Ontario Land Tribunal
Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire
ISSUE DATE: May 21, 2026
CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000925
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 17(36) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended
Appellant: Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians Subject: Proposed Official Plan Amendment 45 Description: To permit the lands to be developed with a mixed use development (OPA 45) and to permit warehouse use within Site Specific Policy Area 41 of the Official Plan (OPA 42) Reference Number: 30-OP-251164 Property Address: 490 Huron Road Municipality/UT: Kitchener/Waterloo OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000925 OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-25-000925 OLT Case Name: Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians v. Municipal Affairs and Housing (Ministry)
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 17(36) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended
Appellant: Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians Subject: Proposed Official Plan Amendment 42 Description: To permit the lands to be developed with a mixed-use development (OPA 45) and to permit warehouse use within Site Specific Policy Area 41 of the Official Plan (OPA 42) Reference Number: 30-OP-251168 Property Address: 485 Huron Road Municipality/UT: Kitchener/Waterloo OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000926 OLT Lead Case No.: OLT-25-000925
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 9(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6
Appointed by: Ontario Land Tribunal Motion for: Directions Heard: April 30, 2026 by Video Hearing
APPEARANCES:
| Parties | Counsel |
|---|---|
| Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians | Brittiny Rabinovitch, Aaron Gold, Aidan Testa, Student-at-Law |
| Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing | Theresa McGee, Ugo Popadic |
| 2517293 Ontario Inc. | Jennifer Meader, Meredith Baker |
DECISION DELIVERED BY DAVID BROWN AND ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
Link to Final Order
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1The Tribunal initiated a motion (“Motion”) to determine the validity of an appeal filed by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians (“Six Nations”).
22517293 Ontario Inc. (“Applicant”) filed applications to the City of Kitchener (“City”) proposing amendments to the Official Plan (“OPA”) and the Zoning By-law in August of 2022 affecting the lands they own at 490 Huron Road (“Subject Property”).
3Notice of the applications was circulated as prescribed by the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended (“Planning Act”); notice signs were posted on the Subject Property; and the City conducted a Statutory Public Meeting on February 26, 2024. On March 18, 2024, City Council considered the OPA and ZBA, approving the ZBA and adopting Official Plan Amendment No. 45 (“OPA 45”).
4The Six Nations did not make oral or written submissions to Council prior to the adoption of OPA 45.
5OPA 45 was submitted to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing (“Minister”) for approval following changes introduced pursuant to Bill 23, the More Homes Built Faster Act, 2022, which removed planning authority from the Region of Waterloo effective January 1, 2025.
6The Minister approved OPA 45 with no modifications and issued a Notice of Decision pursuant to s. 17(35) of the Planning Act on October 28, 2025.
7The Six Nations filed an appeal pursuant to Section 17(36) of the Planning Act (“Section 17(36)”) in response to the Notice of Decision issued by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (“MMAH”) on November 17, 2025.
8The MMAH forwarded the Notice of Appeal together with the prescribed record to the Tribunal. In its submission to the Tribunal, the MMAH noted what the MMAH described as a deficiency with the Six Nations appeal, that being the Six Nations did not make oral or written submissions to City Council prior to the adoption of OPA 45 by the City. The MMAH cited Section 17(36), setting out that only a public body which before the plan was adopted made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council may appeal the decision of the approval authority.
9The Tribunal issued Notice advising that a Motion for direction, pursuant to its authority set out in s. 9(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c.4, Sched. 6 (“OLTA”), would be heard to determine the validity of the appeal filed by the Six Nations.
10The Tribunal, having considered submissions from the Six Nations, the Applicant, and the MMAH, finds that the appeal filed by the Six Nations is not valid and dismisses the appeal for the reasons set out as follows.
LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT
11Section 17(36) sets out the appeal provisions relating to amendments to an official plan stating:
17(36) Any of the following may, not later than 20 days after the day that the giving of notice under subsection (35) is completed, appeal all or part of the decision of the approval authority to the Tribunal by filing a notice of appeal with the approval authority:
- A specified person who, before the plan was adopted, made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.
1.1 A public body that, before the plan was adopted, made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.
1.2 The registered owner of any land to which the plan would apply, if, before the plan was adopted, the owner made oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.
The Minister.
In the case of a request to amend the plan, the person or public body that made the request.
