Kelly Slate

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the court conducted the required post-verdict fact-finding exercise and accepted the complainant's evidence in its entirety, including repeated forced anal, oral, and vaginal penetration, choking, degrading conduct, and profound long-term psychological harm.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount given the manipulative and degrading nature of the offence, while also recognizing the offender's lack of prior record, family support, work history, and rehabilitation prospects.

A defence forensic psychiatric opinion was not accepted as a reliable basis to conclude the offender posed a low future risk or lacked a paraphilic disorder.

Collateral consequences, including loss of career, public notoriety, and exposure to a civil claim, were considered but given limited weight.

A penitentiary sentence of five years and mandatory ancillary orders were imposed.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breaching a recognizance after a five-year-old child was found severely beaten in a wooded area.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's motive stemming from a deteriorating relationship with the child's mother, his opportunity to commit the crime, pattern bruising on the child matching the accused's shoes, and the child's DNA found under the accused's fingernails.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused committed the assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

On a Crown application during a jury trial for sexual offences involving two complainants, the court considered whether cross-count similar fact reasoning could be left with the jury.

Applying the framework in Handy, the court held the allegations disclosed a sufficiently specific and distinctive pattern, including the surrounding context, degrading acts, and post-incident conduct, such that coincidence was objectively improbable.

The court found the probative value of the proposed similar fact reasoning outweighed both moral and reasoning prejudice, which could be managed by instruction.

The application was granted and a cross-count similar fact instruction would be given.

Prior to a jury trial for sexual assault, the defence brought several evidentiary motions.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of the accused's prior sexual communications with a complainant, renew an application for severance of counts, and exclude a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown's expert witness on the neurobiology of trauma.

The court admitted the communications evidence, finding it essential to the narrative and the Crown's similar fact application.

The court dismissed the renewed severance application, concluding the accused's intention to testify did not undermine the viability of the similar fact evidence.

The court permitted the expert to use the PowerPoint presentation with specific modifications to prevent prejudice.

Finally, the court expanded the opening jury instructions to address nonconscious bias and false assumptions regarding consent.

The accused was tried for two counts of first-degree murder in the stabbing deaths of his wife and mother-in-law.

The Crown argued for constructive first-degree murder on the basis that the killings occurred during a forcible confinement.

The accused conceded he killed the victims but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to intoxication and denied forcible confinement.

The court rejected the intoxication defence, finding the accused had the intent to murder based on his actions, the extent of the injuries, and his post-offence conduct.

The court also found that the accused forcibly confined the victims by dragging them from an upstairs bedroom to the kitchen where the fatal wounds were inflicted.

The accused was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, a key Crown witness refused to be sworn and testify.

The Crown brought an application under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's testimony from the preliminary inquiry.

The accused opposed the application, arguing he did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry because he subsequently obtained new impeachment materials.

The court held that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine and that admitting the prior testimony would not occasion unfairness, provided the newly discovered impeachment materials were also admitted into evidence.

The Crown's application was granted subject to conditions.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual interference, the court ruled on several pre-trial applications.

The court permitted a challenge for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The court excluded proposed evidence from a former bandmate regarding a masturbation video and a statement about degradation, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence from a prior sexual partner regarding sexual urination.

Finally, the court permitted the Crown to call an expert witness to testify about the basic neurobiology of trauma to dispel myths and stereotypes, but restricted the expert from applying that science specifically to the context of sexual assault.

On a pretrial application, the accused sought severance of counts relating to two complainants on a single indictment alleging sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual interference.

The court applied the interests of justice severance framework and held that, despite some moral prejudice concerns arising from one complainant's age and surrounding circumstances, the allegations were sufficiently connected in factual context and legal issues to support a joint trial.

The court further held that the Crown had a viable similar fact application because the allegations disclosed a strong and specific nexus, including unusual and distinctive features.

Balancing prejudice, trial fairness, efficiency, and the truth-seeking function of the process, the severance application was dismissed, with leave to renew if circumstances changed.

Following a brief trial, the defendant was found guilty of sexual assault and not guilty of assault.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that a suspended sentence with two years of probation was appropriate.

The court accepted the joint submission, crediting 102 days of pre-trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio (153 days equivalent).

The sentence included probation conditions, a weapons prohibition, DNA sampling requirements, and mandatory registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for 10 years.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and assault upon his aunt.

The defendant pleaded guilty to simple assault on count two.

The court conducted a trial on the sexual assault charge.

The Crown called two witnesses and the defendant testified.

