Nicola Brankley

His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario appealed a decision denying a declaration that its general liability insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, had a duty to defend Ontario in a class action.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in interpreting the Second Policy's Personal Injury coverage, which did not include the "neither expected nor intended" limitation applicable to Bodily Injury.

However, the appeal was ultimately dismissed because the claim for coverage under the Second Policy was premature.

Ontario had not yet incurred the $5,000,000 "Ultimate Net Loss" self-insured retention, which included defence costs, required to trigger St. Paul's duty to defend.

The plaintiff, a newly formed lacrosse league, sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend the defendant's regulations that penalized players for participating in competing leagues.

The plaintiff argued the regulations constituted intentional interference with economic relations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the defendant was merely enforcing long-standing rules and not intentionally targeting the plaintiff.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the defendant, as suspending the rules would destabilize its established organization.

A class representative of Mr. Sub franchisees appealed the Court of Appeal's dismissal of their negligence claim against an exclusive meat supplier following a 2008 listeria recall that caused significant economic losses.

The majority held that the supplier owed no duty of care to the franchisees in respect of pure economic losses because the parties lacked the proximity required under the Anns/Cooper framework.

The majority found that neither the negligent misrepresentation nor the negligent supply of shoddy goods categories of pure economic loss applied, and that the multipartite contractual matrix — under which the franchisees could have sought alternative supply sources — precluded a finding of proximity.

The dissent would have recognized a novel duty of care arising from the close and direct relationship between the exclusive supplier and the franchisees who were contractually bound to purchase exclusively from it.

The appeal was dismissed five-to-four, with costs.

The Graywood defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action in tort, arguing it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs claimed property damage to their restaurant, Kit Kat Bar & Grill, caused by the adjacent construction of a high-rise condominium by the Graywood defendants.

The court found that the plaintiffs had discovered their claim by March 11, 2014, at the latest, when they reported significant damage to their insurer and believed the construction was the cause.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that ongoing settlement discussions or the lack of an expert report postponed the limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the Graywood defendants.

The court heard multiple motions to strike claims against Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (HMQ), various Children's Aid Societies (CAS), and an expert witness (Julia Klein).

These claims arose from the use of unreliable hair follicle drug testing by the Motherisk Drug Testing Laboratory in child welfare investigations and proceedings, leading to children's apprehension and, in some cases, Crown wardship.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of Charter rights, bad faith, and other torts against the defendants.

The court granted all motions to strike, finding that HMQ and the CAS did not owe a private law duty of care to the parents or children in their supervisory or investigative roles, as their paramount duty was to the child's best interests.

Many claims were also deemed impermissible collateral attacks on existing court orders.

The claim against the expert witness, Julia Klein, was struck due to witness immunity and a lack of causal connection between her testimony and the alleged damages.

Following a jury trial, the jury found the defendant Hinder punched the plaintiff Pullano but caused no physical, emotional, or psychological injury.

The jury also found Pullano defamed Hinder and awarded Hinder $50,000 in general damages on the counterclaim.

The court declined to award nominal damages for battery, reasoning that it would usurp the jury's role and that the legal basis for battery (offence to dignity or harm) was not met given the jury's findings of no injury.

The issue of vicarious liability for Magna International Inc. and The Stronach Group was deemed moot due to no damages being awarded against Hinder.

Costs were awarded to the defendants against the plaintiff, fixed at $174,509.63, considering the plaintiff's lack of success, inflated claims, and unreasonable conduct, including a social media defamation campaign.

The plaintiff commercial tenant and defendant condominium corporation settled an action regarding the use of common spaces via minutes of settlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion to have the minutes of settlement issued and entered as a Court Order due to ongoing disputes.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the minutes contained an arbitration clause intended to resolve future disputes and explicitly required the action to be dismissed without costs.

The court directed that an assessment officer assess costs if the parties could not agree, as provided in the settlement.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission that allocated Standardbred Revenue Allocation marketing funds between two horsepersons' associations.

The applicant argued the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by recognizing a new association and altering a longstanding Memorandum of Understanding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's broad statutory powers to govern and regulate the horse racing industry in the public interest permitted it to modify existing legal rights to resolve a longstanding dispute over languishing funds.

The standard of review was reasonableness, and the Commission's decision was justifiable, intelligible, and within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant brought a motion to review a decision ordering her to post security for costs of $20,000 for her appeal.