12For the purposes of this matter, the Tribunal reasons that ss. 17(36) 1.1 is the applicable provision as the Six Nations is defined as a public body in s. 1(1) of the Planning Act.
13Section 19(1) of the OLTA provides the authority for the Tribunal to dismiss an appeal in specified circumstances. Section 19(1) states:
19(1) Subject to subsection (4), the Tribunal may, on the motion of any party or on its own initiative, dismiss a proceeding without a hearing,
(a) if the party who brought the proceeding has not paid any fee required to be paid under this Act;
(b) if the party who brought the proceeding has not responded to a request by the Tribunal for further information within the time specified by the Tribunal;
(b.1) if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the party who brought the proceeding has contributed to undue delay of the proceeding;
(c) if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the proceeding has no reasonable prospect of success;
(d) in any circumstance listed in subsection 4.6 (1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act; or
(e) in any circumstance provided for under any other Act.
14Section 19(1)(d) references s. 4.6(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (“SPPA”) which is set out below:
Subject to subsections (5) and (6), a tribunal may dismiss a proceeding without a hearing if,
(a) the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious or is commenced in bad faith;
(b) the proceeding relates to matters that are outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal; or
(c) some aspect of the statutory requirements for bringing the proceeding has not been met.
15The Tribunal finds that s. 4.6(1)(c) of the SPPA is the applicable consideration of this matter.
SUBMISSIONS
16The Tribunal received Responses to the Motion and Reply Submissions from the Six Nations, the MMAH, and the Applicant. Counsel for the Parties also made oral submissions before the Tribunal.
17The Six Nations contends that the Minister failed to discharge the constitutional duty to consult with the Six Nations prior to the approval of OPA 45. The Subject Lands are situated on the Six Nations treaty lands, and it was only after the Six Nations made inquiries at the City and the MMAH that they were made aware of OPA 45. Notwithstanding that the MMAH was aware of the interest from the Six Nations, the Minister approved OPA 45.
18The Six Nations appealed the decision on the grounds the Crown, represented by the Minister in this instance, did not consult or accommodate the Six Nations prior to making its decision, as required by s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Six Nations submits that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in this matter, and the Tribunal is the proper forum before which the appeal is to be considered. The Six Nations requested that the Tribunal find that the appeal is valid and that the merits of the appeal be adjudicated by the Tribunal.
19The Applicant and the MMAH take the position that requirements of Section 17(36) are clear and only after making an oral or written submission to council prior to the adoption of an amendment to an official plan does a public body crystalize their appeal rights. This statutory requirement has not been met and therefore the appeal is not valid and should be dismissed.
Submissions of Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians
20Brittiny Rabinovitch, Co-Counsel to Six Nations, submitted that the OLTA provides that the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction of all matters in which jurisdiction is conferred on it1 and has “the authority to hear and determine all questions of law and fact with respect to all matters within its jurisdiction unless limited by this or any other Act.”2 Section 17(36) identifies the Tribunal as having the jurisdiction to consider appeals of official plan amendments and does not impose any limitations on the Tribunal’s powers in that regard.
21The Courts have held that the Tribunal is the proper forum to consider the matter over which it has been given jurisdiction, referencing Country Pork Ltd. v. Ashfield (Township)3. Further, the Courts have set out that parties must exhaust such statutory rights and remedies before resorting to the courts, as established in C.B Powell Limited v. Canada (Border Services Agency)4. Ms. Rabinovitch submitted that the Tribunal is the proper forum in which to determine that the appeal is valid and to determine questions of constitutional law.
22Section 17(36) is a remedial provision which must be given a large and liberal interpretation to achieve its objects as directed by s. 64(1) of the Legislation Act, S.O. 2006, c.21, Sched. F (“Legislation Act”). Legislation must be interpreted “according to a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis”5 and “can not be founded on the wording of the legislation alone”6. Ms. Rabinovitch argues that the purpose of Section 17(36) is clear, that only parties which have demonstrated an interest in the matter under consideration can appeal the decision.
23The Subject Property is located within the treaty and traditional territory of the Six Nations, and as such, the Six Nations has a clear interest in the development of these lands, which the Minister knew prior to making the decision. Ms. Rabinovitch submits that both the City and the Minister are obligated to consult and accommodate the Six Nations. Further, the Six Nations made its interests known through correspondence with the MMAH and City staff, clearly demonstrating their interest in the matter. The denial of the right of the Six Nations to appeal undermines the purpose of the Planning Act and the Tribunal’s remedial authority.
