Ellen C. Williams

The appellant appealed his convictions for four counts of sexual assault and his 11-year sentence.

He argued that expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma was improperly admitted and that similar fact evidence was erroneously used across counts.

The Court of Appeal found that while the expert evidence was admitted in error, the error was harmless due to robust jury instructions, applying the curative proviso.

The court also upheld the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the appellant's deteriorating health was dismissed, as it would not have altered the proportionate sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants, two highly paid executives, were convicted of fraud arising from the public procurement process for a $300 million renovation to St. Michael's Hospital.

They engaged in secret communications and concealed conflicts of interest, causing significant financial and reputational harm to the hospital, other bidders, and the public procurement system.

The court found the fraud exceeded $1 million, triggering a mandatory minimum sentence.

Aquino, who orchestrated the scheme and destroyed evidence, was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

Georgiou, who breached his position of trust but may have misguidedly believed his actions benefited the hospital, was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.

The defendants, having been found guilty of two counts of fraud over $5,000 in relation to a public hospital procurement process, applied to re-open their trial prior to sentencing.

They argued that the Crown failed to provide notice of the alleged deprivation, failed to prove causation, and that the court erred in its factual and legal findings regarding intangible deprivation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendants were fully aware of the case to meet, the factual findings were supported by circumstantial evidence, and intangible losses such as risk to market integrity constitute valid deprivation in fraud.

The court concluded that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify the extraordinary step of re-opening the trial, and any alleged errors should be pursued at the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple criminal offences involving domestic abuse and sexual assault of his former domestic partner.

He appealed his convictions on two grounds: (1) that the jury charge on myths and stereotypes was imbalanced and insufficient, and (2) that the jury instruction on prior consistent statements was inadequate.

He also sought leave to appeal his five-year sentence for sexual assault, arguing it was excessive and based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding his conduct in other relationships.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge, while not perfect, was functional and equipped jurors to decide the case according to law.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the five-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the severity of the offence and the offender's moral culpability.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed outstanding issues in a motion brought by the respondent seeking orders under ss. 683(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code in support of an anticipated fresh evidence application.

The court considered two primary issues: (1) whether the Executive Legal Officer of the Superior Court should be required to provide a will-say statement and submit to cross-examination regarding communications with trial Crown counsel; and (2) whether counsel for the respondent could communicate with the now-retired trial judge to obtain clarification on matters raised in the trial judge's emails.

The court dismissed the motion for a will-say and cross-examination of the Executive Legal Officer, finding that while the communications were not themselves privileged, the risk of inadvertently disclosing matters subject to judicial immunity outweighed the limited probative value of the evidence sought.

The court also directed that neither counsel could communicate with the retired trial judge, holding that judges cannot waive judicial immunity and that the inquiries sought would necessarily disclose matters covered by judicial immunity.

In a Crown appeal of an acquittal where the trial judge resigned due to permanent infirmity without providing written reasons, the respondent sought disclosure regarding communications between the Executive Legal Officer (ELO) of the Superior Court of Justice and the Crown.

The Office of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice (OCJSCJ) moved to provide unredacted communications in the ELO's possession to the appellate panel for judicial inspection only.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the OCJSCJ's motion, agreeing to review the sealed materials to ensure the panel has the necessary context regarding sensitive issues of judicial independence and privilege.

The court also deferred a decision on the respondent's request to contact the retired trial judge, inviting input from the Ontario Superior Court Judges’ Association.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for careless storage of a firearm, arguing the trial judge applied a standard of perfection.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of an absolute discharge, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and that the trial judge improperly deferred to police disciplinary proceedings.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals.

The court found the trial judge correctly applied the 'marked departure' standard to the appellant's storage of his service weapon in an unlocked plastic drawer.

On sentence, while noting the absolute discharge was extremely lenient, the court held it was not demonstrably unfit given the collateral consequences the appellant faced under the Police Services Act.

The decision concerns a fatal boating accident in Toronto, where Filip Grkovski was charged with multiple counts of criminal negligence and impaired operation causing death and bodily harm.

The court found that the only viable route to conviction was if Grkovski was proven to be driving at the time of the crash.

After reviewing the evidence, the court found reasonable doubt as to who was driving and acquitted Grkovski of all charges.

Michael Katz appealed the two-year sentence imposed after pleading guilty to several offences, including possession of a loaded firearm, assaulting a police officer with a weapon, impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s approach or conclusions.

The court also substituted a three-year driving prohibition, to commence from the date of sentencing, in place of the original 18-month prohibition, in accordance with the Criminal Code and relevant case law.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered three applications related to a previous application by David Swaine, the respondent on a Crown appeal.