The appellant, acting in person, confirmed she had no ability to pay costs and hinted she would refuse to pay in any event.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the appeal had scant prospects of success and was frivolous.

The appellant would need to demonstrate palpable and overriding errors by the trial judge on both the limitations issue and the merits of the case.

The court found the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were not undermined by the evidence presented.

Following a successful discovery motion where the plaintiff obtained an order for answers to undertakings and refusals, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $26,964.65.

The defendant argued the amount was excessive and suggested $5,000.

The court found the plaintiff was largely successful and the issues were complex, justifying senior counsel.

However, the court reduced the requested amount by 50% due to the use of two senior lawyers, a late adjournment caused by the plaintiff, and time spent on general discovery matters.

The court fixed costs at $13,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendants brought a motion regarding outstanding undertakings and refusals, which was resolved between counsel prior to the hearing, leaving only the issue of costs.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking various relief, including leave to file a jury notice out of time, further documentary discovery, answers to refused questions, and leave to amend the statement of claim.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay costs for the main motion due to the failure to address undertakings in a timely manner.

On the cross-motion, the court granted leave to file a jury notice and an amended statement of claim, but dismissed the requests for further discovery and answers to refusals.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay costs for the cross-motion.

The plaintiff in a constructive dismissal action brought a motion to compel answers to discovery questions and for non-party production of a workplace investigation file.

The defendant hospital refused to disclose the identities of medical residents interviewed during the investigation, claiming common-law privilege under the Wigmore test.

The court found that while the communications originated in confidence, the public interest in the correct disposal of the litigation outweighed the interest in protecting the identities, as the case involved a routine workplace dispute rather than patient safety or physician credentials.

The court ordered disclosure of the identities and production of the unredacted investigation file.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim for wrongful denial of a full-time position at a care centre.

The respondents brought motions for security for costs and access conditions to trial exhibits.

The court granted the appellant access to trial exhibits at her cost and in the presence of respondent's counsel.

The court also ordered security for costs of $20,000, finding the appeal frivolous and vexatious based on the appellant's conduct and insufficient evidence to challenge the trial judge's findings on both the limitation period and merits.

The respondents were awarded costs of $2,500 for their motion.

The plaintiff, Svitlana Novak, sued the defendants for breach of contract and misrepresentation, alleging she was promised a full-time recreation assistant position that was subsequently given to another individual.

The defendants denied any such agreement or representation and raised a limitations defense.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, finding it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiff failed to rebut the statutory presumption of discoverability.

Alternatively, the court found the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that a guaranteed full-time employment agreement or specific representation was made.

Multiple insurers disputed their duty to defend an insured chemical delivery company arising from two actions following a chlorine gas release at a public pool.

The insured and one insurer sought declarations compelling other insurers to contribute to defence costs.

Applying the pleadings rule from Monenco and related appellate authorities, the court held that the possibility of coverage under the policies triggered the duty to defend and that extrinsic evidence could not be used to prematurely determine factual causation issues.

The court also rejected an argument that defence cost coverage depended on insurer consent.

Principles of equitable contribution required all insurers with potential coverage to share defence costs.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing professional negligence claims arising from the prescription and dispensing of Clindamycin for an infected tooth, while the federal defendant moved under Rule 21 to strike a regulatory negligence claim.

The court held that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care, breach, and causation in the medical and pharmacy negligence claims, and the plaintiff had provided no evidence capable of supporting those claims.

The expert evidence filed by the moving parties established that the prescription, dental treatment recommendations, and pharmacy counselling met the applicable standards of care.

The court further held that Health Canada does not owe a private law duty of care to individual users of approved drugs in the circumstances pleaded.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed against the moving parties.

The self-represented appellant appealed an order requiring him to post $30,000 in security for costs in his action for assault and false arrest against retail security guards.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to address whether the action was 'frivolous and vexatious' under Rule 56.01(1)(e).

Given the conflicting evidence regarding the degree of force used during the arrest, the court concluded there was no good reason to believe the action was frivolous and vexatious.

The self-represented plaintiff successfully moved for leave to appeal an order requiring him to pay $30,000 into court as security for costs.

The court then determined the costs of the leave motion.

The defendants argued costs should be in the cause, but the court ordered costs payable forthwith to preserve the plaintiff's access to justice.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1), the court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $4,135 on a partial indemnity scale, valuing his time at $100 per hour.