Kelly Slate

Prior to a jury trial for sexual assault, the defence brought several evidentiary motions.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of the accused's prior sexual communications with a complainant, renew an application for severance of counts, and exclude a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown's expert witness on the neurobiology of trauma.

The court admitted the communications evidence, finding it essential to the narrative and the Crown's similar fact application.

The court dismissed the renewed severance application, concluding the accused's intention to testify did not undermine the viability of the similar fact evidence.

The court permitted the expert to use the PowerPoint presentation with specific modifications to prevent prejudice.

Finally, the court expanded the opening jury instructions to address nonconscious bias and false assumptions regarding consent.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual interference, the court ruled on several pre-trial applications.

The court permitted a challenge for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The court excluded proposed evidence from a former bandmate regarding a masturbation video and a statement about degradation, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence from a prior sexual partner regarding sexual urination.

Finally, the court permitted the Crown to call an expert witness to testify about the basic neurobiology of trauma to dispel myths and stereotypes, but restricted the expert from applying that science specifically to the context of sexual assault.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "Over 80" following a motor vehicle collision on the QEW.

The defence challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a demand for breath samples, arguing this constituted a breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer had sufficient grounds based on witness testimony regarding erratic driving, the defendant's admission that he had consumed alcohol, the odour of alcohol on his breath, and the defendant's statement that he would fail the breath test.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the defendant guilty of the "Over 80" charge, entering a conditional stay on the impaired driving charge.

Mandeep Punia was charged with second-degree murder and Skinder Punia with accessory after the fact to murder.

The jury found Mandeep guilty of manslaughter and Skinder guilty of accessory to manslaughter.

This decision provides the judge's reasons for several trial rulings: (a) the effect of a registrar's error during peremptory challenges in jury selection, which was deemed procedural and saved by s. 643(3) of the Criminal Code; (b) the refusal to issue a Vetrovec warning for a crucial Crown witness (Supinder Litt) due to her non-unsavoury character, though a strong caution was given; (c) the refusal to give a Bero instruction regarding incomplete police recordings, as no deliberate failure to preserve evidence was found, but the jury was instructed that reasonable doubt could arise from the absence of evidence; and (d) the decision to leave the defence of provocation with the jury for Mandeep, finding an "air of reality" to the subjective element based on the totality of evidence, despite the defence not actively advancing it.

In a murder trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a 911 call purportedly made by a central Crown witness.

The Crown argued the call was admissible as the best evidence of the event and to rebut recent fabrication.

The defence argued the recording lacked context and amounted to improper oath-helping.

The court ruled the 911 call-back was inadmissible at this stage, finding it devoid of material information and that its admission would serve solely to bolster the witness's credibility before it was attacked, thereby offending the rule against oath-helping.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter following the death of a 14-month-old child in her care.

The child suffered a severe skull fracture and subdural hematoma.

The court found that the accused momentarily lost her patience and intentionally assaulted the child, causing the fatal injuries.

Alternatively, the court found that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of life by delaying calling 911 for over an hour after observing the child was unresponsive and limp, which significantly contributed to the child's death.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit four out-of-court statements made by a witness, Kulwant Litt, for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (a K.G.B. application).

The witness, who is the father of one accused and father-in-law of the other, had previously confessed to his son (acting as a police agent) and the police about the accused's involvement in a murder and the subsequent disposal of the body, but later recanted.

The court found that necessity was established by the recantation and that threshold reliability was met through a combination of procedural reliability (the witness was available for cross-examination and the statements were recorded) and substantive reliability (confirmatory physical evidence and lack of motive to lie at the time).

The statements were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of his young daughter.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the child's unusual utterances and the accused's five-hour police statement.

The court found the accused's statement to police was involuntary and wholly unreliable, obtained through a combination of oppressive circumstances, impermissible inducements, and quid pro quos.

The accused, who suffered from obsessive-compulsive disorder, was particularly vulnerable to the Reid technique interrogation employed by police.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to guilt and acquitted the accused.

During a jury trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the accused brought a motion seeking further disclosure relating to certified translations of Punjabi-language recordings and interviews relied upon by the Crown.

The defence identified material discrepancies between police, Crown-certified, and defence-certified translations of a key intercepted conversation and sought documentation relating to the commissioning, preparation, and certification of translations.

The court found that the requested materials had a sufficient nexus to the reliability of the translations relevant to a proposed s. 9 Canada Evidence Act application under R. v. K.G.B. The judge ordered limited disclosure of communications, requests, drafts, and information concerning the preparation and certification of specific transcripts prepared by a particular translator.

Broader disclosure requests were withdrawn without prejudice.

During a jury trial for second‑degree murder and accessory after the fact, the Crown sought a preliminary ruling regarding disputed Punjabi-to-English translations of intercepted communications.

The Crown requested that the court appoint a neutral third‑party translator to resolve discrepancies between the Crown and defence transcripts or, alternatively, determine that the Crown translation was accurate before addressing a defence disclosure application.

The court declined to order a court-appointed translator, emphasizing that calling its own witnesses should occur only rarely and with extreme caution.

