Cynthia Erin Heather Silver Nadler

Following a trial, the offender was convicted of attempted murder and breaching a recognizance for brutally assaulting a five-year-old child and leaving him for dead in an isolated area.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation under section 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the dangerous offender application, finding that while the conduct was undoubtedly brutal, the psychiatric evidence did not compel the conclusion that the offender's future behaviour would be unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint.

However, the court imposed a life sentence based on the extreme brutality of the offence, the vulnerability of the victim, the breach of trust, the premeditated nature of the crime, and the offender's high risk of violent reoffending as established by actuarial assessment.

The court declined to impose a parole eligibility delay under section 743.6, finding that a life sentence adequately addressed the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

This decision addresses a request by counsel for two individuals convicted of second-degree murder, and agreed to by the Crown, to conduct sentencing remotely via video, audio, or written decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the constitutional imperative of the accused's presence for sentencing under Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the requirement for a valid waiver of physical presence, and the public interest, including victims' rights.

The court found that sentencing is part of the trial and that physical presence serves both individual and broader public interests, especially for serious offences.

The court determined the matter was not urgent for appeal purposes and preferred to defer sentencing to early July, hoping for an in-person proceeding if courts reopen, otherwise revisiting the remote sentencing issue.

The applicants, convicted of second-degree murder, sought a mistrial based on the Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Chouhan*, which clarified that former provisions regarding peremptory challenges remained operative during their jury selection.

The trial judge acknowledged the probable reversible error but denied the mistrial application, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict for an error of law, as such remedies are the purview of the Court of Appeal.

The court emphasized that a jury verdict is "sacrosanct" and a trial judge's post-verdict jurisdiction is "extremely limited," applying only to issues concerning the integrity of the deliberative process or the rendering of the verdict itself, not errors of law committed during trial.

The accused, a medical doctor, was charged with sexual assault of a patient.

This was a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal following a previous conviction.

The complainant testified to various sexual acts by the accused during a medical appointment.

The accused denied all allegations, citing a severe right hand injury at the time that would have made the alleged actions excruciatingly painful.

The defence also presented "fresh evidence" from other patients and a tenant who claimed to have overheard the complainant and her sister discussing fabricating an allegation for financial gain.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness but disbelieved the accused's testimony.

However, considering the medical evidence regarding the accused's hand injury and the "fresh evidence" from defence witnesses, despite its suspicious nature, the court found that a reasonable doubt existed.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused, a young person, was on trial for first-degree murder.

This decision provides reasons for the judge's instructions to the jury regarding the use of post-incident conduct evidence.

The Crown sought to use this evidence for all elements of the offence, including planning, deliberation, and intent to kill.

The defence argued for a "no probative value" instruction.

The court ruled that post-incident conduct was not relevant to the shooters' intent to kill or whether the murder was planned and deliberate, citing risks of speculation and inferring intent.

However, the court found the evidence relevant to whether the accused aided the shooters in carrying out their plan and the accused's knowledge of the plan, particularly regarding flight and disposal of weapons.

A young person, A.D., charged with first-degree murder, brought a voir dire application to determine the admissibility of two statements: a conversation with his mother and an interview with Cst.

Irwin.

The court ruled that the conversation with his mother was a privileged consultation under section 146(2)(b)(iii) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and was inadmissible for any purpose.

The statement to Cst.

Irwin was found to be voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, with a specific portion excluded due to concerns about threats or inducements related to sentencing.

The court emphasized the enhanced procedural protections for young persons and the privacy of consultations with parents.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with "over 80" after being stopped for cell phone use while driving.

The trial judge found racial profiling, excluded breathalyzer readings, and acquitted.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by misapprehending evidence, failing to consider an innocent mistake as an alternative to racial profiling, and improperly drawing inferences from the police's failure to investigate the cell phone.

The trial judge's finding of "unconscious" racial profiling by an honest officer was deemed a stretch and difficult to substantiate.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The court delivered reasons for its ruling on limiting a previously declared mistrial and for convictions on certain charges.

The Crown sought to limit the mistrial, initially declared due to prosecutorial non-disclosure regarding a material witness, to only those charges involving the complainant (June 9 and 23, 2016 offences).

The defence opposed, arguing the mistrial should apply to all charges, including those from July 13, 2016, which involved weapons possession upon arrest.

The court granted leave to the Crown to argue for a limited mistrial, finding it would not render the trial unfair.

The court then provided reasons for convicting the accused on the July 13, 2016 offences, concluding that the impugned prosecutorial conduct was unrelated to these charges and did not taint them.

Consequently, the convictions for the July 13, 2016 offences remained, and the mistrial was limited to the June 9 and 23, 2016 offences.