Swaine sought orders under sections 682 and 683 of the Criminal Code, including cross-examination of prosecuting Crowns and production of documents from the Executive Legal Officer of the Superior Court of Justice.

Two applications to intervene were brought by the Office of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Superior Court Judges’ Association, both raising concerns about the administration of justice and judicial independence.

The Crown also sought a sealing order for future materials.

The Court granted leave to intervene to both proposed interveners and dismissed the Crown’s application for a sealing order, finding it inapplicable to the materials at issue.

The court considered the Crown's application under section 714.2 of the Criminal Code to permit a key witness, Ms. Kelly Zeng, to testify by Zoom from outside Canada.

The application arose after the Crown failed to subpoena Ms. Zeng before she left the country.

The defence argued that the Crown should not benefit from its own negligence.

The court agreed, finding it contrary to the principles of fundamental justice to allow remote testimony in these circumstances, and dismissed the application, but left open the possibility for the Crown to renew it if further information became available.

The applicant, a police officer acquitted of failing to provide the necessaries of life, brought an application to cross-examine the prosecuting Crowns and obtain documents from the Executive Legal Officer and the retired trial judge.

The Crown had appealed the acquittal based on the trial judge's failure to provide reasons.

The applicant sought this evidence to support a fresh evidence application, alleging that ex parte communications by the Crown with the Executive Legal Officer led to the trial judge being prohibited from sitting, which prevented the delivery of reasons.

The Court of Appeal granted the request to cross-examine the Crowns, finding it relevant to the fresh evidence application, but adjourned the requests for document production pending submissions on potential privilege claims.

The appellant appealed a six-year sentence for two counts of sexual assault and one count of unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by treating a risk assessment as having no value due to the appellant's alleged dishonesty and by classifying the appellant's mental health issues as "neutral" rather than mitigating.

While upholding the application of the intimate partner aggravating factor, the appellate court re-evaluated the sentence, reducing it from six years to five years concurrent.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, sought a panel review of a decision denying him bail pending appeal under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the bail judge erred in assessing his medical evidence, misunderstanding his release plan, and undervaluing the strength of his appeal.

The motions judge found no arguable material errors of fact or law in the bail judge's decision, concluding that the applicant remained a flight risk and that his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The application for a panel review was dismissed.

J.W. was found guilty by a jury on six counts including choking to overcome resistance to sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, stemming from a domestic relationship between 2013-2015.

The court, in its reasons for sentence, considered the serious and ongoing nature of the abuse, its profound impact on the victim, and the aggravating factor of domestic partner abuse.

Despite mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record and strong community support, the court found a conditional sentence inappropriate due to the gravity of the offences.

The total sentence imposed was six years incarceration, with specific terms for each count, and ancillary orders including a non-communication order, DNA order, lifetime firearms prohibition, and a 20-year Sexual Offender Information Registry order.

The appellant, Daniel Wright, appealed a three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence for sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, committed between 1988 and 1990.

He argued the sentence was excessive, the judge erred in applying contemporary sentencing principles to a historical offence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a risk assessment and prior willingness to take responsibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact, and that the sentence was fit.

The court also denied the fresh evidence application, concluding it would not have affected the outcome, and declined jurisdiction over the SOIRA order given the sentence was not reduced.

The appellant, Nicholas Doering, brought a second appeal against his conviction for failing to provide the necessaries of life, after the Court of Appeal had previously affirmed his guilt on that charge and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in not re-opening the case to allow new legal arguments on his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to re-open the case as the matter was remitted for sentencing purposes only.

The court held that the issue of guilt was res judicata and the current appeal constituted an impermissible collateral attack on its previous order, emphasizing the principle of finality in the appellate process.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearm offences and sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the application judge's ruling on pole camera surveillance or the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the total incarceration period from 18 to 15 years and quashing the delayed parole order.

The court found the trial judge erred by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a first-time offender.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred by not cautioning the jury about relying solely on uncorroborated police evidence of an accused's utterance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police witnesses are assessed for credibility and reliability in the same manner as any other witness.

A specific cautionary instruction is only appropriate if an evidentiary foundation is laid, and a categorical approach is unwarranted.

The court also found that the prosecution did not depend solely on the undercover officer's evidence, given the seizure of a significant quantity of cocaine.

The three accused were charged with conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime following an RCMP undercover operation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on voice identification evidence from intercepted communications to link the accused Shanker to the conspiracy.

The court found the voice identification evidence unreliable due to cross-racial identification issues, expectation bias, and the poor quality of the recordings.

Without reliable voice identification, the circumstantial evidence of the accused's presence at the warehouse was insufficient to prove their involvement in the drug trafficking scheme beyond a reasonable doubt.

All accused were acquitted of the cocaine-related charges.

Pawar conceded guilt to a separate charge of possessing opium for the purpose of trafficking.