Amy Rose

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud after failing to declare over $50,000 in earnings and COVID-19 benefits while receiving Ontario Works assistance, collecting approximately $16,000 to which she was not entitled.

She received a six-month conditional sentence and a restitution order.

On appeal, the appellant sought to set aside her guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to mental health conditions and uninformed because she was unaware those conditions might have provided a defence.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was voluntary, as the record showed active participation in the year-long process leading to the plea, and informed, as the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, making child pornography, distributing child pornography, possession of child pornography, and two counts of failure to comply with a release order, and received a global sentence of 11 years and 3 months less pre-sentence custody credit.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in factoring in pre-sentence custody credit and that the sentence was excessive compared to similar cases.

He also challenged ancillary non-communication orders and an internet restriction order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's treatment of pre-sentence custody, held the sentence was not unfit given the exceptionally serious nature of the offences and numerous aggravating factors, and declined to interfere with the ancillary orders.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder after a vicious, unprovoked attack on his neighbour.

The trial judge subsequently designated the appellant a high-risk accused (HRA) under ss. 672.64(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standards and that the findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinct risk thresholds under the two subsections and finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of grave harm.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding the complainant’s credibility and motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the evidence or in her reasons, holding that the findings were open to her on the record and that the reasons were sufficient for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, D.R., appealed convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, assault, and uttering threats, as well as the imposition of a lifetime SOIRA order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or credibility assessments.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the evidentiary record was insufficient to substitute a 20-year SOIRA order for the lifetime order.

The appellant retains the right to apply to the Superior Court to vary the SOIRA order’s length.

The appellant, N.D., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of legal principles regarding consent and mistaken belief.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court affirming the custodial sentence as fit given the nature of the offences and the aggravating factor of a prior relationship of trust.

The court declined to rule on the appellant's Charter application to vacate the SOIRA order, suggesting it be pursued in a lower court with a more developed evidentiary record.

The appellant, Joshua Normand, sought leave to appeal a four-year global sentence imposed for mischief, criminal harassment, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and unsafe storage of a firearm.

The appellant, who is Metis, argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of restraint and did not give sufficient weight to mitigating factors, including his Gladue report.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit, noting the serious nature of the offences, the appellant's prior record, and that the sentencing judge had properly considered and applied the principle of restraint and mitigating factors, including the Gladue report.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of indecent assault and sentenced to four years concurrent, sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the three elements under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal was frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

While the appeal was deemed not frivolous and the applicant was likely to surrender, the court found that his detention was necessary in the public interest.

Balancing the strong interest in enforceability due to the seriousness of the sexual offences against children against the weak interest in reviewability given the weakness of the appeal grounds, the court dismissed the application for bail pending appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded firearm and a prohibited device following a shootout incident.

He appealed his global sentence of three years and five months, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to properly weigh multiple mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or law and concluding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, affirming the deference owed to the sentencing judge's discretion.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for voyeurism.

The trial and summary conviction appeal judges excluded evidence (a hidden camera) found in an Airbnb apartment, ruling that the apartment owner (accused) had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and police actions violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal found that the accused, as the apartment owner, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment while it was rented to the complainant.

The complainant was entitled to invite police to investigate a crime committed against him in the apartment.

The hidden camera was properly seized under the Criminal Code.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, admitted the evidence, and ordered a new trial.

Richard Aguilar appealed his convictions for child luring and communicating for sexual services, and his sentence.

The convictions stemmed from text message conversations with an undercover officer believed to be a 14-year-old girl, part of 'Project Raphael'.

Aguilar alleged errors in the trial judge's findings regarding the offences and rejection of his innocent explanations.

He also argued the sentence was unfit, lacked parity, and did not adequately consider his health or sentencing delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in credibility findings, and no reversal of the burden of proof.

The court also found the sentence fit and that the principle of parity was not disregarded.

The appellant, a young racialized man, was gathered with four others in a private backyard at a Toronto housing co-operative when three police officers entered without warrant, consent, or warning and immediately questioned the men, demanding identification.

The appellant fled when asked what was in his satchel and was arrested in possession of a firearm, drugs, and cash.

The majority held that the arbitrary detention crystallized the moment police entered the backyard, not merely when they asked about the satchel, applying the Grant framework with particular attention to the racialized context and private-property setting; the resulting s. 9 breach was serious and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

The dissent would have found the detention began only when the officer directed inquiry at the appellant, and in any event would have admitted the evidence given the trial judge's unchallenged findings that the police acted in good faith with legitimate investigatory purposes and the seriousness of the offences.