Jennifer Woollcombe

Summary conviction appeal from a conviction entered after a guilty plea to operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The appellant argued that the trial judge wrongly refused a day-of-trial adjournment to retain counsel and that the plea was uninformed because he did not understand the immigration consequences of conviction.

The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing the adjournment, given the age of the charges, the absence of diligence in retaining counsel, and the readiness of the witnesses and Crown to proceed.

The court further held that the appellant was sufficiently aware that a criminal conviction could carry serious immigration consequences, and in any event failed to establish credible subjective prejudice showing a reasonable possibility that he would have proceeded differently.

The applicant, convicted of planned and deliberate first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for judicial screening of a "faint hope" application to reduce his parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the statutory factors under ss. 745.61 and 745.63, including the horrific nature of the offence, the applicant's post-offence conduct, his purported acceptance of responsibility and remorse, his conduct in custody, victim impact evidence, and risk assessments.

Despite acknowledging some genuine progress in custody and low to low-moderate risk of reoffending, the court found that the applicant's late-breaking claim of remorse was opportunistic and not genuine, his criminal thinking remained entrenched, and there was no reasonable prospect a unanimous jury would reduce his parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder of his former domestic partner.

The victim was killed in her home in a brutal attack involving multiple stab wounds and near-decapitation.

The offender had a documented history of violence and threats toward the victim, breached court-ordered no-contact conditions, and committed the murder while the victim's young child was present in the home.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility of 18 years, reduced from 20 years due to Charter violations arising from the offender's mistreatment during an Institutional Crisis Intervention Team deployment at Maplehurst Correctional Centre.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference following a trial before Justice E. Allen on March 7, 2024.

The charges arose from an incident at a wave pool on July 30, 2022, where the appellant allegedly touched a 13-year-old complainant's genital area over her bathing suit.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) insufficient reasons regarding mens rea; (2) improper admission of post-offence conduct in videotaped statements under s. 715.1 and failure to consider alternative inferences; and (3) improper credibility contest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court found the trial judge's reasons were factually and legally sufficient in context, the videotaped statements were properly admitted, and the trial judge did not reverse the onus of proof or improperly engage in a credibility contest.

The court sentenced Calvin Au, a Toronto Police Service officer, for assaulting Chadd Facey after a failed transaction involving a fake watch.

The court found Au used excessive force in taking Facey to the ground, though not in his capacity as a police officer.

The sentence imposed was a suspended sentence and 12 months probation, with ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The decision discusses the aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact on the victim’s family and community, and the heightened standards for police officers convicted of assault.

This endorsement addresses a media request for the release of exhibits from the sentencing hearing in R. v. Ritchie.

The court permitted the release of all exhibits to the media, subject to privacy protections for inmates and the victim’s child, and restrictions on the publication of certain sensitive materials, including medical and psychiatric reports.

The order was made with the consent of all parties involved.

The accused, an off-duty police officer, was charged with assault causing bodily harm after taking down a 19-year-old who had sold a fake Apple watch to his colleague.

The accused pursued the seller and tackled him to the ground after the colleague had already retrieved the money.

The court rejected the accused's defences under sections 25 (lawful arrest) and 35 (defence of property) of the Criminal Code, finding he did not intend to arrest the seller and the force used was excessive.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the takedown caused the victim's head bruise.

The accused was found not guilty of assault causing bodily harm, but guilty of the included offence of assault.

Jarnail Randhawa pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his wife.

The court determined the parole ineligibility period, which is statutorily set at a minimum of 10 years, considering aggravating factors such as the brutality of the attack, gratuitous violence, abuse of trust, and leaving the victim to die, as well as mitigating factors including the guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior criminal record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The court delivered oral reasons for sentence after Roger Jaggernauth was found guilty of attempted murder and counselling to commit murder.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a total sentence of 16.5 years custody, with credit for pre-sentencing custody.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the devastating impact on the victim, the domestic context of the offences, the victim's vulnerability, the fact the attack occurred at her home, and the extensive planning involved in the contract hit.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, pro-social history, and time spent on house arrest.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it proportionate and consistent with sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.

H.P. was found guilty of five sexual offences against his stepdaughter, with two counts conditionally stayed.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the breach of trust, and the protracted nature of the abuse.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of criminal record, pro-social life, and low risk of re-offending.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing that such sentences are rarely appropriate for sexual violence against children, and imposed a sentence of four and a half years of incarceration.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a non-communication order, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The court granted an exemption from SOIRA registration due to the low risk of re-offending but imposed specific s. 161 prohibitions to protect children.

