Matthew John Richard Asma

The appellant, convicted of fraud, brought two motions related to his appeal: one for document production (dismissed as redundant) and another to appoint a special commissioner under s. 683(1)(e) of the Criminal Code to inquire into alleged email deletion by police and alteration of trial transcripts, seeking fresh evidence for a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions, finding no credible evidence to support the allegations of obstruction of justice or abuse of process, and that the proposed inquiry would not reasonably lead to admissible fresh evidence under the Shulman test.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the trial judge's decision not to exclude computer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite a s. 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the balancing of the Grant factors.

The court affirmed that the breach was not particularly serious, its impact limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was high, especially given the evidence's probative value for the first-degree murder conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Michael St. Clair, appealed his conviction for possession and careless storage of a prohibited firearm and ammunition.

The appeal stemmed from an unsuccessful Charter application to exclude seized evidence, where the police had inexplicably lost surveillance video referenced in the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

The application judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 7 Charter rights (right to make full answer and defence) due to the lost video but, as a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, only excised references to the appellant "exhibiting the characteristics of an armed person" from the ITO, not all references to the video.

The application judge concluded that sufficient grounds remained in the ITO to uphold the search warrant and found no s. 8 Charter breach, thus dismissing the exclusion application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the automatic excision rule (typically for s. 24(2) breaches) does not apply to s. 7 breaches arising from lost evidence, where remedies under s. 24(1) are flexible and contextual.

The Court found the application judge's chosen remedy appropriate, as the ITO still contained ample corroborated information to support the warrant's issuance.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his robbery convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to misadvice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

He was led to believe that sentences under two years per count would provide a "fighting chance" from an immigration perspective, when in fact, sentences over six months rendered him inadmissible with no right to appeal a removal order.

Applying the test from R. v. Wong, the Court of Appeal found the pleas uninformed and that the appellant suffered subjective prejudice, as he would have opted for a trial or different conditions had he been properly advised.

The convictions were set aside, a new trial ordered, and further proceedings were stayed in the public interest given the served sentences, lack of re-offending, and court resource pressures.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario adjourned a motion sine die in a criminal appeal.

The adjournment was requested and agreed upon by all counsel after the Toronto Police Service recovered additional emails that may be pertinent to the motion.

The court determined that the parties needed time to explore this new development, and any subsequent matters arising from the recovery should be addressed by the case management judge.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an application for extraordinary relief (prohibition and certiorari) seeking to prevent a judge from proceeding with a remote video trial and to quash a ruling for a remote trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant's request for a full in-person trial had been accommodated.

The court declined to hear the moot appeal on public interest grounds, citing an insufficient record, the issues not being evasive of review in normal appellate process, and no evidence of a systemic problem requiring immediate resolution.

The appellant, Carlos Pavao, appealed his convictions for fraud and his sentence.

He was convicted of defrauding ten investors and the public through the sale of non-existent shares in gold mining companies.

His appeal of conviction was based on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the delay was justified under the Morin transitional exception.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the restitution and fine orders by $45,000, as these amounts related to individuals who were not named complainants in the indictment.

David Holden was found guilty of fraud exceeding $54 million and money laundering in a large-scale Ponzi scheme.

This decision outlines the sentencing, which includes 12 years imprisonment for fraud (concurrent with 8 years for money laundering), a restitution order, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $54,159,737, with a default imprisonment of 5 years consecutive.

The court emphasized denunciation, general deterrence, and separation due to the egregious nature of the fraud, its devastating impact on 65 victims, and Holden's significant prior record of similar offences and lack of remorse.

On June 21, 2019, Parliament enacted Bill C-75, which substantially limited the availability of preliminary inquiries in Canada.

Prior to the amendments, any accused who elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice could request and obtain a preliminary inquiry.

After September 19, 2019, preliminary inquiries became available only for indictable offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The central issue on appeal was whether these amendments applied retrospectively to charges that were before the Ontario Court of Justice when the amendments came into force, specifically to accused who had elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice and requested preliminary inquiries before September 19, 2019.

The appellants were charged with sexual assault, which is not punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The Superior Court of Justice had prohibited the Ontario Court of Justice from holding preliminary inquiries in their cases.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the amendments do not apply to accused who had elected and requested preliminary inquiries before the amendments came into force.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions, with a majority substantially adopting Justice Nordheimer’s reasons and a dissent that would have allowed the appeal for reasons substantially aligned with Justice Pardu.

The appellant was convicted of operating a vessel over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood causing bodily harm following a boating accident on Lake Muskoka.

She appealed on the grounds that evidence was obtained in violation of her Charter rights.

The trial judge found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the hospital records containing blood-alcohol analysis while excluding the blood samples themselves.

The Court of Appeal (majority) upheld the convictions, finding that while Charter breaches occurred, the cumulative effect did not warrant exclusion of the hospital records under section 24(2).

Justice Pardu dissented, arguing the hospital records should be excluded due to the serious invasion of bodily integrity and dignity.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal entered at the close of its case on a charge of manslaughter.

The trial judge had held that the Crown was bound by its factual theory that the accused was the getaway driver and that witness evidence precluded such a finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for a directed verdict and erred in restricting the Crown to a single factual theory.

The court found ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code based on a common unlawful purpose to commit robbery, regardless of the accused's specific role.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on two young persons, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The Crown also sought to establish judicial criteria for the grant of a reprimand by a youth court judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was legally available and that the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the offenders.

Both young persons had undertaken substantial rehabilitative measures independently.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery of a Cash in a Flash store on November 14, 2010, arguing that the jury's verdict was unreasonable because the video evidence was extremely poor and unreliable for identification purposes.

The trial judge had given strong warnings about the frailties of the video identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the video evidence had limitations, the totality of the evidence—including distinctive identifying details visible in multiple video recordings, photographic evidence, DNA evidence from a balaclava, and physical evidence recovered from the appellant's apartment building—provided a reasonable foundation for the jury's verdict.

The accused appealed convictions for fraud and an order for a new trial on cheating-related counts arising from attempts to rig horse races by drugging horses.

The Court held there was evidence a horse race can involve mixed chance and skill through randomized post positions, supporting a new trial on cheating counts.

It further held the drugging scheme constituted dishonest conduct creating a non-remote risk of deprivation to bettors, and upheld entered fraud convictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a criminal charge under s. 127(1) for allegedly disobeying an injunction, arguing Ontario civil contempt rules provided an express alternative mode of proceeding.

The majority held the statutory exception applies only where legislation provides the legal foundation for contempt, defines contempt circumstances, and provides punishment or procedure.

The Court found Rules 60.11 and 60.12 are procedurally detailed but remain dependent on common law substratum for legal foundation and contempt definition.

Accordingly, the exception was not triggered and prosecution under s. 127(1) could proceed.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the rules themselves constituted an express legislative mode of proceeding.