Rebecca Anne De Filippis

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

C.P. was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to a conditional sentence.

C.P. appealed the conviction, and the Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence, arguing for incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment or fact-finding.

While the Court found the conditional sentence demonstrably unfit for a serious sexual assault, it dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, concluding that re-incarceration was not in the interests of justice given the time already served on the conditional sentence and the appellant's compliance and rehabilitation prospects.

The appellant, Justin Lozon, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The central issue at trial was whether the deceased's motorcycle headlight was on, which the trial judge found to be true.

The appeal argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to apply the principles from *R. v. W.(D.)* regarding credibility analysis.

A fresh evidence application was also brought, claiming the motorcycle had mechanical difficulties, including the light.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the *W.(D.)* principles correctly applied, and the fresh evidence lacked cogency due to inconsistencies and the witness's credibility issues.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault and a Crown appeal from sentence.

The appellant challenged the conviction based on alleged errors in the trial judge’s reasoning, including the *Browne v. Dunn* rule and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

The Crown appealed the two-year less a day conditional sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court declined to interfere with the sentence, finding it was an exceptional case justified by the offender's remorse, commitment to rehabilitation, insight, and the severe family consequences of incarceration.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of drugging and sexually assaulting 14 women and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence, appealed his convictions on three counts and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the use of similar fact evidence (despite a procedural oversight which was deemed harmless), or the determination that a determinate sentence would not adequately protect the public given the appellant's high risk of reoffending due to antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of one respondent and the sentence of another, while the second respondent appealed his conviction.

Both cases involved border officers searching the respondents' digital devices under s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act, leading to the discovery of child pornography.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 99(1)(a) violates s. 8 of the Charter because it authorizes highly intrusive searches of digital devices without reasonable suspicion.

The law was declared unconstitutional with a six-month suspension.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court admitted the evidence for both respondents due to the officers' good faith reliance on existing law and the serious nature of the offences.

The first respondent's acquittal was overturned and a new trial ordered.

The second respondent's conviction was upheld.

The Court also established a new sentencing range for child pornography possession, finding the second respondent's conditional sentence demonstrably unfit and stating a three-year sentence was appropriate, though it declined to incarcerate him given the time already served on house arrest.

The appellant, Caleb Burgler, appealed his sentence for criminal negligence causing death, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting his unsuccessful rehabilitation attempts and not considering his drug addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that drug addiction is not a general mitigating factor for such crimes and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the appellant's efforts and ongoing addiction in assessing reoffending risk and public protection.

The court also upheld the probation terms and weapons prohibition as within the sentencing judge's discretion.

The Crown sought to bifurcate the conviction and sentence appeals of the respondent, C.P., who was convicted of sexual assault.

The Crown argued for bifurcation due to anticipated delays in perfecting the conviction appeal, fearing C.P. would benefit from time served on a conditional sentence.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the expected delay was not undue and that the benefits of hearing the appeals together outweighed the Crown's concerns, noting that any benefit from delay would only be granted if in the interests of justice.

The appellant, Safwat Sadek, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, uttering a threat, impersonating a peace officer, and firearm/weapons offences.

The appeal focused on the admissibility of evidence seized from his apartment and vehicles following alleged Charter breaches by police.

The trial judge excluded evidence from the apartment due to serious s. 8 Charter breaches but admitted evidence from the vehicles, deeming those breaches "technical." The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that even considering the serious apartment breaches, the s. 24(2) Grant analysis did not warrant exclusion of the vehicle evidence, as the connection was remote and the impact on privacy in vehicles was minimal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his guilty pleas were uninformed, and his dangerous offender designation, asserting that the sentencing judge failed to consider his treatment prospects at the designation stage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The Court found that the appellant's guilty pleas were informed, as the facts underlying the Superior Court charges were part of the agreed statement of facts in the Ontario Court of Justice and the Crown had explicitly stated these matters would inform the dangerous offender application.

The Court also rejected the argument that using Superior Court facts in the dangerous offender proceeding constituted double punishment under s. 725 of the Criminal Code, clarifying that a dangerous offender hearing is not a "further proceeding" for that purpose.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the Court held that the sentencing judge's reasons, read as a whole, were consistent with the principles of considering treatability at the designation stage, as articulated in R. v. Boutilier.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that even if there was an error, the curative proviso would apply given the overwhelming evidence of the appellant's untreatability and high risk of recidivism.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing child pornography, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that s. 8 of the Charter was not engaged when his wife voluntarily turned over computers containing evidence to the police, and by failing to find a s. 8 breach due to delayed reporting of the seizure.

The Court of Appeal found that s. 8 was engaged when police took control of the computers, constituting a seizure.

While the seizure of Computer 1 was found to be lawful under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code, the delay in filing the report to a justice for Computer 1 was a Charter breach.

The court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breaches were not serious and the evidence was reliable and essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to consider his treatability at the designation phase, contrary to R. v. Boutilier.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied Boutilier, considering treatability at both designation and penalty phases.

Even if there was an error, it caused no prejudice as the conclusion of untreatability would have been the same.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge confused "treatability with curability." The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ian Reid, appealed his convictions for multiple firearm-related offences, alleging Charter ss. 7 and 9 violations and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the detention was not arbitrary, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on confidential informant information, and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding the burden of proof on the Charter application and the trial judge's assessment of police credibility.

The appellant, Jabir Khan, appealed his convictions for possessing a restricted firearm and occupying a vehicle with a firearm.

He argued that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a s. 24(2) analysis regarding the firearm's exclusion and materially misapprehended evidence, leading to an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the s. 24(2) argument was inappropriately raised for the first time on appeal.

The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence, upholding the trial judge's thorough and compelling reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony due to its illogical nature and inconsistencies with audio surveillance and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of breach of trust, conspiracy, and attempting to obstruct justice after disseminating confidential police information.

He appealed, arguing that the London Police Service's investigation of its own officer created an inherent conflict of interest amounting to an abuse of process under the residual category.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police service's conduct did not offend societal notions of fair play and decency, and that the failure to transfer the investigation to an outside force earlier did not undermine the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant was convicted of possessing child pornography.

The appeal challenged the sufficiency of grounds for a search warrant, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) did not establish reasonable grounds for drug trafficking evidence at his apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the warrant could have been issued based on the totality of circumstances, including a credible and compelling confidential informant tip corroborated by police investigation and property manager information, despite some deficiencies in the ITO.

The offender, a police officer of Indigenous descent, pleaded guilty to breach of trust for conducting unauthorized searches on police databases and sharing the information with an acquaintance.

The court considered the offender's severe addiction issues, PTSD from his policing career, and his disconnection from his Indigenous heritage as significant Gladue factors.

Finding that the offence was an aberration and that a conviction was not necessary for general deterrence, the court granted an absolute discharge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and reliability, arguing that the judge misapprehended evidence and failed to address the cumulative impact of weaknesses in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and the trial judge's reasons, finding no misapprehension of evidence or piecemeal approach.

The trial judge's findings on credibility were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, two police officers charged with theft, obstruct justice, and perjury, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 41 months and 6 days.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including an implicit waiver by one co-accused, and delay caused by an inaccurate estimate for the preliminary inquiry.

The court also deducted 10 months as an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic backlog.

After deductions, the net delay for both applicants fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.