The accused, A.G., applied for bail under s. 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code following convictions and a subsequent ruling of abuse of process by the Crown leading to an intended mistrial.

The application was a reverse onus situation as the accused was on release at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing a pattern of non-compliance with previous bail orders and the gravity of the offences.

The court dismissed the bail application, finding that detention was warranted on both secondary grounds (substantial likelihood of committing further offences) and tertiary grounds (to maintain confidence in the administration of justice), despite the complainant's recantations and the presumption of innocence applied for the bail hearing.

Donald Barber appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied a stricter scrutiny standard to his testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the appellant's testimony regarding being 'sucker-punched in the face,' which was a material error affecting the assessment of credibility.

This misapprehension was deemed substantial and played an essential role in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an unfair trial.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to section 254(3).

The accused admitted to operating his vehicle while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was transporting an injured friend to hospital and then returning home to protect his sister from imminent danger.

The court rejected the necessity defence, finding no clear and imminent peril to the sister and that reasonable legal alternatives existed.

On the breath sample charge, the court found the accused wilfully failed to provide a sample through malingering rather than incapacity, and that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a reasonable excuse.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown's case relied on civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of impairment, and breath sample results of 185 mg and 176 mg.

The defence advanced a "last drink" argument under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, claiming the accused consumed minimal alcohol before driving and substantial alcohol after arriving home.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence as incredible and fabricated, finding the accused had consumed substantial alcohol prior to driving.

The court found the statutory presumptions of identity were not rebutted and convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood.

The accused alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) rights.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to arbitrary detention (overholding) for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was complete.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence as remedies, finding that the breach occurred post-offence and was unrelated to evidence gathering.

The breath test readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty, with the court indicating it would consider a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The Crown charged the defendant with breaching a house arrest condition of his recognizance on December 24, 2013.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict challenging whether there was sufficient evidence of identity to pass the Shephard test.

Officer Perreault identified the defendant based on a mug shot and surveillance observations, but the Crown failed to establish an admissible evidentiary link between the defendant and the person named in the recognizance and Information.

The court found the Crown's case fatally flawed due to reliance on hearsay evidence regarding the defendant's identity and lack of admissible evidence connecting the defendant to the named person in the legal documents.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breathalyzer readings of 137 and 139 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000C readings by arguing that the accused had unmedicated diabetes which would produce acetone in his breath, and that the acetone detection system in the machine could malfunction without alerting the operator.

The court found that the accused's evidence regarding his alcohol consumption and failure to take medication was credible, and that expert evidence established a realistic scientific possibility that the machine's acetone detection system could have malfunctioned.

The Crown failed to rebut this evidence, and the presumption of accuracy was rebutted.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge misapplied the W.D. credibility framework, misapprehended evidence relating to the police officer, her own testimony, and medical evidence regarding asthma, and convicted her on a charge not properly particularized in the information.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s factual findings and credibility assessments were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the officer’s testimony that the appellant had numerous opportunities to provide a sample but failed to do so.

The court also concluded that the trial judge’s reasons were functionally sufficient and disclosed an intelligible basis for the verdict.

The appellant failed to establish any palpable and overriding error or miscarriage of justice.

The accused was charged with one count of assault and two counts of sexual assault against his spouse.

The prosecution relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony regarding three alleged incidents occurring between 2009 and 2010.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts across her police statement, preliminary inquiry testimony, and trial evidence, as well as contradictions when considered alongside surrounding circumstances and other witness testimony.

Applying the credibility analysis and the principles in W.(D.) v. The Queen, the court concluded that the accused’s evidence was believable and at minimum raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also noted the timing of the complaint in the context of marital breakdown and custody disputes as relevant to assessing credibility.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 mg of alcohol in blood.

She argued that the Crown failed to disclose police notes, that the investigative detention in a private parking lot was unlawful, that the breath samples constituted an unlawful search, and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from the alleged disclosure breach and that the issue was not properly pursued at trial.

Applying the ancillary police powers doctrine and the framework from Mann and Clayton, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate a potential impaired driver in a bar parking lot and that the detention and breath demands were lawful.

Minor misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge were found to be peripheral and not material to the conviction.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

A peace officer observed the accused exhibiting signs of impairment and made an approved screening device demand.

The accused failed to provide a suitable sample on two attempts and then verbally refused.

The accused claimed he had provided two suitable samples both registering 0.00, attributed the odour of alcohol to spilled beer on his clothing, and alleged racial abuse by the officer.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and the accused's evidence incredible and internally inconsistent.

The court convicted the accused, finding he had violated section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.