Matthew John Richard Asma

The appellants, a police officer and an employee of the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, were convicted of defrauding an elderly man's estate using a fabricated will.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing errors in the trial judge's refusal to stay proceedings for a Charter breach, admission of after-the-fact conduct evidence regarding the concealment of their affair, and an unbalanced jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the sentences imposed.

The appellant sought an order to prevent police from continuing to examine electronic devices seized under search warrants, pending an appeal of a decision dismissing an application for certiorari to quash the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, as certiorari is discretionary and exceptional in ongoing investigations.

The court also found no irreparable harm, as remedies remain available on appeal or at trial, and the balance of convenience favoured allowing the investigation to continue.

The moving party sought a stay of an order dismissing his application for certiorari to quash search warrants related to a child sexual abuse material investigation.

The motion judge questioned whether a single judge of the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant the requested stay under the Criminal Code, the Courts of Justice Act, or the court's ancillary jurisdiction.

Given the unsettled jurisdictional law, the motion judge referred the motion to a full panel for determination and adjourned the hearing.

The accused, former legal counsel to the Thunder Bay Police Service, was charged with obstruction of justice and breach of trust by a public official.

The Crown alleged she made intentional false or misleading statements during an Ontario Civilian Police Commission investigation regarding her knowledge of a criminal investigation into the police services board chair.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while some of the accused's statements were inaccurate, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally made false statements or material omissions.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant, convicted of fraud, brought two motions related to his appeal: one for document production (dismissed as redundant) and another to appoint a special commissioner under s. 683(1)(e) of the Criminal Code to inquire into alleged email deletion by police and alteration of trial transcripts, seeking fresh evidence for a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions, finding no credible evidence to support the allegations of obstruction of justice or abuse of process, and that the proposed inquiry would not reasonably lead to admissible fresh evidence under the Shulman test.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the trial judge's decision not to exclude computer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite a s. 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the balancing of the Grant factors.

The court affirmed that the breach was not particularly serious, its impact limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was high, especially given the evidence's probative value for the first-degree murder conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Michael St. Clair, appealed his conviction for possession and careless storage of a prohibited firearm and ammunition.

The appeal stemmed from an unsuccessful Charter application to exclude seized evidence, where the police had inexplicably lost surveillance video referenced in the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

The application judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 7 Charter rights (right to make full answer and defence) due to the lost video but, as a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, only excised references to the appellant "exhibiting the characteristics of an armed person" from the ITO, not all references to the video.

The application judge concluded that sufficient grounds remained in the ITO to uphold the search warrant and found no s. 8 Charter breach, thus dismissing the exclusion application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the automatic excision rule (typically for s. 24(2) breaches) does not apply to s. 7 breaches arising from lost evidence, where remedies under s. 24(1) are flexible and contextual.

The Court found the application judge's chosen remedy appropriate, as the ITO still contained ample corroborated information to support the warrant's issuance.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a youth charged with impaired driving causing death.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of the youth's statements to a paramedic, breath samples, and blood samples, finding multiple breaches of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the youth had a reasonable expectation of privacy during a medical assessment in an ambulance, and that the police officer's breath demand lacked subjective grounds.

The Court also agreed that the subsequent breath demand by a technician was tainted by the initial breach, and that the search warrant for hospital records was invalid.

The exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) was upheld due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his robbery convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to misadvice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

He was led to believe that sentences under two years per count would provide a "fighting chance" from an immigration perspective, when in fact, sentences over six months rendered him inadmissible with no right to appeal a removal order.

Applying the test from R. v. Wong, the Court of Appeal found the pleas uninformed and that the appellant suffered subjective prejudice, as he would have opted for a trial or different conditions had he been properly advised.

The convictions were set aside, a new trial ordered, and further proceedings were stayed in the public interest given the served sentences, lack of re-offending, and court resource pressures.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario adjourned a motion sine die in a criminal appeal.

The adjournment was requested and agreed upon by all counsel after the Toronto Police Service recovered additional emails that may be pertinent to the motion.

