Aaron Gold

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal a decision and a subsequent reconsideration decision of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of J.K. Trimble J. dated November 26, 2025.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the appeal to be expedited.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal and fixed at $5,000.

The Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians appealed the Minister's approval of an Official Plan Amendment (OPA 45) for lands in Kitchener.

The Tribunal initiated a motion to determine the validity of the appeal because the Six Nations had not made oral or written submissions to City Council prior to the OPA's adoption, as required by s. 17(36) of the Planning Act.

The Six Nations argued that the Minister failed to discharge the constitutional duty to consult and that the Tribunal should interpret the appeal provisions liberally.

The Tribunal found that the statutory requirement under s. 17(36) is clear and non-discretionary.

Because the Six Nations did not make the required submissions to Council, they lacked standing to appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

Sentencing on a guilty plea to careless driving causing death contrary to s. 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant drove a van at high speed toward a boat launch ramp in a parking lot adjacent to Ashbridges Bay, mistaking it for an exit road.

The vehicle entered the icy waters of Lake Ontario and sank, resulting in the death of the front-seat passenger who was trapped by an interior security cage.

The original charge of dangerous driving causing death under the Criminal Code was withdrawn after the Crown determined insufficient evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care.

A joint submission was accepted pursuant to R. v. Anthony-Cook.

Sentence comprised time served of four months actual custody with enhanced credit of six months less a day, twelve months probation with counselling conditions, a five-year driving suspension, and a victim fine surcharge.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the granting of summary judgment in favour of the Defendant Ernst & Young LLP, on the basis that the limitation period for the Plaintiffs’ action had elapsed.

The court reviews the relevant factors under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the result achieved, the complexity of the issues, and the offers to settle.

The court awards costs to Ernst & Young LLP on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of its offer to settle, and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, ordering the Plaintiffs to pay $125,000.00 in costs.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Ernst & Young LLP, finding that the limitation period for the plaintiffs’ action had expired.

The decision reviews the contractual and statutory limitation periods, the relevant facts, and the legal standards for summary judgment, ultimately concluding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant, Citadelle, brought a motion seeking an order to seal certain Master Supply Agreements (MSAs) and Individual Supply Agreements (ISAs) with Coca-Cola, arguing that these documents contained commercially sensitive and confidential information.

The plaintiff consented to the motion.

The court applied the three-part test from Sherman Estate v. Donovan, finding that court openness posed a serious risk to the important public interest of preserving confidential commercial information, that no reasonable alternative measures would prevent this risk, and that the benefits of the narrowly tailored sealing order outweighed its negative effects on the open court principle.

The motion was granted, and the identified agreements were ordered sealed.

Michael Katz pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, assault police officer with a taser, failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The offences occurred on Christmas Day 2021, involving a car collision, flight from the scene, and a violent struggle with police where a firearm was discharged and a taser used against an officer.

The Crown sought a 4-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence of 6-9 months.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the seriousness of firearm offences, the discharge of a loaded weapon on a public street, the assault on a police officer, and the impaired driving.

Mitigating factors included the accused's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior criminal record, strong family support, and compliance with strict bail conditions.

The court rejected the defence's argument for a sentencing discount due to alleged excessive force by police during arrest, finding the officers' actions reasonable given the dynamic and chaotic circumstances.

The judge found a conditional sentence inappropriate due to the pressing need for denunciation and deterrence.

Karson Benjamin, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to numerous serious offences including trafficking 27 firearms, 12 overcapacity magazines, 2 selector switches, over half a kilogram of fentanyl, and cocaine.

He was also found with a loaded handgun and proceeds of crime upon arrest.

The Crown sought a 15-year global sentence, while the defence argued for less than 10 years.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of drugs and firearms, the combination of guns and drugs, and Benjamin's integral role, attenuated by his intellectual limitations.

Mitigating factors included his youth, lack of criminal record, difficult background, early guilty pleas, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, denunciation, protection of the public, rehabilitation, and restraint, the court imposed a global sentence of 13 years, with specific counts running concurrently or consecutively, and credited 1458 days for pre-sentence custody.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order dismissing the appellants' motion for summary judgment and declaring that the respondents' action was commenced within the limitation period.

The appellants argued the claim was discovered earlier, based on a 2015 telephone conversation and a 2005 memorandum concerning tax consequences of a trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her application of the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw, particularly Grant Thornton LLP v. New Brunswick.