The court found the defendant guilty of sexual assault and not guilty of the assault charge, as the assault was committed in circumstances of a sexual nature and formed part of a continuing transaction that began in the boiler room with the defendant's exposure of his genitals and sexually suggestive language.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of non-consensual prior sexual activity with the complainant, his aunt, to explain the nature of their relationship, his behaviour during the alleged incident, and his mental state at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the other sexual activity (OSA) evidence met the requirements of section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant claimed the complainant had sexually assaulted him over a two to three-year period when he was a youth.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence sufficiently particularized, relevant to issues at trial, and having significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a motor vehicle collision on the QEW.

The defence challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a demand for breath samples, arguing this constituted a breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer had sufficient grounds based on witness testimony regarding erratic driving, the defendant's admission that he had consumed alcohol, the odour of alcohol on his breath, and the defendant's statement that he would fail the breath test.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the defendant guilty of the "Over 80" charge, entering a conditional stay on the impaired driving charge.

Mandeep Punia was charged with second-degree murder and Skinder Punia with accessory after the fact to murder.

The jury found Mandeep guilty of manslaughter and Skinder guilty of accessory to manslaughter.

This decision provides the judge's reasons for several trial rulings: (a) the effect of a registrar's error during peremptory challenges in jury selection, which was deemed procedural and saved by s. 643(3) of the Criminal Code; (b) the refusal to issue a Vetrovec warning for a crucial Crown witness (Supinder Litt) due to her non-unsavoury character, though a strong caution was given; (c) the refusal to give a Bero instruction regarding incomplete police recordings, as no deliberate failure to preserve evidence was found, but the jury was instructed that reasonable doubt could arise from the absence of evidence; and (d) the decision to leave the defence of provocation with the jury for Mandeep, finding an "air of reality" to the subjective element based on the totality of evidence, despite the defence not actively advancing it.

In a murder trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a 911 call purportedly made by a central Crown witness.

The Crown argued the call was admissible as the best evidence of the event and to rebut recent fabrication.

The defence argued the recording lacked context and amounted to improper oath-helping.

The court ruled the 911 call-back was inadmissible at this stage, finding it devoid of material information and that its admission would serve solely to bolster the witness's credibility before it was attacked, thereby offending the rule against oath-helping.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter following the death of a 14-month-old child in her care.

The child suffered a severe skull fracture and subdural hematoma.

The court found that the accused momentarily lost her patience and intentionally assaulted the child, causing the fatal injuries.

Alternatively, the court found that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of life by delaying calling 911 for over an hour after observing the child was unresponsive and limp, which significantly contributed to the child's death.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit four out-of-court statements made by a witness, Kulwant Litt, for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (a K.G.B. application).

The witness, who is the father of one accused and father-in-law of the other, had previously confessed to his son (acting as a police agent) and the police about the accused's involvement in a murder and the subsequent disposal of the body, but later recanted.

The court found that necessity was established by the recantation and that threshold reliability was met through a combination of procedural reliability (the witness was available for cross-examination and the statements were recorded) and substantive reliability (confirmatory physical evidence and lack of motive to lie at the time).

The statements were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of his young daughter.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the child's unusual utterances and the accused's five-hour police statement.

The court found the accused's statement to police was involuntary and wholly unreliable, obtained through a combination of oppressive circumstances, impermissible inducements, and quid pro quos.

The accused, who suffered from obsessive-compulsive disorder, was particularly vulnerable to the Reid technique interrogation employed by police.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to guilt and acquitted the accused.

During a jury trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the accused brought a motion seeking further disclosure relating to certified translations of Punjabi-language recordings and interviews relied upon by the Crown.

The defence identified material discrepancies between police, Crown-certified, and defence-certified translations of a key intercepted conversation and sought documentation relating to the commissioning, preparation, and certification of translations.

The court found that the requested materials had a sufficient nexus to the reliability of the translations relevant to a proposed s. 9 Canada Evidence Act application under R. v. K.G.B. The judge ordered limited disclosure of communications, requests, drafts, and information concerning the preparation and certification of specific transcripts prepared by a particular translator.

Broader disclosure requests were withdrawn without prejudice.

During a jury trial for second‑degree murder and accessory after the fact, the Crown sought a preliminary ruling regarding disputed Punjabi-to-English translations of intercepted communications.

The Crown requested that the court appoint a neutral third‑party translator to resolve discrepancies between the Crown and defence transcripts or, alternatively, determine that the Crown translation was accurate before addressing a defence disclosure application.

The court declined to order a court-appointed translator, emphasizing that calling its own witnesses should occur only rarely and with extreme caution.

Given material discrepancies between translations and incomplete argument on the defence disclosure application, the court directed that submissions continue on the defence request for further disclosure relating to the translations.

The court ruled on the admissibility of hearsay statements and conduct of a toddler (30-33 months old) as related by her mother in a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The accused was charged with committing these offences against his daughter over a 98-day period.

The Crown sought to admit the child's statements and conduct under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying on the Khan framework.

The court found the evidence necessary and reliable, admitting it for trial.