attend discovery and cross-examination with appropriate accommodations.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed his sentence of 10 years imprisonment followed by 10 years long-term supervision.

He argued that the custodial portion was unfit because the hearing judge improperly determined its length based on the time needed for rehabilitative programming rather than applying traditional sentencing principles of proportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, hearing judges may impose fixed-term sentences exceeding the normal range for the predicate offence to ensure access to necessary treatment programs in a penitentiary, subject to three constraints: the statutory maximum for the predicate offence, applicable sentencing principles, and evidence-based nexus to public protection.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed following his conviction for intimidation, criminal harassment, and two counts of assault.

The appellant did not challenge the validity of the dangerous offender designation but contested the trial judge's decision to impose an indeterminate sentence rather than a long-term supervision order.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence regarding treatment refusal, misapprehension of evidence regarding burnout in aging offenders, application of the wrong test for manageability in the community, and an unfair burden placed on the defence to demonstrate immediately available resources.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the indeterminate sentence.

The Crown appealed a sentencing judge's decision dismissing its application to designate the respondent as a dangerous offender under section 753(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge instead designated the respondent as a long-term offender and imposed a determinate sentence of two years less one day, followed by a five-year long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's decision, finding that there was sufficient evidence of treatability and a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the respondent's risk in the community through a graduated release plan involving psychiatric treatment and community supervision.

The accused pleaded guilty to 11 charges involving child pornography, sexual offences against children, bestiality, and conspiracy charges.

The Crown sought a Long Term Offender (LTO) designation with a sentence of 4 to 6 years and a 10-year supervision order.

The defence sought a sentence of 2 years less 1 day with probation.

The court found the accused met all three LTO criteria and imposed a global sentence of 3 years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody resulting in 193 days to be served, followed by a 4-year Long Term Supervision Order.

The court emphasized that the accused's offences, committed in furtherance of an abusive relationship with an older male, involved serious crimes against children and required significant denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence arising from a conviction for possession of child pornography, and also challenged the length of a ten-year long-term offender supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge imposed an illegal custodial sentence because the sentence, when combined with pre-sentence custody expressly treated as additional time, exceeded the then-applicable five-year statutory maximum under s. 163.1(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Re-sentencing afresh, the court imposed a fit sentence of 4.5 years' imprisonment and granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5:1 under Summers, leaving 16 days remaining.

The challenge to the ten-year supervision order was dismissed because the record amply supported the appellant's very high risk of reoffending and need for close supervision and gradual reintegration.

The offender pleaded guilty to an unprovoked assault causing bodily harm against a stranger while on parole for manslaughter.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 years and a long-term offender designation.

The court sentenced the offender to 3.5 years (reduced to 6 months with enhanced pre-sentence credit) and 3 years of probation.

The court dismissed the long-term offender application, finding that while the offender posed a risk, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a substantial risk of violent reoffending as required by the legislation.

Two personal injury appeals were heard together to determine the scope of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses.

The Court of Appeal held that Rule 53.03 does not apply to 'participant experts' (such as treating physicians) or 'non-party experts' who form opinions based on their observation of or participation in the events at issue, rather than being engaged by a party for the litigation.

In Westerhof, the trial judge's erroneous exclusion of such evidence warranted a new trial.

In McCallum, the trial judge correctly admitted the treating practitioners' opinion evidence.

The appellant appealed her first-degree murder convictions for the deaths of her two young daughters.

At trial, she raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, arguing she believed killing her children was an altruistic act to save them.

The jury rejected the defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the concept of 'moral wrongfulness' and in his treatment of the expert psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding the instructions properly focused on the appellant's capacity to know her acts were morally wrong by societal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a family law trial involving issues of custody, access, and support, the court determined the appropriate costs award under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party had been successful on the issue of care and control of the children, while the responding party had been successful on spousal support.

The court considered the parties’ relative success, the reasonableness of their conduct, and the effect of settlement offers.

Finding the moving party more successful overall, the court ordered costs in the amount of $12,500 plus HST, subject to set-off against a retroactive support award.

The court also issued supplementary reasons correcting an omission in the earlier judgment and confirming the parenting arrangement of alternating weekly residence under joint custody.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, but the court held the disposition was reasonable, supported by the evidence, and involved no error of law or miscarriage of justice.

Relying on the attending psychiatrist's evidence, the Board had properly found that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

Deference was owed to the Board's risk-management decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.

The applicant sought to reopen his sentence appeal after being declared a dangerous offender and receiving an indeterminate sentence.

He argued that based on a subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the sentencing judge erred by not considering the long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to reopen the appeal because the merits were not previously decided.

The court found it was in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal due to the serious error of law and the possibility of a different result at a new sentencing hearing.