His Majesty the King v. Anthony Corallo, 2026 ONSC 3390

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-00000203-00AP DATE: 2026-06-08

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING Appellant

– and –

ANTHONY CORALLO Respondent

Counsel: M. Ansell, for the Appellant P. Socka, for the Respondent

HEARD: March 6, 2026

PUBLICATION RESTRICTION NOTICE

By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, no information that could identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant may be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any manner. These reasons have been anonymized to permit their publication.

On appeal from the decision entered by Justice J. Lefebvre of the Ontario Court of Justice, dated June 4, 2025.

BELLOWS, J.

SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL

Background

1A.L. and D.P. were both employees at a cannabis business where Anthony Corallo was the Human Resource Manager and Vice President. Both were victims of several sexual assaults by Mr. Corallo. A.L. was also the victim of a threat to keep her silent on his assault. Mr. Corallo sexually assaulted D.P. seven times over a nine-month period at work. A.L. was sexually assaulted three times – once outside the workplace under the guise of helping her find an apartment, and the other times at work. He also threatened to kill her if she told anyone after the assault outside her hotel.

2Mr. Corallo pleaded guilty to the offences. The sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence report and able submissions by counsel on sentence. The Crown proceeded by summary conviction and sought the maximum available sentence: an 18-month jail term. The defence agreed that a jail sentence was appropriate but sought a conditional sentence order.

3The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 16 months' jail on each count of sexual assault, concurrent to one another, and a 30-day sentence on the charge of utter threats, also concurrent. Mr. Corallo was also subject to a 2-year probationary period and several ancillary orders. He received a 2-year s. 110 weapons prohibition, and was required to provide a sample of his DNA to law enforcement.

4The Crown also sought an order under s. 490.012(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Criminal Code”), requiring that the respondent comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (“SOIRA”). The sentencing judge declined to make the order on the basis that it would be “grossly disproportionate to the public interest…”¹

5The Crown appeals the sentencing judge’s refusal to impose a SOIRA order, pursuant to s. 490.014 of the Criminal Code. The appellant maintains that the judge erred in principle by failing to give effect to various statutory considerations enumerated in s. 490.012(4) and concluding that the order would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest on the record before her. The appellant also argues that the sentencing judge’s decision not to impose a SOIRA order was clearly unreasonable.

6No other aspects of the sentence are subject to this appeal.

7For the following reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision denying the SOIRA order, and make the order pursuant to s. 490.012(3) of the Criminal Code.

Analysis and Disposition

8The recent Court of Appeal for Ontario decision of Associate Chief Justice Fairburn in R. v. Eldon, 2025 ONCA 348, clearly sets out the history of the statutory scheme and current scheme for orders under s. 490.012: see paras. 28-47. I will not review that entire history here, but will note the following points, explained in greater detail in Eldon, about the current statutory scheme:

a. That it is Parliament’s response to R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38, at para. 40.

b. That SOIRA orders are mandatory in certain circumstances: at para. 41. Those circumstances do not exist in the case before me.

c. As in Eldon, this matter is governed by 490.012(3) and (4) – where an offender not caught by (1) or (2) is convicted of a designated offence, “the court ‘shall make an order’ requiring compliance with SOIRA ‘unless the court is satisfied the person has established that’ one of two exceptions apply:

(a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act; or

(b) the impact of the order on the person, including their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under the Act” [Emphasis added.]: at para. 43.²

d. Each of these exceptions establishes a high threshold and recognizes the dual-purpose framework of the Act, as was recognized in Ndhlovu, as laudable goals: prevention and investigation, at para. 44.

e. The new addition to the scheme enumerates factors that the court shall consider in an assessment. As Fairburn, A.C.J.O. states: “As the presumption is that an order is to be made…, this list of factors informs those situations where the offender attempts to establish that an order should not be made…”: at para. 45.

f. Where a 20-year order is mandatory, the subject may bring an application to terminate the order after 10 years under s. 490.015: at para. 47.³

9It is mandatory to consider the factors set out in s. 490.012(4) when determining whether there is “no connection” under s. 490.012(3)(a) or whether the order would be “grossly disproportionate” under s. 490.012(3)(b). Those factors are:

(4) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (3) in respect of a person, the court shall consider

(a) the nature and seriousness of the designated offence;

(b) the victim’s age and other personal characteristics;

(d) the personal characteristics and circumstances of the person;

(e) the person’s criminal history, including the age at which they previously committed any offence and the length of time for which they have been at liberty without committing an offence;

(f) the opinions of experts who have examined the person; and

(g) any other factors that the court considers relevant.

10The sentencing judge’s reasons are short. As noted in Eldon, this is understandable given the volume the Ontario Court of Justice faces on a regular basis. They are as follows:

[…] That is my sentence, but I still need to address the Sex Offender Information Registry Act. The Crown requested an order, pursuant to s. 490.012(3) of the Criminal Code, requiring Mr. Corallo to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registry Act for ten years.

Pursuant to that subsection, the court shall make an order unless the court is satisfied the person established that a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature; or b) the impact of the order would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown submits the order would not be disproportionate given the unique and troubling nature of the sexual assault. [The Crown] submits it is important in any police investigation to know where a convicted sexual offender resides. As there is no risk assessment in this case, there’s no reason Mr. Corallo should be exempt, he argued.

