The appeal concerned whether submerged strips of privately owned land lying between sold riparian lots and a navigable lake were transferred with the lots under art. 1718 of the Civil Code of Québec.

The majority held that although the deeds of sale described only the riparian lots as principal property, the submerged parcels were accessories because they were destined to serve the lots and were necessary to their agreed use as private waterfront vacation properties with direct and exclusive shoreline access.

The Court formulated the applicable accessory analysis by focusing on the destination of the principal property, the accessory’s appropriation to that use, and the buyers’ legitimate expectations.

It further held that the contracts did not unequivocally exclude the accessory rule, particularly where the buyers were not informed of the submerged lands’ existence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, over a dissent that would have held land cannot constitute an accessory in these circumstances and that the deeds excluded any such transfer.

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' lawyers of record due to a conflict of interest.

The plaintiffs' former counsel had obtained medical-legal reports from a company owned by her spouse without disclosing this relationship to the defendants.

Although the former counsel had been replaced, the new lawyers of record were from a successor firm operating out of the same office and employing lawyers from the former firm.

The court found that the conflict of interest had not been adequately addressed and that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice required the removal of the current lawyers of record.

The motion was granted.

The proposed intervener brought a motion for leave to intervene in the Crown's appeal against the respondent's acquittal for public incitement of hatred.

The respondent had been acquitted on the basis that his online statements were not communicated in a "public place" as required by s. 319(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the motion, finding that the interpretation of "public place" in the context of online communications is an issue of wide-reaching impact.

The court concluded that the proposed intervener's submissions on statutory interpretation were sufficiently distinct from the Crown's and would provide useful assistance to the panel.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim and for the issuance of summonses to witness in an action against his bank regarding a credit card dispute.

The court dismissed the motion to amend, finding that the proposed amendments pleaded fundamentally different facts and a new cause of action after the expiry of the presumptive limitation period, which constitutes non-compensable prejudice.

The court also dismissed the request for summonses as no trial had been scheduled.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the defendant.

The appellants failed to complete the sale of their home in 2016.

The respondent was awarded $715,000 in damages in lieu of specific performance at trial.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant requested an adjournment, which the court denied due to the lengthy history of the litigation and lack of evidence supporting the request.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and fact-finding.

The court also rejected the argument that the appellant wife was not a proper party, noting she signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale as a consenting spouse under the Family Law Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the search of his residence was unreasonable, the trial judge failed to apply the rule in W.(D.), and the verdict was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Charter issue was not properly before the court and the trial judge correctly applied the relevant legal standards.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to credit the appellant for 48 days of pre-sentence custody, reducing his sentence on one count.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment attacking a police towing procurement process, challenging municipal towing licensing requirements, and alleging unlawful interference with economic interests.

The court held that the applicable procurement thresholds under the municipal purchasing by-law turned on the municipality’s annual expenditure, not the supplier’s anticipated revenue, so no RFT or RFP was required and no procurement breach occurred.

The court further found no breach of procurement-related duties of fairness or good faith, no basis to invalidate the towing contract awarded to the successful bidder, and no merit to the claim that an out-of-municipality towing operator was exempt from Windsor’s licensing regime when towing within the city.

The tort claim also failed because the impugned police conduct did not constitute actionable unlawful means against third parties and there was no proof of intention or damages.

The plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was dismissed, the defendants’ cross-motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Complaints Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, which confirmed an investigator's finding that his complaint against four police officers was unsubstantiated.

The applicant alleged the officers unlawfully demanded identification, unlawfully detained him, and used abusive language.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding the Director's decision unreasonable because it failed to adequately address the applicant's central arguments regarding the lawfulness of the demand for identification and detention under the Trespass to Property Act, misapprehended video evidence, and failed to address allegations of bias against the investigator.

The matter was remitted for redetermination.

The appellant commenced an action in Ontario for breach of a share purchase agreement.