The appellant, Matthew Priestley-Campbell, appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand under s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

He alleged errors by the trial judge regarding the proof of the ASD's possession, credibility assessment of witnesses, and a s. 10(b) Charter violation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the officer's testimony was sufficient to prove ASD possession, her credibility assessment was reasonable, and there was no Charter breach.

The appellant, Wojciech Kuleczka, appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision to impose a one-year weapons prohibition and forfeit seized firearms under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The original decision was based on concerns about the appellant's mental stability, specifically detailed hallucinations he experienced, which led to high-risk police responses.

The appellant argued the Justice unreasonably inferred risk from his mental health history and misapprehended evidence from his doctors.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Justice's conclusion reasonable given the unexplained nature of the hallucinations and the potential for recurrence, which raised legitimate public safety concerns despite the appellant's lack of prior violence or misuse of firearms.

The accused, Roger Jaggernauth, was charged with attempted murder and counselling to commit murder.

The charges stemmed from a crossbow attack on Marlene Pimenta, his former partner, following a contentious separation and family law dispute over her financial investment in his home.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including Jaggernauth's strong motive, his solicitation of a "hitman" from a former biker club member (Paul Eakin), threatening utterances to his work supervisor (David Allan), and "heat conscious" after-the-fact conduct prior to being officially contacted by police.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence, viewed holistically, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jaggernauth orchestrated the attack with intent to kill and deliberately counselled murder.

The applicant, Dean McAlpine, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of ss. 7 (excessive force during arrest) and 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found that the police used excessive force by deploying a taser drive stun after the applicant was compliant, breaching his s. 7 rights.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, as the applicant was offered a call to duty counsel when he could not provide his chosen counsel's full details, and privacy was afforded.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence, finding that a sentence reduction would be the appropriate remedy for the s. 7 breach.

Henry Morales was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder of his wife, Malena Morales, committed in 2006.

The court imposed a mandatory life sentence and determined the parole ineligibility period.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence argued for 12 years, reduced from 13 due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered aggravating factors, including domestic violence, abuse of trust, the presence of children during the murder, and post-offence conduct (staging the scene, flight to Mexico).

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, genuine remorse, pro-social behaviour while in Mexico, and participation in rehabilitation programs.

The court also extensively discussed whether harsh pre-sentence custody conditions could be a mitigating factor for parole ineligibility, concluding they could.

Ultimately, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, commencing February 20, 2020.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Syed Rizvi, on a charge of excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a s. 10(b) Charter breach (right to counsel) and in excluding breath samples.

The Crown also sought a "bright line rule" for police wait times for counsel of choice in impaired driving cases.

The Superior Court of Justice declined to set a rigid timeline, emphasizing that the "reasonable opportunity" for counsel is fact and context-specific.

The court found that the trial judge erred in concluding a s. 10(b) breach, as the respondent chose to speak with duty counsel after police made reasonable efforts to contact his chosen lawyers, and this choice did not constitute a waiver requiring a specific warning.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, a conviction entered, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed a decision staying sexual offence charges against the respondent for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was under the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the application judge erred by failing to attribute a 42-day period to defence delay when the defence rejected earlier trial dates offered by the Crown.

The Court also found that the application judge erred in his under-the-ceiling analysis by failing to properly consider local circumstances in Brampton, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Crown's proactive steps to secure earlier dates.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

J.S. appealed his sentence for possession of child pornography and voyeurism, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not considering a conditional sentence, misassessing *Friesen* factors, and not giving enough weight to injuries suffered in custody.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding the sentencing judge implicitly rejected a conditional sentence, correctly applied *Friesen* factors, and adequately considered the collateral consequences of the appellant's injuries by imposing a sentence at the low end of the range.

The court affirmed the original sentence and recommended protective custody for the appellant.

The accused, H.P., was charged with five sexual offences against his step-daughter, K.T., including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, spanning from June 2018 to February 2020.

The trial focused on the credibility of the complainant's testimony versus the accused's denials.

The court found the complainant's evidence compelling and reliable, supported by an audio recording, and rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and fabricated.

H.P. was found guilty on all five counts.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling on the admissibility of WhatsApp messages between the complainant and the respondent in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown argued that the respondent's silence in response to the complainant's direct allegation of non-consensual sexual activity in the messages constituted an adoptive admission.

The motion also addressed the admissibility of implied "other sexual activity" (paternity testing) within the messages, engaging s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the respondent's silence could reasonably be considered an adoptive admission by a jury.

The court also ruled that the evidence of paternity testing was admissible as critical background, with proper jury instructions to prevent twin myth reasoning.

The defence was permitted to adduce evidence of any prior denials by the respondent.