Paul Socka

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and assault with choking on the basis that recordings secretly made by the complainant should have been excluded under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the complainant was not a state agent when she made the recordings because there had been no police contact, direction, or inducement at the time, and her purpose did not alone transform her into a state actor.

The court further held that, although the appellant had a subjective privacy interest in the intimate conversations, he did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in recordings lawfully made by a participant and voluntarily provided to police in support of criminal allegations.

In the alternative, even if there had been a s. 8 breach, the recordings would have been admitted under s. 24(2) because the law was unsettled, the police acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual assault and uttering threats against two employees at his workplace.

The sentencing judge imposed a 16-month jail sentence but declined to make a mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, finding it would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown appealed the refusal to impose the SOIRA order.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reversing the statutory presumption in favour of the order and failing to properly analyze the enumerated factors under s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code.

A SOIRA order was imposed.

Sentencing for a school teacher who pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation arising from abuse of a student in a position of trust.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding numerous aggravating factors including grooming, secrecy, planning, persistence after protests, and significant harm to the complainant and community confidence in schools.

The offender's mental health evidence did not mitigate sentence because no causal link was established between any illness and the offences, and the defence expert's recidivism opinion was given limited weight due to inaccurate self-reporting.

A global sentence of three years' imprisonment was imposed together with mandatory and discretionary ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed her nine-year sentence for historic sexual offences against a young child, arguing the sentencing judge double-counted probation breaches, failed to consider her Indigenous background, and imposed overly broad prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's Indigenous heritage but found it would not have altered the sentence, as her moral blameworthiness was not impacted and her difficult upbringing was already considered.

The court upheld the global sentence, the section 161(1)(a) order, and the mandatory lifetime weapons prohibition under section 109(3).

The appeal was allowed only to set aside a section 161(1)(c) order on Crown concession.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple historic child sexual offences against two complainants, arguing misapprehension of evidence, improper reliance on demeanour, and erroneous credibility considerations.

The court held that any imprecision in describing the appellant’s evidence was not consequential, that demeanour was not given undue weight, and that references to lack of embellishment were permissible; although the trial judge’s reliance on counselling evidence was unnecessary, it caused no miscarriage of justice.

On sentence, the court found the custodial term fit in light of the seriousness, grooming, breach of trust, and the governing sentencing guidance for child sexual abuse.

The court clarified that an arithmetic error meant the total sentence was 11 years, not 12, and varied the internet prohibition order under s. 161(1)(d) to add tailored exceptions.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

He argued that the trial judge failed to provide him with sufficient assistance, rendering the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge failed to explain the trial process, provided inadequate instructions on cross-examination, and failed to assist the appellant in deciding whether to testify or call witnesses.

The cumulative effect of these failures resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Ontario Review Board held a mandatory annual review hearing for an accused found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault.

The accused, diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, experienced a recent exacerbation of psychotic symptoms and remains treatment resistant.

The Board found that the accused continues to represent a significant threat to the safety of the public.

On joint submission, the Board ordered the continuation of her detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, with a modification to her privileges allowing the person in charge to permit travel both inside and outside of Canada.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, break and enter, and two counts of threatening to use a weapon, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed trial counsel usurped his right to elect the mode of trial and his right to testify.

The Court of Appeal rejected the election claim, finding the appellant had not established the factual foundation and had not shown a reasonable probability he would have elected differently.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the right-to-testify ground, finding trial counsel failed to make clear that the decision to testify was the appellant's to make, failed to obtain written instructions, and that the police interview was not a functional equivalent of in-court testimony.

A new trial by judge and jury was ordered.

The appellant, who suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder after a vicious, unprovoked attack on his neighbour.

The trial judge subsequently designated the appellant a high-risk accused (HRA) under ss. 672.64(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standards and that the findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinct risk thresholds under the two subsections and finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of grave harm.

The appellant appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in giving a restrictive corrective instruction.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could not find a key Crown witness fabricated her evidence about the appellant's confession because defence counsel did not explicitly put that suggestion to her in cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no breach of the rule occurred as the tenor of the cross-examination made the defence's position clear.

Furthermore, the corrective instruction erroneously usurped the jury's function by prohibiting them from considering whether the witness fabricated the confession.

The curative proviso was not applied, and a new trial was ordered.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

The appellant, Josiah Lowe, appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment for three counts of robbery, possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000, and wearing a disguise with intent.

