Sean Husband

Andrew Allen was charged with impaired driving and unlawfully refusing to provide a breath sample.

He brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) to exclude evidence, alleging breaches of his s. 9 (arbitrary detention due to wrongful arrest on a warrant and arbitrary confinement in a cell) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial arrest on a warrant was without reasonable grounds and the subsequent confinement in a cell, driven by OPP policy rather than individualized assessment, constituted arbitrary detention, both breaching s. 9.

The failure to immediately inform him of his right to counsel upon arrest was a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the breaches were serious and had a significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

Despite society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, the admission of the impugned evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This criminal trial concerned Jeffrey Bluecloud, who faced numerous charges arising from seven bank robberies, along with breach of recognizance and probation.

The central issue was the identity of the perpetrator, as the Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The court addressed a similar act application, seeking to admit evidence from each robbery against the others, and also extrinsic evidence from a prior 2017 robbery.

The court also ruled on a severance motion for an eighth robbery and the admissibility of a mid-trial utterance by the accused.

The judge found the accused guilty of four bank robberies (Incidents #2, #3, #5, and #7) and the breach charges, relying heavily on video evidence and similar act principles.

However, the accused was acquitted of three other robberies (Incidents #1, #4, and #6) due to reasonable doubt, primarily based on dissimilarities in hold-up notes and perpetrator descriptions.

The applicant sought to vary bail conditions to permit driving, citing material changes in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the disproportionate length of the driving prohibition compared to potential Highway Traffic Act penalties, and the need to care for his ill mother.

The Crown opposed, arguing the driving prohibition addressed secondary ground concerns related to Criminal Code charges.

The court found the pandemic and associated delays constituted a material change, and that the driving prohibition was not directly and necessarily related to the criminal offences alleged.

The application was granted, varying the bail conditions to allow driving for work, with surety, or for necessities of life, and requiring identification.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg% following a single motor vehicle accident on the Gardiner Expressway.

The trial involved multiple Charter applications, including claims under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b), as well as procedural challenges regarding delayed disclosure and the timing of new Charter allegations.

The court dismissed all Charter claims and found the accused guilty on both counts based on credible police evidence, proper grounds for the approved screening device demand, and reliable breath sample results.

The accused was charged with breaching a prohibition order under section 161(1) of the Criminal Code by entering High Park on August 6, 2018.

The Crown alleged the accused knowingly entered the park or failed to leave with reasonable dispatch.

The accused testified he inadvertently entered the park while searching for a bathroom due to sudden urinary urgency and left immediately upon realizing his location.

The court found the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he knew he was entering the park and that there was no evidence he failed to leave promptly.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant sought directions on whether certain materials in his possession relating to the complainant trigger the third party disclosure regime under section 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The materials at issue were a photograph of the applicant and complainant taken together at a bar and a cell phone video recording of the complainant leaving the applicant's premises following an alleged sexual assault.

The court found that neither item constitutes a "record" within the meaning of section 278.1 of the Criminal Code, as neither contains the requisite personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Both items were permitted to be tendered as evidence at trial.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment order requiring it to pay HST to the respondent supplier.

The central issue was whether a supplier can issue invoices disclosing HST payable after the supply transaction has occurred, or whether such disclosure must be made at the time of the transaction to comply with section 223(1) of the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent sold unrefined gold to the appellant over a two-year period without collecting or remitting HST.

After a CRA audit, the respondent issued invoices months later demanding payment of the HST.

The court held that section 223(1) is silent on timing and permits post-transaction invoices, affirming the summary judgment.

The third parties, EMK, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim for contribution and indemnity arising from a fire at a poultry processing plant.

EMK also sought a declaration that Belgian law governed the contract for the sale of a boiler to the defendants.

The court applied the closest and most substantial connection test and determined that Belgian law governed the contract.

However, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that a fair and just determination of whether EMK had knowledge of the alleged defects under the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods could not be made prior to the trial of the main action, as it risked inconsistent findings of fact.

The third party brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim for contribution and indemnity as statute-barred under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

In a previous motion in the same action, another third party successfully struck the defendants' third party claim on the basis that the two-year limitation period commenced upon service of the statement of claim, without regard to discoverability.

The court held that the defendants were precluded by the doctrine of issue estoppel from relitigating the limitation period issue.

The motion was granted and the third party claim was dismissed.