Daniel Guttman

The appellant, Gary Hoffman, appealed his manslaughter conviction, raising three grounds: the trial judge's failure to give a W.(D.) direction regarding exculpatory evidence from a key witness (Peter Ojha), a misdirection on double hearsay contained in Ojha's K.G.B. statement, and a constitutional challenge to the Ontario Juries Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the constitutional challenge but found errors in the jury instructions regarding the W.(D.) direction and double hearsay.

The court held that a W.(D.) direction is required for exculpatory evidence from any witness, even if that witness also provides inculpatory evidence or if the exculpatory evidence relates to only one theory of culpability.

It also clarified that if a jury finds a K.G.B. statement to be based on double hearsay, they must disregard it entirely, rather than merely considering it for reliability.

Consequently, the manslaughter conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of a Reference Judge upholding the Chief Firearms Officer's refusal to renew his firearms licence.

The refusal was based on three past incidents of alleged domestic violence that resulted in criminal charges, which were ultimately withdrawn but led to two peace bonds.

The appellant argued the Firearms Officer unreasonably relied on unsworn police reports and withdrawn charges.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Firearms Officer reasonably considered the cumulative effect of the incidents and peace bonds in determining that issuing the licence was not in the interests of public safety.

The applicant church sought $75,000 in costs after being unsuccessful on an urgent application for an interim injunction to stay COVID-19 restrictions on in-person religious services.

The church argued costs were warranted because the case raised a novel issue of significant public importance.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the injunction application focused on the narrow interests of the church rather than broad public interest, and turned on settled legal principles rather than novel issues.

No costs were awarded to either party for the injunction application.

The applicant church sought an interim injunction to exempt it from O. Reg. 82/20, which restricted religious gatherings to a maximum of ten people in regions designated as Stage 1 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The church argued the regulation infringed its freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the church established a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm.

However, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, as the public interest in protecting health and preventing the spread of COVID-19 outweighed the temporary restriction on the church's religious freedom.

The application for an interim injunction was dismissed.

The applicant, a former postsecondary student with disabilities, brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) and the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP).

The applicant argued that the 'time in study' structure of the programs disproportionately burdened students with disabilities, who often take longer to complete their studies and thus accrue more debt.

The court found that while the legislation establishing the CSLP did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, the operation and administration of the program infringed the applicant's equality rights by failing to redress the additional debt she accrued due to her disabilities.

The court held that this infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court granted declaratory relief and ordered the return of monies paid by the applicant pursuant to the unconstitutional operation of the CSLP, but denied her request for Charter damages.

The applicant, a monocular bus driver, challenged the constitutionality of the vision standards in s. 18(3) of the Drivers' Licences Regulations under s. 15 of the Charter.

The regulations imposed a blanket prohibition on monocular individuals holding a Class C commercial driver's licence.

The court found that the regulations substantively discriminated against the applicant based on her physical disability by perpetuating the stereotype that all monocular drivers are unsafe, without allowing for individual assessment.

The court further held that the infringement was not minimally impairing and therefore not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the regulations unconstitutional but suspended the declaration for 12 months to allow the government to amend the legislation, denying the applicant's request for an immediate individual exemption.

This proposed class action concerned the alleged retention of DNA profiles by the Province of Ontario after individuals voluntarily provided samples for forensic DNA analysis that did not match any samples obtained under the Criminal Code.

The plaintiff moved for certification of the action, alleging breach of the Criminal Code, violation of section 8 of the Charter, and intrusion upon seclusion.

The defendant consented to certification shortly before the scheduled hearing.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding and addressed two outstanding issues: costs of the certification motion and the temporal limit of the proposed class.

The court adopted a hybrid approach for costs, ordering half payable forthwith and half in the cause, and fixed the quantum at $124,504.38.

The court also ordered that the temporal limit of the class definition be "without prejudice to the plaintiff bringing a future motion within this proceeding to certify an amended class" to protect future class members.

The court heard multiple motions to strike claims against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ), various Children's Aid Societies (CAS), and an expert witness (Julia Klein).

These claims arose from the use of unreliable hair follicle drug testing by the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory in child welfare investigations and proceedings, leading to children's apprehension and, in some cases, Crown wardship.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of Charter rights, bad faith, and other torts against the defendants.

The court granted all motions to strike, finding that HMQ and the CAS did not owe a private law duty of care to the parents or children in their supervisory or investigative roles, as their paramount duty was to the child's best interests.

Many claims were also deemed impermissible collateral attacks on existing court orders.

The claim against the expert witness, Julia Klein, was struck due to witness immunity and a lack of causal connection between her testimony and the alleged damages.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a Charter challenge against the jury panel, alleging violations of ss. 11(d) and 11(f) due to the Province of Ontario's jury source list compilation methods.

The applicant contended that the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) process systematically under-included non-property owners and, consequently, black individuals in Peel, creating an appearance of partiality.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the state made reasonable efforts to ensure a broad cross-section of society for jury selection.

The statistical evidence presented was deemed confusing and contradictory, and ultimately did not support the applicant's claims of under-representation of renters or black individuals.