He argued that the sentencing judge misapplied the law regarding anti-Black racism, erred by prioritizing denunciation and deterrence, and erred in crediting his bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s application of the law or principles and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Padraig Teggart from a decision designating him as a "high risk accused" (HRA) under the Criminal Code following a finding of not criminally responsible for attempted murder.

The court found that the application judge applied the correct legal standard and properly considered the evidence, including expert opinions and statutory factors, in concluding that there was a substantial likelihood that Mr. Teggart would use violence endangering the life or safety of others.

The decision affirms the exceptional and sparing use of the HRA designation and the heightened risk threshold required.

In a sentencing appeal arising from guilty pleas to sexual assault, uttering threats, and unlawful confinement, the Court addressed whether anticipated completion time for institutional programming may be considered in fixing a fit sentence and when delay-related conduct can justify denying enhanced pre-sentence credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that programming and treatment timelines may be considered where supported by an adequate evidentiary record, provided the sentence remains proportionate to offence gravity and moral blameworthiness.

The Court further held that delay alone is insufficient to constitute wrongful conduct; conduct must be intended to frustrate the proper operation of the criminal justice system.

Applying the sentencing standard of review, the custodial term was upheld as fit, but the denial of enhanced credit for confinement in a mental health facility was varied because the offender’s delay-related conduct was materially linked to mental and cognitive impairment.

The appeal was allowed in part with additional enhanced credit awarded.

This decision addresses a Stage 1 application under sections 278.93 to 278.95 of the Criminal Code concerning the production of third-party records held by Covenant House in a sexual assault prosecution.

The accused sought records related to an incident report that might contain the complainant’s first statement about the alleged assault.

The court emphasized the high threshold for production of third-party records, requiring a demonstration of "likely relevance" and a "sufficient, case specific evidentiary or informational foundation." Mere existence of records or that they contain a prior statement is insufficient.

The application was dismissed as speculative, lacking evidence that the records would provide added information or impeachment value beyond Crown disclosure.

The appellant was charged with several human trafficking and sexual services counts and with one count of assault and one count of assault causing bodily harm.

He was convicted on the two assault counts but acquitted of the remaining charges.

He appealed his convictions and his total sentence of 14.5 months.

He argued the trial judge improperly siloed credibility findings, having acquitted him of the related charges, and provided insufficient reasons.

He also appealed the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, particularly given corroborating photographic and video evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably found the assaults were separate incidents and the total sentence was proportionate.

The court sentenced Ryan Turgeon, a former high school teacher, to three years’ imprisonment for making sexually explicit materials available to a child and for child luring, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The decision reviews the facts, the positions of the parties, the impact on the victim, and the aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Friesen and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. M.V. to situate the sentence within the evolving range for such offences, emphasizing the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

Sentence appeal from convictions for child luring and invitation to sexual touching involving online sexual exploitation of a child, including direction to create explicit images and videos.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence above the Crown's position without notice, by failing to give proper mitigating effect to the historical nature of the offences, and by relying on an improper victim impact statement comment.

The Court of Appeal held that, although notice should have been given before exceeding the Crown's position, no impactful error in principle occurred because the sentence was grounded in the authorities and individualized reasons.

The court also held that the sentencing judge made no error in treating rehabilitation and specific deterrence as important despite the passage of time and did not rely on the impugned victim impact statement.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

This sentencing decision addresses the serious offences committed by Abdisatar Aden, who pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm endangering life, aggravated assault, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession contrary to a prohibition order.

The case involved a shooting of an 18-year-old victim, Amadou Suwareh, who suffered life-threatening injuries but survived.

The decision carefully balances aggravating factors such as the use of a modified fully automatic firearm, prior weapons prohibition orders, and possession of crack cocaine for trafficking, against mitigating factors including an early guilty plea, social context evidence of systemic racism and disadvantage, and the offender’s remorse and family support.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years, with credit for pre-sentence custody, reflecting the gravity of the offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence in the context of ongoing gun violence in Toronto.

This is an appeal from a sentence where the Crown and appellant jointly requested a reduction in the custodial sentence.

Due to an inadvertent error, the negotiated joint submission of 26 months was not presented to the sentencing judge, who imposed a 36-month sentence.

The sentencing judge deemed herself functus officio to correct the error.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and substituted the sentence to reflect the original 26-month joint submission, less pre-trial credit, to rectify the procedural unfairness.