24Ms. Rabinovitch contends that the City failed to notify the Six Nations despite being statutorily obligated to do so and that the MMAH is also obligated to consult with the Six Nations prior to making any decisions that affect the rights of Indigenous communities7 and also failed to do so. The Six Nations does not accept that the City’s nor the MMAH’s failure to meet the statutory requirement to notify nor the constitutional duty to consult results in the denial of access to the Tribunal and thereby overrides the Planning Act’s remedial authority.
25In Zantingh v. Sarnia (City)8 (“Zantingh”) the Tribunal ruled that procedural failures on the part of the City do not foreclose a statutory appeal route. Section 17(36) is structured to facilitate participation in the land use planning process, including exercising appeal rights, and Ms. Rabinovitch submits that a proper interpretation cannot allow, where a First Nation (a public body) has not been notified as constitutionally and statutorily mandated, to then be barred from participating in the land use planning process.
26Section 17(36) must be considered in the context of the statute as a whole9, which directs challenges by interested parties to the Tribunal, which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the matter. An interpretation that is at odds with the purpose and context “cannot prevail” over one that aligns with the goals of the statutory scheme10. Ms. Rabinovitch submitted that considering an unduly narrow and technical interpretation of only the bare text being advanced by the Applicant and the MMAH would be at odds with these core principles of statutory interpretation. A liberal interpretation, consistent with the purpose of Section 17(36), exercising the Tribunal’s broad jurisdiction and authority consistent with the principles of statutory interpretation, allows the submission and consideration of the appeal.
27The Six Nations should not be prevented from filing an appeal having only been made aware of the adoption of OPA 45 by City Council after they contacted the MMAH.
28Aaron Gold, Co-Counsel for the Six Nations, submitted that the Applicant, in seeking an alternative Order from the Tribunal in the Applicant’s Response to the Motion pleadings dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the appeal filed by the Six Nations “does not disclose any apparent land use planning ground upon which the Tribunal could allow all or part of the appeal and therefore has not reasonable prospect of success”11, attorns to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
29Mr. Gold argued that the Applicant’s extensive submissions on the merits of the appeal, which are not relevant to the question of jurisdiction currently before the Tribunal, effectively attorns the jurisdiction to the Tribunal to consider the appeal on its merits, waiving the jurisdiction question of the validity of the appeal. In the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision Kunuthur v. Govindareddigari, the Court found in paragraph 18, “A party attorns to courts jurisdiction when it goes beyond simply challenging the jurisdiction of that court and, instead, litigates a claim on the merits…”12 and Mr. Gold submits that the Applicant in seeking an alternative order is litigating the claim on the merits and not simply challenging the jurisdiction.
Submissions of 2517293 Ontario Inc. (Applicant)
30Jennifer Meader, Counsel for the Applicant, submits that the plain reading of Section 17(36) is that only a public body which made written or oral submissions to the council before the plan was adopted may appeal the decision. The Six Nations, a public body, did not make written or oral submissions to City Council prior to its adoption of OPA 45. Ms. Meader contends that there is no ambiguity in the statute, and the Tribunal can not consider the appeal as this statutory requirement has not been met.
31Ms. Meader directed the Tribunal to case law addressing this exact question and submits that it is settled law that Section 17(36) is non-discretionary and cannot be waived.
32The Superior Court of Justice, in 1884901 Alberta Ltd. v. Park2Sky Inc.13 (“Park2Sky”), described the list of persons who may appeal a zoning by-law as “exhaustive”. Ms. Meader submits that Section 17(36) provides a very similar list of persons who may appeal an official plan amendment including a public body. The Superior Court commented on the validity of the appeal, referencing Divisional Court decision Liddy v. Vaughan (City)14 (“Liddy”).
33In Liddy, the Divisional Court held that there is no discretion to depart from the requirement that a valid appeal requires the appellant to make a submission to council at the meeting at which the matter is being considered15.
34Ms. Meader submits that the Tribunal need only rely on Section 17(36) to make its determination on the validity of the appeal as there is no discretion in the application of the authority set out in the section. A public body has standing to bring an appeal only if they make submissions in writing or orally to council prior to the adoption of the amendment. The Six Nations did not make submissions to council before the adoption of the amendment and therefore the appeal is not valid.