The court determined that the parties needed time to explore this new development, and any subsequent matters arising from the recovery should be addressed by the case management judge.

The offender was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5000 and one count of knowingly using a forged document involving significant loans from private lenders.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence.

The court found the offences constituted a large-scale fraud, attracting a three-to-five-year range.

However, considering the offender's lack of a prior record and the severe collateral immigration consequences (deportation without appeal), the court imposed a sentence of 30 months imprisonment.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of an application for extraordinary relief (prohibition and certiorari) seeking to prevent a judge from proceeding with a remote video trial and to quash a ruling for a remote trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant's request for a full in-person trial had been accommodated.

The court declined to hear the moot appeal on public interest grounds, citing an insufficient record, the issues not being evasive of review in normal appellate process, and no evidence of a systemic problem requiring immediate resolution.

The appellant, Carlos Pavao, appealed his convictions for fraud and his sentence.

He was convicted of defrauding ten investors and the public through the sale of non-existent shares in gold mining companies.

His appeal of conviction was based on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the delay was justified under the Morin transitional exception.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the restitution and fine orders by $45,000, as these amounts related to individuals who were not named complainants in the indictment.

The appellant, a paralegal prosecutor, was convicted of breach of trust and attempting to obstruct justice for fixing traffic tickets for associates of a police officer with whom she was having an affair.

The police discovered her conduct through intercepted communications, which were subsequently disclosed to her employer.

On appeal, she argued the verdict was unreasonable, the disclosure of the intercepts violated her Charter rights, the convictions violated the Kienapple principle, and the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences reasonable, the disclosure lawful under the Criminal Code, the offences distinct, and the conditional sentence appropriate.

The accused was charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000 and one count of using forged documents.

The Crown alleged that the accused and a co-conspirator obtained significant loans from two private lenders by falsely representing that the funds would be invested in lucrative Pakistani land deals and by providing forged bank letters to secure further advances.

The court found that the accused knowingly made misrepresentations that induced the lenders to advance funds that were never repaid.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought to admit a four-and-a-half-hour statement given by the accused to the RCMP during a fraud investigation.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary because he was not formally cautioned and was not told the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The Superior Court of Justice found the statement voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the accused was aware of his jeopardy, the nature of the investigation, and that his statements could be used in court.

The failure to use a standard police caution did not render the statement involuntary.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on multiple charges, including break and enter, which resulted from a trial judge's decision to quash a DNA warrant and exclude the resulting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found insufficient grounds to link the respondent to the crimes.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapplied the standard of review for warrants by substituting his own view rather than assessing whether the issuing judge could reasonably have found reasonable grounds.

The Court found sufficient evidence, including a fingerprint in a stolen truck linked by DNA to the crime scenes, to support the warrant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on four counts.

David Holden was found guilty of fraud exceeding $54 million and money laundering in a large-scale Ponzi scheme.

This decision outlines the sentencing, which includes 12 years imprisonment for fraud (concurrent with 8 years for money laundering), a restitution order, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $54,159,737, with a default imprisonment of 5 years consecutive.

The court emphasized denunciation, general deterrence, and separation due to the egregious nature of the fraud, its devastating impact on 65 victims, and Holden's significant prior record of similar offences and lack of remorse.

On June 21, 2019, Parliament enacted Bill C-75, which substantially limited the availability of preliminary inquiries in Canada.

Prior to the amendments, any accused who elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice could request and obtain a preliminary inquiry.

After September 19, 2019, preliminary inquiries became available only for indictable offences punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The central issue on appeal was whether these amendments applied retrospectively to charges that were before the Ontario Court of Justice when the amendments came into force, specifically to accused who had elected trial in the Superior Court of Justice and requested preliminary inquiries before September 19, 2019.

The appellants were charged with sexual assault, which is not punishable by 14 years' imprisonment or more.

The Superior Court of Justice had prohibited the Ontario Court of Justice from holding preliminary inquiries in their cases.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the amendments do not apply to accused who had elected and requested preliminary inquiries before the amendments came into force.