Given material discrepancies between translations and incomplete argument on the defence disclosure application, the court directed that submissions continue on the defence request for further disclosure relating to the translations.

The court ruled on the admissibility of hearsay statements and conduct of a toddler (30-33 months old) as related by her mother in a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The accused was charged with committing these offences against his daughter over a 98-day period.

The Crown sought to admit the child's statements and conduct under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying on the Khan framework.

The court found the evidence necessary and reliable, admitting it for trial.

Pre‑trial motions concerning severance and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a multi‑count indictment arising from four bank robberies and an attempted armoured truck robbery.

The Crown sought to rely on evidence from separate robberies as similar fact evidence to establish identity, motive, and intent.

The court held that evidence of the second, third, and fourth robberies was admissible count‑to‑count on the issue of identity for one accused due to significant similarities and linking evidence, but evidence from the first robbery was not sufficiently similar.

The court further ruled that the bank robbery evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence to prove motive or intent regarding the attempted armoured truck robbery.

Applying the severance factors in R. v. Last, the court ordered the armoured truck counts severed from the bank robbery counts and also severed the first robbery from the remaining robbery counts.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from the prolonged abuse and death of a child, the court determined the appropriate periods of parole ineligibility under ss. 235 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge assessed the character of each offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendations.

The evidence established prolonged physical abuse, malnutrition, and deprivation of medical care, culminating in a fatal assault.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused committed the final assault causing death, while the other was complicit through failure to protect and participation in the ongoing abuse.

The primary perpetrator received life imprisonment with 18 years’ parole ineligibility, while the secondary participant received life imprisonment with 13 years’ parole ineligibility.

During a murder trial involving allegations that a child died following assaults and a failure to provide necessaries of life, the court considered whether the defence of duress should be left with the jury for one accused.

Evidence was led of a long history of domestic violence and threats by the co‑accused spouse.

The Crown argued there was no evidence that threats were made for the purpose of compelling the accused to commit the underlying unlawful acts.

Applying the air of reality test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the evidence was capable of supporting an inference that the accused’s failure to act was compelled by ongoing threats and violence.

The defence of duress was therefore left to the jury in relation to omissions arising from a legal duty, though not for acts of commission.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police during a pre-arrest telephone call and a post-arrest interview.

The accused argued the telephone statements were involuntary because she was not cautioned, and the post-arrest statements were the product of oppressive circumstances, including continued questioning after she requested counsel.

The court found that the accused had an operating mind and made a meaningful choice to speak during the telephone call.

The court also held that the post-arrest interview was not oppressive, as the accused had already consulted with counsel and the police were not required to facilitate further contact.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault with a weapon under s. 267 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s admission of a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and argued the trial judge improperly relied on judicial notice regarding the complainant’s injuries.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly assessed threshold reliability and necessity when admitting the 911 call and was entitled to consider surrounding circumstances, including corroborating observations by police and the complainant’s availability for cross‑examination.

The court also held that the trial judge did not improperly take judicial notice but instead made permissible credibility findings based on the evidentiary record.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s credibility assessments and factual findings.

The accused was charged with two driving-related offences and required a Korean interpreter.

The defence challenged the competency of the proposed interpreter, Mr. Hu-Kal Kim, who held only conditional accreditation, having failed to achieve the passing grade of 70% on two of three accreditation tests.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the interpreter was competent to provide forensic interpretation services.

The court applied the five-part test from R. v. Tran and found that despite partial accreditation, the interpreter possessed sufficient competency based on his extensive experience in forensic interpretation since 1981, prior successful qualification voir dires, and specific expertise in drinking and driving trials.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing that the police failed to make an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code and thereby breached his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9.

The trial judge had found that no roadside screening demand was made but concluded that the officer nevertheless had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breath demand.

On appeal, the court held that there is no requirement that police administer a roadside screening test before forming reasonable and probable grounds for arrest if those grounds arise from observations during a rapidly unfolding encounter.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and the brief timeline between the stop and arrest, the court found no legal error in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The conviction was upheld.

In a criminal trial arising from a shooting at a house party, the complainant initially identified the accused as the shooter but later refused to confirm the identification at trial.

The Crown sought to admit five prior statements made to police, including statements at the scene, at hospital, a hospital photo identification, a later written statement, and a formal photo line-up.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule under R. v. KGB and subsequent jurisprudence, the court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness recanted or claimed lack of memory.

The court held that threshold reliability was met, particularly due to the videotaped photo line-up and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination at trial.

The prior formal statement and photo line-up were admitted as substantive evidence, while earlier statements were admitted to provide contextual background.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault, arguing there was no admissible evidence identifying him as the shooter.

The victim had identified the applicant in a photo line-up but testified at the preliminary inquiry that the applicant was not the shooter, though he acknowledged his memory was better at the time of the line-up.

The reviewing court held that a trier of fact could disbelieve the victim's in-court denial and conclude he had adopted his prior statement, meaning there was 'some evidence' of identification.

The application was dismissed.