35Ms. Meader referred the Tribunal to the Ryan Humberstone v. Halton Hills (Town)16 (“Humberstone”) decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (“Board”) where, at paragraph 8, the Board reasoned as follows:
Thus the law is clear, through a plain reading of the Act, the consistent findings of the Board, and the binding decision of the Divisional Court, that an appeal is valid only if the person filing the appeal has satisfied the prerequisite conditions of the Act. The Board has no discretion in dismissing an appeal where the appellant did not participate in the process before the council made its decision. To find otherwise, the Board would be creating an appeal, for which it has no jurisdiction.
36And in Cheryl Batten et al v. Lanark (County)17, Ms. Meader submits that the Tribunal followed the jurisprudence when dismissing an appeal of an official plan amendment where the appellant had not made written or oral submissions before the amendments were adopted by council. At Paragraph 33 of the Decision, the Tribunal sets out:
The requirement to make submissions to Council has been strictly applied by the Tribunal to ensure that matters are decided at the first instance by Members of Municipal Council as a whole who are elected and accountable to the public to have the best interests of their community at the forefront. For example, attending a Public Information Centre or Open House and informally speaking to Councilors at that event has been found not to meet the requirement. The Tribunal finds that ad hoc meetings and emails with Planning Staff outside of the formal public meeting and review process of Council are not sufficient to grant Pegasus standing for this Appeal as it does not constitute “oral submissions at a public meeting or written submissions to the council.”
37Ms. Meader contends that the case law is clear that the Six Nations appeal is not valid as they have not met the statutory requirement to secure standing to file an appeal.
38Ms. Meader responded to the contention of the Six Nations that Zantingh supports the Tribunal’s validation of the appeal. Ms. Meader asserts that the case currently before the Tribunal is very different in that the appellant in Zantingh had made written submissions to the city prior to the approval of the application which fulfilled the statutory requirement, thus confirming the appellant’s standing to file an appeal. The Six Nations made no oral or written submissions prior to the adoption of the OPA 45 by the City and Ms. Meader submits that the Tribunal’s finding in Zantingh supports that the Six Nations has no standing to file an appeal and therefore the appeal should be dismissed.
39The Applicant requests that the Tribunal dismiss the Six Nations appeal as they do not meet the requirements set out in Section 17(36).
Submissions of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing
40Theresa McGee, Counsel for the MMAH, submitted that there is no dispute amongst the Parties that:
- the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to consider the matter;
- the Tribunal has jurisdiction to address questions of law, including the Constitution Act, 1982, when considering an appeal;
- Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 does not carve out a special path to appeal under statute;
- there are no constitutional questions to decide upon in the Motion; and
- there are no challenges to the legislation under consideration before the Tribunal.
41Ms. McGee contends that the question before the Tribunal is whether there is discretion in the interpretation of Section 17(36).
42Ms. McGee echoed the submissions of the Applicant, reiterating that the Divisional Court held in Liddy18 and again in Park2Sky19 that an appeal filed by an individual, or as applicable in this matter, a public body, that has not met the requirement of making written or oral submissions to council prior to the adoption of an amendment set out s. 17(36) is not a valid appeal. Ms. McGee submits that the Tribunal does not have the discretion to waive this requirement as it is absolute and not provisional.
43Further, Ms. McGee submits that there is a long history of jurisprudence in Tribunal decisions and the decisions of its predecessors in which the Tribunal has concluded that there is no discretion in the application of Section 17(36), specifically referencing the findings of Humberstone20.
44It is settled law that the Tribunal has only the jurisdiction conferred on it by legislation and cannot create appeal rights. A non-mandatory requirement is a contradiction, and Ms. McGee submits that applying the discretion sought by the Six Nations would result in unfettered appeals being filed, which is clearly not what the Legislation intends.
45Section 19 of the OLTA addresses a broad range of matters to allow effective case management by the Tribunal and Ms. McGee submits that it does not waive statutory requirements. Section 17(36) has the effect of requiring interested parties to participate early in planning process and waiving the requirements would result in no timeframe or restriction on one’s involvement in the planning process. Ms. McGee submits that this would effectively render the section useless and that is not what was intended by the Legislature.
46The Legislation Act establishes that every word of a statute has purpose, and Ms. McGee contends that the Legislature intentionally restricted participation in the appeal process of the official plan amendment process, arguing that there is no alternative interpretation of Section 17(36).
