Danielle Robitaille

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an identified error by the summary conviction appeal court judge regarding consent versus capacity to consent.

However, the court found this error inconsequential given the trial judge's thorough analysis of the evidence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for voyeurism.

The trial and summary conviction appeal judges excluded evidence (a hidden camera) found in an Airbnb apartment, ruling that the apartment owner (accused) had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and police actions violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal found that the accused, as the apartment owner, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment while it was rented to the complainant.

The complainant was entitled to invite police to investigate a crime committed against him in the apartment.

The hidden camera was properly seized under the Criminal Code.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, admitted the evidence, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant, charged with making an explosive substance, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 33 months and 22 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for the Superior Court.

After deducting defence-caused delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

However, the court found that the Covid-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance that justified the delay, as it caused a seven-month suspension of court operations.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Crown appealed from the Court of Appeal for Ontario's finding that s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which bars accused persons from raising a defence of self-induced extreme intoxication akin to automatism, violates ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and is not saved by s. 1.

The Court dismissed the appeals on the basis of the companion decision in R. v. Brown, 2022 SCC 18, which held s. 33.1 unconstitutional and of no force or effect.

The Court further held that ordinary horizontal stare decisis principles govern prior s. 52(1) declarations of unconstitutionality issued by superior courts within the same province, applying the Spruce Mills criteria, and that a trial judge is not strictly bound to follow such a declaration unless it is distinguishable or one of the recognized exceptions to stare decisis applies.

The Court also quashed the respondent Chan's application for leave to cross-appeal for want of jurisdiction under s. 691 of the Criminal Code, as no statutory route exists to challenge a new trial order where a conviction was set aside.

The defendants in two related actions sought orders to compel the plaintiffs, Andrew Stronach and Selena Stronach, to undergo medical examinations to assess their mental capacities for the purpose of determining if litigation guardians were required.

The court dismissed the motion against Selena Stronach, finding insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity.

The motion against Andrew Stronach was dismissed without prejudice, as the court found it premature and suggested other discovery avenues should be pursued first.

The court also declined to order production of video recordings of Andrew's examination for discovery.

The accused, T.K., charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application under section 278.4 of the Criminal Code seeking production of the complainant's and witnesses' electronic communications and photos/videos from a specific period.

The defence argued these records were relevant to the accused's belief regarding the complainant's age and consent.

The Crown and witnesses opposed, citing privacy and arguing the records were not necessary for full answer and defence.

The court, applying section 278.5(2) factors, found potential relevance and ordered the records to be produced for judicial review to determine if they are necessary for full answer and defence, balancing privacy interests against the accused's right to defence.

The applicant, F.N., sought bail after being charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder following the poisoning of two young children with sodium nitrite, resulting in one fatality.

The court considered the three grounds for detention under the Criminal Code, with particular focus on the tertiary ground, which assesses whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite the applicant presenting strong sureties and a reasonable release plan, the court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be formidable, given the applicant's access to the chemical and familiarity with the victims' household.

The gravity of the offence, involving the deliberate poisoning of defenceless children, was deemed extremely high.

The application for bail was dismissed, as the court concluded that a reasonable, informed member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released under these circumstances.

The appellant, Grant Litt, appealed his conviction for breaking and entering, touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose, and attempting to choke a person to commit sexual assault, stemming from a home invasion.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of evidence, particularly expert evidence on a boot print, and the dismissal of a Charter application to exclude evidence.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence: a revised expert opinion on the boot print, downgrading its association with the appellant's boot.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the cogency and due diligence criteria, as the trial judge had heavily relied on the original expert opinion and failed to sufficiently scrutinize other circumstantial evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The offender, a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner, was found guilty of a historical sexual assault against a patient during an examination in 1992.

The Crown sought 60 days incarceration, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court emphasized the breach of trust and the need for denunciation and general deterrence, rejecting a discharge.

Considering the offender's lack of prior record, positive community contributions, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court imposed a 60-day conditional sentence followed by three years' probation, along with mandatory DNA, weapons prohibition, and SOIRA orders.

The accused, a Taekwondo coach charged with sexual assault, applied for the production of interview recordings and notes held by the CBC involving one of the complainants.

The court determined that the common law O'Connor regime applied rather than the Criminal Code s. 278.1 regime, as the complainant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in statements made for a television documentary.

Balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the media's freedom of the press under the Vice Media framework, the court ordered the CBC to produce limited, highly relevant excerpts of the interviews and notes.

The appellant, Marcel Seip, appealed his conviction and sentence for multiple offences, including aggravated assault, stemming from a home invasion and kidnapping.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in convicting him of aggravated assault after acquitting him of discharging a firearm with intent to wound, arguing that the finding of a potentially accidental shooting precluded the necessary intent for aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the mens rea for aggravated assault requires only objective foreseeability of bodily harm, not specific intent to wound.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of this principle or in her credibility findings, concluding that the appellant was a party to the aggravated assault as the mastermind of the home invasion who knew his accomplice had a gun.