The court agreed that the information known to the respondents' lawyer was insufficient to ground a plausible inference of liability without expert advice, thus the limitation period began later, making the action not time-barred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Vermette J. dated December 15, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

As no costs outline was submitted, the court made no order as to costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a dismissed interlocutory injunction motion brought by the Applicants and a granted cross-motion for consolidation brought by the Respondents.

The Respondents, as successful parties, sought substantial indemnity costs, citing egregious conduct and reasonable settlement offers.

The Applicants argued for costs in the cause or partial indemnity, denying bad faith.

The court ordered costs payable forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, finding no reprehensible conduct warranting substantial indemnity and noting the limited compromise in the Respondents' settlement offers.

The quantum of costs claimed by the Respondents was reduced due to excessive hours, particularly for the consolidation motion.

The applicants sought a declaration that Lloyd's Underwriters had a duty to defend them in an action brought by a former business partner, Gavin Dabron.

Dabron's action included claims for breach of confidence and negligent/fraudulent misrepresentation related to a prior settlement and company valuation.

The court found that while the claims initially fell within the policy's coverage, they were ultimately excluded by the "prior and pending litigation" clause, as both the confidentiality and valuation claims arose directly from earlier litigation between the parties.

The application for a duty to defend was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction in an oppression application to preserve their alleged shareholdings in a startup company and restrict the respondents' use of corporate assets.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to convert the application into an action and consolidate it with their own action against the applicants.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion, finding they failed to establish a strong prima facie case for specific performance regarding the issuance of shares and failed to show irreparable harm.

The court granted the respondents' cross-motion, ordering the application to proceed as an action and be consolidated or heard together with the respondents' action, given the overlapping issues, disputed material facts, and need for discoveries.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the plaintiffs' former lawyer had sufficient knowledge of the potential claim more than two years before the action was commenced.

The plaintiffs contended that the information available to their lawyer was insufficient to trigger the limitation period, requiring further expert investigation.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the information known to the plaintiffs' lawyer was merely a suspicion and not enough to establish a plausible inference of liability, especially given the complex technical nature of the tax issue and conflicting professional opinions.

The limitation period was held to have commenced either when further due diligence was decided upon (February 22, 2016) or when a comprehensive expert opinion was provided (February 24, 2017), both dates being within the two-year period.

The accused, facing historical sexual abuse charges, brought an application to exclude a recorded telephone conversation between himself and the complainant.

The accused argued the recording was more prejudicial than probative.

The court found the recording had significant probative value, as the accused's failure to deny the allegations and his apology could be construed as an admission.

The court also found no moral or reasoning prejudice would result from its admission.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, G.D., faced historical sexual abuse charges.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to the complainant, his niece, during two telephone conversations, without proving voluntariness under the confessions rule.

The accused argued the complainant was a "person in authority" because he believed she was a parole officer and could initiate criminal proceedings.

The court examined the "person in authority" requirement, particularly in light of R. v. Hodgson, and concluded that for the confessions rule to apply, the recipient of the statement must actually be an agent of the state or capable of influencing the prosecution, in addition to the accused's reasonable belief.

Since the complainant was not acting on behalf of investigating authorities, her status as a private citizen meant the confessions rule did not apply.

The accused brought a motion to adjourn his criminal jury trial, arguing that the Chief Justice's order excluding unvaccinated individuals from serving as jurors violated his rights under sections 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

The accused contended that the order excluded a particular group of independent-minded people, thereby depriving him of a representative jury.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that vaccination status is not a relevant characteristic for jury representativeness and that the exclusion of unvaccinated individuals does not violate the Charter.

The accused, Rene Hamouth, faced charges of possessing firearms without a license.

Police executed a search warrant at his residence, finding multiple firearms and ammunition.

The defence argued for the exclusion of evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to alleged s. 10(b) infringements, including delayed access to counsel and breaches of the "hold-off" duty.

The court found multiple s. 10(b) breaches by the police, citing lack of diligence in facilitating counsel access and improper questioning.

However, applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the violations and their impact on the accused's Charter rights did not outweigh society's interest in a trial on the merits, especially given the lawful seizure of reliable evidence prior to the breaches.

Consequently, the firearms and ammunition were admitted.

The court then found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding that the prosecution proved constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.