47In consideration of the Notice requirements, Ms. McGee contends that the Planning Act does not establish any specific notice provisions for First Nations beyond those requirements prescribed. The evidence of the Affiant, Pooneh Derakhshan, is that the City provided notice of the application in accordance with the Planning Act, and no evidence has been proffered to the contrary.
48Ms. McGee concluded, stating that the case law provides clear direction on the interpretation and application of Section 17(36) and the matter before the Tribunal is clear, the appeal filed by the Six Nations is not valid and should be dismissed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
49Section 17(36) requires the prerequisite that any prospective appellant wishing to file an appeal must make submissions to the council before the amendment to the plan is adopted by the council. The Tribunal and its predecessors, the LPAT and the OMB, have consistently found, and the Divisional Court has held, that this requirement of the Planning Act is clear and unambiguous.
50The Tribunal finds that there is no discretion in applying Section 17(36) in this instance. To have standing to file an appeal, a prospective appellant must have made submissions, either orally or in writing, to the council prior to the adoption of the amendment.
51There is no dispute amongst the Parties in this proceeding that the Six Nations did not make submissions to the City Council prior to the adoption of OPA 45.
52No evidence was submitted confirming whether the Six Nations was circulated notice of the OPA by the City prior to its adoption of OPA 45. The City did not participate in the Motion and did not make submissions before the Tribunal. The Six Nations argued that the MMAH was notified of their interest in the matter prior to the Minister’s approval of OPA 45 and that the Minister, as an agent of the Crown, ought to have engaged in consultation and did not.
53The Tribunal is not being asked to confirm whether the City or the MMAH notified or consulted the Six Nations or whether they failed to execute their statutory responsibilities or constitutional duties. The matter before the Tribunal is the determination of the validity of the appeal filed by the Six Nations pursuant to Section 17(36).
54This Member holds that, as the Tribunal found in Verhart v. Chatham-Kent (Municipality)21, complaints about municipal process do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to provide any relief. Further, this Member holds that, as the LPAT found in Morais v. Georgina after considering the submission of the Town’s Counsel, the courts maintain jurisdiction and the power to determine a by-law’s validity22.
55The Divisional Court in Liddy23 reasoned that, “the standing provisions […] should be seen as a liberalization of ordinary standing principles, tailored to the unique context of planning law. It was reasonable for the Board to interpret this liberalized provision as it did.”
56The Tribunal finds that the assertions of the Six Nations that Section 17(36) provides the flexibility to permit an appeal when notice was not provided as required by s. 17(21) of the Planning Act creates a contradiction. Arguing that the failure to comply with one section of the Planning Act supports not complying with a subsequent section is not a reasonable argument in the Tribunal’s view. The old adage, “two wrongs don’t make a right” comes to mind.
57Section 19(1)(d) of the OLTA empowers the Tribunal to dismiss an appeal without a hearing where s. 4.6(1)(c) of the SPPA applies. Section 4.6(1)(c) authorizes that a tribunal may dismiss proceedings without a hearing if some aspect of the statutory requirements for bringing the proceeding has not been met.
58The Tribunal reasons that it is not necessary to rely on s. 4.6(1) of the SPPA or s.19(1) of the OLTA to determine the validity of the appeal; however, the Tribunal notes the significance of compliance with statutory requirements, as the SPPA reinforces the requirement, and this is further supported by the reference in the OLTA in s. 19(1)(d).
59Failure to consult and accommodate First Nations is a procedural matter. The Tribunal does not challenge nor question the Six Nations’ interest in the development of the Subject Property; however, the interest in the development is not the question before the Tribunal. The question is, does the appeal meet the statutory test as set out in Section 17(36). The uncontroverted evidence before the Tribunal is that the appeal does not, and therefore the Tribunal must find that the appeal is not a valid appeal.
Alternative Motion to Dismiss / Attorning of Jurisdiction
60In the Applicant’s Response to the Motion pleadings, the Applicant sought an alternative motion in the event that the Tribunal determined that the Six Nations appeal was valid. The Applicant requested the Tribunal dismiss the appeal pursuant to s. 17(45)1.i. and ii., which provide as follows:
(45) Despite the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and subsection (44), the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the motion of any party, dismiss all or part of an appeal without holding a hearing if any of the following apply:
- The Tribunal is of the opinion that,
i. the reasons set out in the notice of appeal do not disclose any apparent land use planning ground upon which the plan or part of the plan that is the subject of the appeal could be approved or refused by the Tribunal,
ii. the appeal is not made in good faith or is frivolous or vexatious[.]
