Dr. Lori Haskell

The appellant appealed his convictions for four counts of sexual assault and his 11-year sentence.

He argued that expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma was improperly admitted and that similar fact evidence was erroneously used across counts.

The Court of Appeal found that while the expert evidence was admitted in error, the error was harmless due to robust jury instructions, applying the curative proviso.

The court also upheld the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the appellant's deteriorating health was dismissed, as it would not have altered the proportionate sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of P.J.C., who had been convicted of assaulting his three stepchildren and sexually assaulting one of them.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence from Dr. Lori Haskell on the neurobiology of trauma and its effects on memory.

The Court found that the expert evidence was not necessary for the trial judge to assess the credibility and reliability of the complainants, and that its presentation—particularly through hypotheticals closely tracking the complainants’ evidence—improperly bolstered their credibility.

The prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The applicant, an 83-year-old man convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his appeal.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous due to an arguable ground regarding the admission of expert evidence, the applicant failed to establish that he would surrender into custody.

The court noted the applicant's significant resources, history of non-compliance with court orders, and the unsuitability of his proposed surety.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, given the gravity of the offences and the weakness of the remaining grounds of appeal.

The application for bail was dismissed.

Jacob Hoggard appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm to J.B., arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma, failing to correct the Crown's closing submissions, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and improperly admitting discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony as it was not necessary and risked misuse, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred due to the trial judge's effective corrective instructions.

The other grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit expert evidence from Dr. Lori Haskell on the neurobiology of trauma in a sexual assault trial against Peter Nygard.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was irrelevant, unnecessary, and that Dr. Haskell was not properly qualified.

The court applied the Mohan framework and a cost-benefit analysis, finding the evidence relevant to disabuse the jury of myths and stereotypes about victim behaviour, necessary to assist in credibility assessment, and that Dr. Haskell possessed the requisite expertise.

The application was allowed, permitting Dr. Haskell to testify for the limited purpose of explaining general responses to trauma.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, applied for release pending appeal under s. 679 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was not frivolous and there was no flight risk.

The court focused on whether detention was necessary in the public interest, considering public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

Finding no substantial public safety concerns and arguable grounds of appeal, the court granted the application for release, emphasizing that the public interest in reviewability can outweigh the enforceability interest in such circumstances.

Prior to a jury trial for sexual assault, the defence brought several evidentiary motions.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of the accused's prior sexual communications with a complainant, renew an application for severance of counts, and exclude a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown's expert witness on the neurobiology of trauma.

The court admitted the communications evidence, finding it essential to the narrative and the Crown's similar fact application.

The court dismissed the renewed severance application, concluding the accused's intention to testify did not undermine the viability of the similar fact evidence.

The court permitted the expert to use the PowerPoint presentation with specific modifications to prevent prejudice.

Finally, the court expanded the opening jury instructions to address nonconscious bias and false assumptions regarding consent.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual interference, the court ruled on several pre-trial applications.

The court permitted a challenge for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The court excluded proposed evidence from a former bandmate regarding a masturbation video and a statement about degradation, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence from a prior sexual partner regarding sexual urination.

Finally, the court permitted the Crown to call an expert witness to testify about the basic neurobiology of trauma to dispel myths and stereotypes, but restricted the expert from applying that science specifically to the context of sexual assault.

On a pretrial application, the accused sought severance of counts relating to two complainants on a single indictment alleging sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual interference.

The court applied the interests of justice severance framework and held that, despite some moral prejudice concerns arising from one complainant's age and surrounding circumstances, the allegations were sufficiently connected in factual context and legal issues to support a joint trial.

The court further held that the Crown had a viable similar fact application because the allegations disclosed a strong and specific nexus, including unusual and distinctive features.

Balancing prejudice, trial fairness, efficiency, and the truth-seeking function of the process, the severance application was dismissed, with leave to renew if circumstances changed.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempting to obstruct justice by lying to police about the identity of the person who killed her ex-boyfriend.

The accused was assaulted by her ex-boyfriend with a knife, and her current boyfriend shot and killed him in defence.

When police arrived, the accused gave false statements claiming she did not know who the shooter was, and she attempted to persuade a witness not to mention her boyfriend to police.

The accused maintained this lie for seven and a half months before finally admitting the truth.

The court imposed a nine-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, balancing her youth, guilty plea, and lack of criminal record against the serious nature of obstructing justice in a homicide investigation.