Christine Matthews

The applicant trucking company sought declarations of insurance coverage after its cargo of electronic goods was stolen.

The respondent insurer denied the claim on two grounds: that the goods were not in the applicant's custody and that the applicant misrepresented the type of cargo.

The court rejected both grounds, finding that the goods were covered under the policy and that no material misrepresentation occurred.

However, the court declined to order a specific indemnity amount due to the claim value not being crystallized, instead issuing declarations in the applicant's favour.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a modest scale.

The third party brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim for contribution and indemnity as statute-barred under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

In a previous motion in the same action, another third party successfully struck the defendants' third party claim on the basis that the two-year limitation period commenced upon service of the statement of claim, without regard to discoverability.

The court held that the defendants were precluded by the doctrine of issue estoppel from relitigating the limitation period issue.

The motion was granted and the third party claim was dismissed.

The third parties, EMK, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim for contribution and indemnity arising from a fire at a poultry processing plant.

EMK also sought a declaration that Belgian law governed the contract for the sale of a boiler to the defendants.

The court applied the closest and most substantial connection test and determined that Belgian law governed the contract.

However, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that a fair and just determination of whether EMK had knowledge of the alleged defects under the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods could not be made prior to the trial of the main action, as it risked inconsistent findings of fact.

The insured drove a snowmobile after consuming alcohol to rescue a friend who was lost on a frozen lake.

The insured held a valid driver's licence but was in breach of a probation order prohibiting him from driving with alcohol in his blood.

Following an accident that seriously injured the friend, the insured's automobile insurer denied coverage, arguing he was not 'authorized by law to drive' under statutory condition 4.

The court held that 'authorized by law' refers to the possession of and compliance with a valid driver's licence, not court orders or legislative prohibitions.

The insurer was ordered to provide full coverage.

Multiple insurers disputed their duty to defend an insured chemical delivery company arising from two actions following a chlorine gas release at a public pool.

The insured and one insurer sought declarations compelling other insurers to contribute to defence costs.

Applying the pleadings rule from Monenco and related appellate authorities, the court held that the possibility of coverage under the policies triggered the duty to defend and that extrinsic evidence could not be used to prematurely determine factual causation issues.

The court also rejected an argument that defence cost coverage depended on insurer consent.

Principles of equitable contribution required all insurers with potential coverage to share defence costs.

The plaintiff was injured in a charity bicycle ride when the defendant swerved and clipped his wheel.

The defendant pleaded volenti and contributory negligence, and served a jury notice.

At trial, the judge struck the jury notice, finding that the jury would be confused by the waiver signed by the participants and the volenti defence.

The trial judge found the defendant entirely liable.

The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by striking the jury notice.

The volenti defence is not a claim for declaratory relief, and a properly instructed jury could understand the limited legal effect of the waiver.