61The Tribunal does not find that the Applicant has attorned jurisdiction to the Tribunal in this matter with the filing of an alternative motion. The Tribunal ruled at the outset of the Motion proceedings that the alternative motion would not be addressed during the proceedings related to the Tribunal-initiated Motion for direction with respect to the validity of the appeal. The Tribunal advised that only the Tribunal’s Motion would be considered during these proceedings, and, dependent on the outcome of the Tribunal’s Motion, a determination with respect to the alternative Motion would be addressed.
62The Tribunal, having considered the submissions of the Six Nations, finds that the notice of appeal, filed pursuant to Section 17(36), is focussed on the interactions and correspondence with the MMAH and the City as constituting submissions prior to the approval of the OPA 45.
63On the plain reading of Section 17(36), the Tribunal holds that the Planning Act is specific to submissions made to council prior to the adoption of the amendment. The Tribunal reasons that, had the Legislature intended to allow for submissions to other than “council”, it would have used the term “approval authority” or “the Minister”, as it has done in other subsections within s. 17 of the Planning Act. Further, had the Legislature intended to provide for submissions prior to the approval by these respective authorities, the Legislature would have provided additional language and provisions setting out an appeal route. The Tribunal finds that the intent of the Legislature is clear, that submissions are to be made to council prior to the adoption of the amendment to have standing to file an appeal.
64As the Tribunal has concluded that the Six Nations does not have standing to file an appeal, there is no need for the Tribunal to consider whether the appeal filed by the Six Nations raises any land use planning grounds or whether the appeal is frivolous.
65Notwithstanding the Notice of Appeal filed by the Six Nations and the content of their pleadings, no submissions with respect to a Constitutional challenge were raised during the proceedings.
66The Tribunal finds that the appeal is not valid and accordingly the appeal filed by the Six Nations is dismissed.
ORDER
67UPON APPEAL to this Tribunal by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians of the decision of the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing to approve Official Plan Amendment No. 45 to the City of Kitchener Official Plan;
68AND UPON the Motion of the Ontario Land Tribunal for an Order directing the validity of the appeal filed by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians under subsection 9(1) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act;
69AND THE TRIBUNAL having provided the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians, the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, and 2517293 Ontario Inc. with the opportunity to provide written submissions in accordance with subsection 19(2) of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, and the Tribunal having considered the responses by the Parties;
70THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT the appeal by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians is dismissed.
“David Brown”
DAVID BROWN MEMBER Ontario Land Tribunal
Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248
The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.
Footnotes
- Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021 S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6, Section 8(1)
- Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021 S.O. 2021, c. 4, Sched. 6, Section 8(2)
- Country Pork Ltd. v. Ashfield (Township), 2002 CanLII 41578 (ON CA), para. 32
- C.B. Powell Limited v. Canada (Border Services Agency), 2010 FCA 61, para. 4
- Piekut v. Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13, para. 43
- supra, para. 44
- Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 SCR, para. 40
- Zantingh v. Sarnia (City), 2021, CanLII 41866 (ON LPAT), para. 28-29
- Reference re iGaming Ontario, 2025 ONCA 770, para.141
- La Presse inc. v. Quebec, 2023 SCC 22, para. 30
- Planning Act, Section 17(45)1.i. and ii.
- Kunuthur v. Govindareddigari, 2018 ONCA 730, para.18
- 1884901 Alberta Ltd. v. Park2Sky Inc. et al, 2020 ONSC 259, para. 10
- Liddy v. City of Vaughan, Ontario Municipal Board and Vaughan Health Campus of Care and Mackenzie Health, 2015 ONSC 5939
- Liddy, supra, para.6
- Ryan Humberstone v. Halton Hills (Town), 2017 CanLII 85736 (ON LPAT)
- Cheryl Batten et al v Lanark (County), 2025 CanLII 2775 (ON LT), para. 33
- Liddy, supra, para. 6
- Park2Sky, supra, para. 12
- Humberstone, supra, para. 8
- Verhart v. Chatham-Kent (Municipality), 2023 CanLII 5435 (ON LT) para. 33
- Morais v Georgina (Town) [2012] O.M.B.D. No. 926, par. 40 and 41
- Liddy, supra, par. 9