I disagree. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38 [sic], considered this general argument. Unlike a DNA order, the offender is required to attend the police station annually, provide personal information, and as noted at paragraph 43 of the decision, is subject to annual compliance checks. There’s no doubt there is police interference in a person’s life. The purpose of the legislation is to assist law enforcement in identifying a potential suspect when investigating a crime. It also serves a dual purpose of protecting the community members from sexual offenders.

Mr. Corallo is 62 years old. He has never been involved in the criminal justice system prior to being charged with these offences. The offences he committed were against known complainants, and there’s no indication that he ever exhibited other kinds of predatory behaviour.

Finally, and most importantly, is that Mr. Corallo is in counselling and the evidence before me suggests he is a good candidate for rehabilitation and any further counselling, which may be recommended to him. There’s no evidence before me that he is an increased risk of reoffending. Saying he was convicted of a sexual offence is not sufficient since the pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Canada to impose a SOIRA order. Although the legislation has since been amended, the provision requires the court to assess the merit of the objection by counsel.

The defence has shown that the order would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest, given the factors enumerated in subsection 4, and more specifically, the nature and circumstances of the relationship between the person and the victim, the personal characteristics and circumstances of the person, his criminal history or lack thereof, his age, and the fact he has been on bail for a substantial amount of time without incident. The request for a SOIRA order is denied. [Emphasis added.]

11Although the sentencing judge properly identified the requirements of the new legislative scheme, she did not, in my view, apply them. The reasons also referred to Ndhlovu and seem to rely on that decision as the current authority, rather than the new legislative scheme adopted post-Ndhlovu. Also, it does not appear that counsel brought the decision in Eldon, only a month old at the time of sentencing, to the sentencing judge’s attention.

12Despite referencing the requirement for a “grossly disproportionate” impact, and naming some of the enumerated factors required to be considered, there is no analysis of those factors or the others which were not mentioned.

13The sentencing judge’s decision repeatedly referred to Mr. Corallo abusing his position of authority in committing these offences:

a. “There is no doubt Mr. Corallo abused his position of authority when he committed the acts in question.”⁴

b. “Due to his position, vis-à-vis the complainants, his moral culpability is very high.”⁵

c. “Pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(iii), it is aggravating that the offender abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim.”⁶

d. “[…] is the shocking breach of a position of authority by the accused, and his moral blameworthiness is inherent in the commission of these offences.”⁷

e. “The fact that his wife and daughters do not believe that he disrespects women does not take away from the fact that Mr. Corallo did disrespect these women who worked under him. As an HR personnel, he should have been the person to support the complaints.”⁸

14Furthermore, the sentencing judge noted the significant impact the offences had on the complainants throughout the sentencing decision:

a. “D.P. dreaded going to work as she did not know what the accused would do to her on any given day. She enjoyed going to work prior to these incidents. She enjoyed spending time with her work family. D.P. feels ashamed, embarrassed, angry, scared, and sad. She was hospitalized for mental health caused by this incident. It goes without saying that the incidents also had a tremendous impact on D.P. financially…”⁹

b. “A.L. reported feeling fearful, and felt very intimidated at work as a result of Mr. Corallo’s conduct.”¹⁰

c. “Also aggravating is the impact of the offender’s actions on the complainants. Mr. Corallo talks about losing his employment and not being able to return to work in his field. D.P. also could not return to an employment she enjoyed with co-workers she respected and enjoyed being around. A.L. and D.P. both dreaded going to work as they feared the harassment and what was waiting for them. Mr. Corallo’s action has had a tremendous impact on the complainants.”¹¹

15Respectfully, the sentencing judge’s analysis, as in the trial decision in Eldon, is inconsistent with a proper interpretation of the new statutory scheme. I say this for several reasons.

16Referring again to Fairburn, A. C. J. O.’s decision: “First, it is critical to begin the analysis under s. 490.012(3) with the statutory presumption front and centre, recognizing that an order shall be imposed unless it can be established that the criteria under (a) or (b) are met”: Eldon, at para. 52.

17When the sentencing judge states, “There’s no evidence before me that he is an increased risk of reoffending. Saying he was convicted of a sexual offence is not sufficient since the pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Canada to impose a SOIRA order,”¹² it reverses the presumption in favour of making an order under s. 490.012.

18The sentencing judge reverses the presumption, resulting in an error in principle: see Eldon, at paras. 52-53.

19Further, when the Court states, “[…] there’s no indication that he ever exhibited other kinds of predatory behaviour,” it suggests that a prior record or indication of predatory behaviour is a prerequisite in making an order. This, too, reverses the presumption and places the burden of proof on the Crown. At most, this could be considered when assessing the offender's circumstances as part of the review of the enumerated factors.

20The sentencing judge appears to rely on state interference in an offender’s life as the basis for a finding of gross disproportionality. When the Court states, “There’s no doubt there is police interference in a person’s life,” it tends to displace the presumption for an order. Every SOIRA order requires the offender to report annually to police; this “police interference” cannot, on its own, result in gross disproportionality. There have been circumstances of an offender, such as transience and substance abuse, that courts have considered as significant challenges that increase the disproportion: Ndhlovu, at para. 135.¹³

21But for the sentencing judge’s apparent reversal of the presumption and undue weight placed on the impact reporting might have on Mr. Corallo, there is no reference to any evidence to establish either criterion that would exempt him from the presumptive order. These reasons are an error in principle and cannot excuse Mr. Corallo from a SOIRA order.

22Given the foregoing, the decision denying the SOIRA order is set aside, and a SOIRA order in form 52 is made pursuant to s. 490.012(2) of the Criminal Code.