The respondent successfully moved to stay the action in favour of an ongoing International Chamber of Commerce arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a subsequent agreement to which it was not a named party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding an arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding an 'arguable case' that the respondent was an affiliate entitled to benefit from the arbitration clause, thereby engaging the competence-competence principle.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash an appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the motion judge's decision dismissing a motion for summary judgment and to strike pleadings was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the motion judge's decision regarding the 2020 limitation issue was a final determination under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his five-year sentence for firearms offences, seeking to admit fresh evidence of harsh pretrial detention conditions, specifically an incident involving excessive use of force by correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the sentencing judge would have given greater mitigating effect to the punitive character of the pretrial detention had she been aware of the incident.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by six months.

The parties separated after a 32-year marriage.

Before the marriage, the respondent wife received shares in her father's business.

During the marriage, an estate freeze was executed, transferring the growth value of the shares to a new family trust settled by her father for $100.

The trial judge, feeling bound by prior appellate jurisprudence, excluded the wife's interest in the trust from her net family property as a gift after marriage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, distinguishing the prior case and holding that the trust interest was traceable to the pre-marital gift.

The trust interest was included in net family property, but the equalization payment was reduced to $18 million under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act due to unconscionability.

Retroactive spousal support was ordered, but prospective support was denied.

The trial costs award against the appellant husband was upheld.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review case management directions that struck his 267-page appeal factum and required him to obtain trial transcripts for a Small Claims Court appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the case management judge's directions reasonable and necessary given the moving party's flagrant breach of the Rules respecting transcripts and factums.

The court extended the deadline for the moving party to order transcripts but warned that failure to comply could result in the dismissal of his appeal.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple child sexual offences, including sexual interference, sexual assault, possession of CSAEM, making CSAEM, and making CSAEM available, arising from abuse of children known to him and his role administering a dark web CSAEM website.

The Court of Appeal rejected the offender’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no reversible error in the sentencing judge’s treatment of intractability, burden of proof, or the expert evidence.

The court held, however, that the sentencing judge erred in principle in sentencing by failing to meaningfully account for the offender’s administrator role in a global CSAEM enterprise, by treating a prior comparator case as a sentencing ceiling, and by failing to impose some statutorily required consecutive sentences.

Re-sentencing afresh under the Bertrand Marchand approach and subject to totality, the court increased the global determinate sentence from 17 years to 25 years, with a net sentence of 20 years after presentence credit.

The defendants sought costs of a variance motion on a substantial indemnity scale against the plaintiff's former counsel, Monkhouse Law Professional Corporation.

The court found that while Monkhouse's conduct in the underlying action warranted a varied costs order, its conduct during the variance motion itself was professional and not reprehensible.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and fixed costs at $30,000 all-inclusive, representing a mid-point between the parties' submissions.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal a decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a judge-alone trial.

The Crown had conceded it could not prove the appellant inflicted the fatal stab wound based on the evidence of a key witness alone, and advanced a theory of manslaughter.

The trial judge rejected this concession without notice and convicted the appellant of murder based on co-principal liability under s. 21(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's failure to clearly notify counsel that he was considering co-principal liability for murder, and his rejection of the Crown's concession without inviting submissions, deprived the defence of a meaningful opportunity to respond.

This lack of notice amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion under Rule 51.06 for judgment on alleged admissions regarding a limitation period defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's order did not finally dispose of the rights of any parties or any issue, as the limitation defence could still be argued at trial.

Consequently, the order was interlocutory, and jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed an equalization order and sought leave to appeal an elevated costs award.

He argued a $78,000 shareholder loan should have been excluded from his net family property as it was unlikely to be repaid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the loan was outstanding at the date of separation and its inclusion was within the trial judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal costs was denied, as the trial judge's finding of bad faith justified costs on an elevated basis under the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the same reasons given by the motion judge who previously refused to stay enforcement pending appeal.

The court also rejected the appellant's submission regarding title and the respondent's standing, noting the mortgage and its transfer were clearly reflected on the parcel abstract.