The defendant, Patrick Morgan, was found guilty of sexual assault involving unprotected intercourse with a profoundly intoxicated victim (K.L.) whom he had initially tried to help.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the breach of trust, the mens rea of recklessness, and significant mitigating factors including the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and personal hardships.

The Crown sought 12-18 months institutional incarceration, while the defence argued for a conditional discharge.

The court found that a conditional discharge was contrary to public interest due to the need for denunciation and general deterrence, but also that traditional incarceration was not fully appropriate given the unique circumstances and the defendant's strong rehabilitative prospects.

A conditional sentence of 16 months was imposed, to be served in the community with electronic monitoring, followed by 18 months probation.

The Crown brought an application before the Ontario Court of Justice seeking an order to compel two lawyers to disclose confidential and/or privileged information related to a deceased complainant, for use in a criminal prosecution under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The lawyers had refused to provide statements without a court order, citing the Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice lacked the express or implied jurisdiction to grant such an order, which was deemed to be in the nature of declaratory relief.

The court emphasized that its jurisdiction is limited to the criminal proceeding itself and does not extend to pre-trial investigative orders concerning non-parties, a function reserved for the Superior Court.

In a judge-alone criminal proceeding involving sexual abuse allegations by teenage athletes against their taekwondo coach, the court considered both a Crown application to admit count-to-count and third-party similar fact evidence and a defence motion to sever counts involving one complainant.

Applying the similar fact framework, the court held that the evidence of other athletes was highly probative of the actus reus and of the controlling trust-based environment in which the abuse was alleged to have occurred, and that the Crown had disproved collusion on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the severance principles, the court nevertheless concluded that trial fairness required severance because the accused had an objectively justifiable intention to testify on one set of counts but not the others.

After the accused confirmed he would not testify on the remaining counts, the counts involving one complainant were severed and that complainant was barred from testifying as a similar fact witness in the ongoing trial.

Criminal trial arising from allegations that a high-level martial arts coach sexually abused a teenage athlete over a period of years within a coach-athlete relationship marked by control, secrecy, and grooming.

The court addressed delayed disclosure, the complainant's university essay about another coach's sexual offences, and multiple inconsistencies in the complainant's accounts, but concluded these issues did not undermine her credibility or the reliability of her evidence on the core allegations.

Similar fact evidence from other athletes was admitted for limited purposes and provided some contextual support, though the court placed little weight on it in proving the charged acts.

Applying the W.(D.) framework to the accused's denial, the court held the Crown proved all 10 counts beyond a reasonable doubt, while reserving on whether some counts should be stayed as duplicative.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion for disclosure of communications between the complainant and the CBC regarding a proposed documentary.

The Crown and third parties argued the communications were protected under s. 278 of the Criminal Code due to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found that while there was a subjective expectation of privacy, the communications regarding the scope and terms of the CBC interviews were directly relevant to the defence's O'Connor application.

The court ordered the disclosure of relevant emails and texts, excising irrelevant personal details.

The accused, a practitioner of Traditional Chinese Medicine, was charged with sexually assaulting a patient during an internal examination in 2004 or 2005.

The Crown alleged the examination was not a legitimate medical practice and that the complainant's consent was vitiated by fraud.

The court admitted expert evidence on Traditional Chinese Medicine but found it insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's actions fell outside the unregulated practices of the time or that he knowingly breached provincial regulations.

The accused was acquitted.

The court addressed a joint request from the Crown and defence for a ruling on the authority to conduct a criminal trial virtually via Zoom, allowing the accused to participate remotely.

The court found it had jurisdiction under s. 650(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, in conjunction with ss. 715.22-715.24, to permit the accused's absence from the physical courtroom under proper conditions, especially given the accused was represented by counsel and had provided a clear waiver.

The decision distinguished conflicting lower court jurisprudence regarding virtual appearances for self-represented versus represented accused and for pleas versus trials.

The appellants, in separate incidents, committed violent acts while in states of drug-induced psychosis and automatism.

At trial, they were precluded from raising the defence of non-mental disorder automatism due to section 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which removes the defence for violence-based offences where automatism is self-induced by voluntary intoxication.

The Court of Appeal held that section 33.1 violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by permitting convictions without proof of voluntariness or the requisite fault element, and by substituting voluntary intoxication for the essential elements of the offence.

The Court further held that these violations could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

Section 33.1 was declared to be of no force or effect.

The appeals were allowed, with a new trial ordered for one appellant and acquittals entered for the other on the violence-based charges.