Geoffrey Erik Haskell

The appellant was convicted of one count of assault and one count of sexual assault relating to the same complainant and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant raised two related grounds: first, that the trial was rendered unfair because he lacked testimonial capacity due to mental illness; and second, that the trial was unfair because the counts in the indictment were vague and failed to identify specific instances of assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application regarding the appellant's psychiatric condition, finding that the evidence lacked cogency without expert opinion linking the mental illness to testimonial capacity.

The court also rejected the indictment vagueness argument, finding that the counts did not violate the single transaction rule and that the appellant received full disclosure and knew the case he had to meet.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed convictions for firearms possession, arguing the vehicle search was unlawful under the Liquor Licence Act (LLA), the traffic stop was a pretext, and the evidence did not prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search lawful under the LLA, rejecting the pretext argument (including a new racial profiling claim), and affirming the trial judge's finding of possession based on ample evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with a release order.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged s. 10(b) Charter violation regarding the right to counsel, and an alleged error in refusing an election for a preliminary inquiry under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's right to counsel was respected and that an election for trial by judge alone had already been made.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Emmanuel Pinard, sought bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals for possessing a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, through Lauwers J.A., applied the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, focusing on the public interest component, specifically public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court weighed the enforceability interest (seriousness of gun crime) against the reviewability interest (strength of appeal grounds).

The court found the conviction and sentence appeal grounds to be arguable but not clearly surpassing the 'not frivolous' criterion.

Consequently, the application for bail pending appeal was dismissed, as releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence given the seriousness of the crime and the weakness of the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to consider the unusually harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention (lockdowns and triple-bunking) as a mitigating factor, relying on fresh evidence.

The Crown did not oppose the admission of fresh evidence but asserted the original sentence was fit.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and found it warranted a two-month reduction in the appellant's sentence for sexual abuse offences committed against his stepdaughter.

The appellant, Timothy Lee, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, manslaughter, and attempting to unlawfully cause bodily harm, stemming from a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting his inculpatory "Mr. Big" statements and earlier statements about prior cocaine dealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Hart test for Mr. Big confessions, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, and did not err in admitting the cocaine dealing statements.

The court found the Mr. Big statements sufficiently reliable given corroborating evidence and the absence of police misconduct amounting to abuse of process, despite an undercover officer discouraging legal advice.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the defence of a third party and accident, arguing there was no air of reality to the former and the latter was inadequate, thereby undermining his primary defence of identity.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period, alleging misapprehension of evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the defences, which had an air of reality and did not prejudice the appellant's primary defence.

The court also found no reversible error in the parole ineligibility period, concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and the sentence was proportionate.

The defendants brought applications for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay of up to 44 months from arrest to the anticipated completion of their five-week trial.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the delay, while exceeding the presumptive 30-month Jordan ceiling, was justified by exceptional circumstances.

These circumstances included the particular complexity of the multi-accused kidnapping case, which involved extensive investigation, disclosure, and coordination of multiple counsel, and the systemic disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which profoundly impacted court operations and created significant backlogs.

The court concluded that the Crown and the justice system took all reasonable steps to mitigate delay, and the time taken would not violate the applicants' constitutional right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The appellant, John Jackman, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his life sentence.

He was found guilty of manslaughter after setting fire to a mattress in a rooming house, which resulted in the death of another resident.

The main issues on appeal were the sufficiency of the trial judge's oral reasons for admitting similar act evidence (a prior arson conviction) and the fitness of the life sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's oral reasons were brief, they were sufficient for review, and the admission of similar act evidence was proper.

The court also found the life sentence, though maximum, was warranted given the appellant's high moral blameworthiness, the context of the offence, and his extensive criminal record and high risk of re-offending.

The appeals against both conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, theft under $5,000, and unlawful confinement, stemming from an altercation with a complainant in a hotel room.

The trial judge had acquitted on other charges (sexual assault, robbery, choking, threatening death) where proof depended entirely on the complainant's uncorroborated evidence.

The appellant argued misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and error in the self-defence analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension, noting the trial judge's reasoned rejection of the appellant's evidence.

It also found no uneven scrutiny, as the trial judge carefully examined both sides and properly applied rules of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the aggressor, which negated the self-defence claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a 17-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following a guilty plea to second-degree murder.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and by imposing a demonstrably unfit period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, emphasizing deference to the sentencing judge's weighing of factors, and concluded that the sentence was entirely fit given all circumstances, including significant aggravating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against two young sisters.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for third-party records from the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and in making credibility determinations.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that the CAS records were likely relevant to credibility and motive to fabricate and should have been reviewed by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, Derek Oppong and Akido Thomas, appealed their convictions and sentences for kidnapping-related offences with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal organization.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence on gang activity, claiming it was unnecessary and biased, and in refusing to reconsider its admissibility after proposed factual admissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's discretion in admitting expert evidence for contextual understanding and finding no material change in circumstances that would warrant its exclusion.

The court also upheld Mr. Oppong's sentence, finding evidence supported his leadership role in the offence.

The applicants, Darko and Daniel Stojanovski, sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of attempted murder and discharging a firearm, and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court found the appeals were not frivolous but dismissed the applications, concluding that detention was necessary in the public interest due to the serious nature of the offences, the unacceptably weak release plan, and the weak grounds of appeal, which outweighed the applicants' arguments regarding COVID-19 risks in detention.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The parties agreed that the appeal should be allowed to correct the credit given for pre-trial custody.

The appellant had served eight months pre-trial, and the parties agreed the credit should have been 12 months at a 1:5.1 ratio.

With the correct allocation for pre-trial custody, the sentence imposed (suspended sentence with 12 months probation) remained unchanged, as did the other ancillary orders.

The appeal was allowed to reflect the proper credit for time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of domestic violence offences and his dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of two counts of aggravated assault, one count each of sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a death threat, and breach of a probation order, while acquitting him on eight other counts.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's use of cross-count similar fact evidence and the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to the cross-count evidence and confirming that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met.

The appellant appealed his conviction for numerous firearms offences arising from an incident in downtown Toronto where he attempted to discard a loaded handgun.

He challenged the conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a stay of proceedings based on the failure of police to preserve CCTV footage, contrary to section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge applied the framework from established case law and found no breach of section 7.

The appellant received a remedy through a jury instruction regarding the failure to preserve evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was rendered moot as the appellant had already served his sentence, and leave to appeal sentence was refused.