The court emphasized that representativeness focuses on the process of casting a wide net, not on achieving proportional representation of specific groups.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutional validity of section 4(b) of the Juries Act (Ontario).

The applicant argued that this provincial legislation, which disqualifies individuals convicted of an indictable offence from jury service, creates an operational conflict with section 638(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which allows for challenges for cause only for those sentenced to imprisonment exceeding twelve months.

The applicant contended that the provincial law unduly narrows the jury pool and infringes on federal jurisdiction over criminal procedure.

The Crown argued that the provincial legislation is a valid exercise of power over the administration of justice and does not conflict with or frustrate the purpose of the federal law.

The court dismissed the application, finding no operational conflict or frustration of federal purpose, as the provincial and federal laws govern different aspects of jury selection and can coexist.

Enrique Kachuka brought a motion under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude seized currency as evidence in a forfeiture application by the Attorney General of Ontario under the Civil Remedies Act.

Kachuka argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrants of his vehicle and apartment was legally insufficient, leading to an unreasonable search and seizure in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

He also contended that police breached his s. 8 rights by submitting a report of seized items past the statutory deadline and with technical errors.

The court found that the issuing Justice of the Peace had reasonable grounds to issue the search warrants, as police surveillance and corroborated confidential informant information established a sufficient nexus between observed drug transactions and Kachuka's apartment.

The court also determined that the reporting delays and errors did not constitute a meaningful infringement of s. 8 rights, as there was no residual privacy interest in the seized cash.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the forfeiture application was to proceed.

The appellant, Furkan Karatekin, appealed his conviction and nine-month imprisonment sentence for sexual assault.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's credibility findings were fundamentally flawed due to misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence testimony, and improper use of the appellant's police statement.

The trial judge's reasoning regarding the appellant's cellphone number explanation, ankle injury, and police statement was deemed problematic.

The cumulative effect of these palpable and overriding errors rendered the conviction unsafe.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

A lawyer appealed the dismissal of an application for a declaration that sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge found the appellant lacked both private and public interest standing to bring the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the impugned provisions affected him personally and directly, and that his scholarly contributions and representation of affected clients did not establish a genuine interest in the outcome or demonstrate that the application was a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Various public interest groups brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a Charter challenge regarding the application of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to administrative tribunals.

The court granted leave to intervene on consent to several groups.

For the contested proposed intervenors, the court granted leave to the Ontario Judicial Council and Justice for Children and Youth, finding they would bring unique perspectives and expertise.

The court denied leave to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario and the Workers' Health and Safety Legal Clinic, finding their proposed contributions would be largely repetitive of positions already represented by other parties and intervenors.

The applicant moved to strike portions of an affidavit filed by the respondent Attorney General.

The underlying application involves a Charter challenge to the application of FIPPA to certain quasi-judicial tribunals.

The parties had previously agreed to limit the scope of the application to 16 specific tribunals.

The impugned affidavit evidence detailed the procedures of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which was not one of the 16 listed tribunals.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence improperly expanded the scope of the application contrary to a prior case management endorsement.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of domestic assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct without a voir dire, engaged in impermissible propensity reasoning, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the extrinsic evidence was properly admitted as narrative context, the trial judge did not engage in propensity reasoning, and the credibility findings were grounded in the evidence.

This decision concerns a costs award following the dismissal of the applicant's constitutional challenge to sections of the Insurance Act.

The court had previously found the applicant lacked standing and that the challenge failed on its merits.

The applicant argued for no costs, citing public interest, or a reduced award based on public sector salaries of Crown counsel.

The court rejected both arguments, stating that the litigation was speculative and without merit, and that costs for Crown lawyers are not reduced due to their salaried status.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable by the applicant to the Province of Ontario, which represented approximately one-third of a reasonable claim.

The applicants challenged s. 65(5.7) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA), which excludes all records relating to abortion services, arguing it violated their s. 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression by impeding meaningful public discussion.

The court found that the provision substantially impeded meaningful debate on a matter of public interest, establishing a prima facie breach of s. 2(b).

While the objective of protecting privacy and safety was pressing, the absolute exclusion of all records, including non-identifying statistical information, was not rationally connected, minimally impairing, or proportional to the objective.

The court declared s. 65(5.7) of FIPPA to be of no force or effect, suspending the declaration for 12 months to allow the legislature to enact remedial legislation.

The applicant, a personal injury lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act, which limit pre-trial recovery of lost income and grant sole jurisdiction to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule disputes, respectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

On the merits, the court found no breach of sections 15(1) or 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor a violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the impugned provisions did not create distinctions based on prohibited grounds, deprive individuals of life, liberty, or security of the person, or usurp superior court jurisdiction for a novel area of law.

At a preliminary case management conference, the parties agreed to a timetable for the application.

The parties also agreed to limit the scope of the constitutional challenge regarding the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to the 16 quasi-judicial tribunals specifically named in Schedule 'A' of the Notice of Application, rather than applying it broadly to all similarly situated tribunals.