Cynthia Erin Heather Silver Nadler

The offender was convicted of importing firearms, conspiracy to traffic in firearms, and attempt to possess a firearm after a commercial enterprise involving the importation of three handguns with overcapacity magazines.

The court considered the paramount objectives of denunciation and deterrence, alongside mitigating factors including the offender's lack of prior record and the significant collateral consequence of deportation.

A global sentence of four years' imprisonment was imposed, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following a trial, the offender was convicted of attempted murder and breaching a recognizance for brutally assaulting a five-year-old child and leaving him for dead in an isolated area.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation under section 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the dangerous offender application, finding that while the conduct was undoubtedly brutal, the psychiatric evidence did not compel the conclusion that the offender's future behaviour would be unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint.

However, the court imposed a life sentence based on the extreme brutality of the offence, the vulnerability of the victim, the breach of trust, the premeditated nature of the crime, and the offender's high risk of violent reoffending as established by actuarial assessment.

The court declined to impose a parole eligibility delay under section 743.6, finding that a life sentence adequately addressed the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breaching a recognizance after a five-year-old child was found severely beaten in a wooded area.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's motive stemming from a deteriorating relationship with the child's mother, his opportunity to commit the crime, pattern bruising on the child matching the accused's shoes, and the child's DNA found under the accused's fingernails.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused committed the assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, a key Crown witness refused to be sworn and testify.

The Crown brought an application under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's testimony from the preliminary inquiry.

The accused opposed the application, arguing he did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry because he subsequently obtained new impeachment materials.

The court held that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine and that admitting the prior testimony would not occasion unfairness, provided the newly discovered impeachment materials were also admitted into evidence.

The Crown's application was granted subject to conditions.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, the Crown applied to admit a statement made by the victim to a bystander shortly after being stabbed.

The victim, bleeding and seeking help, told the bystander that his assailant was his girlfriend's boyfriend.

The court found the statement met the criteria for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, as it was made contemporaneously with the startling event and before there was time to fabricate.

The application was granted and the statement was admitted into evidence.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder following a gang-related mass shooting, applied for bail under section 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that while the Crown's case was not overwhelming, it was not weak, and the proposed release plan with family sureties was insufficient to address the significant public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed and detention was ordered.

This decision addresses a request by counsel for two individuals convicted of second-degree murder, and agreed to by the Crown, to conduct sentencing remotely via video, audio, or written decision due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the constitutional imperative of the accused's presence for sentencing under Section 650(1) of the Criminal Code, the requirement for a valid waiver of physical presence, and the public interest, including victims' rights.

The court found that sentencing is part of the trial and that physical presence serves both individual and broader public interests, especially for serious offences.

The court determined the matter was not urgent for appeal purposes and preferred to defer sentencing to early July, hoping for an in-person proceeding if courts reopen, otherwise revisiting the remote sentencing issue.

The applicants, convicted of second-degree murder, sought a mistrial based on the Court of Appeal's decision in *R. v. Chouhan*, which clarified that former provisions regarding peremptory challenges remained operative during their jury selection.

The trial judge acknowledged the probable reversible error but denied the mistrial application, holding that a trial judge lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict for an error of law, as such remedies are the purview of the Court of Appeal.

The court emphasized that a jury verdict is "sacrosanct" and a trial judge's post-verdict jurisdiction is "extremely limited" applying only to issues concerning the integrity of the deliberative process or the rendering of the verdict itself, not errors of law committed during trial.

A young offender was convicted of manslaughter for his role as a lookout during a fatal shooting in a fast food restaurant washroom.

The Crown sought the maximum three-year sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, while the defence sought a sentence of time served with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court denied enhanced credit, finding no exceptional circumstances, and sentenced the offender to two years and nine months in closed custody, less time served, followed by two years of probation.

The accused, a medical doctor, was charged with sexual assault of a patient.

This was a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal following a previous conviction.

The complainant testified to various sexual acts by the accused during a medical appointment.

The accused denied all allegations, citing a severe right hand injury at the time that would have made the alleged actions excruciatingly painful.

The defence also presented "fresh evidence" from other patients and a tenant who claimed to have overheard the complainant and her sister discussing fabricating an allegation for financial gain.

The court found the complainant to be a credible witness but disbelieved the accused's testimony.

However, considering the medical evidence regarding the accused's hand injury and the "fresh evidence" from defence witnesses, despite its suspicious nature, the court found that a reasonable doubt existed.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused, a young person, was on trial for first-degree murder.

This decision provides reasons for the judge's instructions to the jury regarding the use of post-incident conduct evidence.

The Crown sought to use this evidence for all elements of the offence, including planning, deliberation, and intent to kill.

The defence argued for a "no probative value" instruction.

The court ruled that post-incident conduct was not relevant to the shooters' intent to kill or whether the murder was planned and deliberate, citing risks of speculation and inferring intent.

However, the court found the evidence relevant to whether the accused aided the shooters in carrying out their plan and the accused's knowledge of the plan, particularly regarding flight and disposal of weapons.

The young person, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown alleged the young person aided and abetted two others in the planned and deliberate shooting of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, assessing whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict based on the circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the young person knew of the plan and acted as a lookout, the court dismissed the motion.

A young person, A.D., charged with first-degree murder, brought a voir dire application to determine the admissibility of two statements: a conversation with his mother and an interview with Cst.

Irwin.

The court ruled that the conversation with his mother was a privileged consultation under section 146(2)(b)(iii) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and was inadmissible for any purpose.

The statement to Cst.

Irwin was found to be voluntary and admissible for cross-examination, with a specific portion excluded due to concerns about threats or inducements related to sentencing.

The court emphasized the enhanced procedural protections for young persons and the privacy of consultations with parents.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with "over 80" after being stopped for cell phone use while driving.

The trial judge found racial profiling, excluded breathalyzer readings, and acquitted.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by misapprehending evidence, failing to consider an innocent mistake as an alternative to racial profiling, and improperly drawing inferences from the police's failure to investigate the cell phone.

The trial judge's finding of "unconscious" racial profiling by an honest officer was deemed a stretch and difficult to substantiate.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender, who pled guilty to two counts of robbery.

The court reviewed the offender's criminal history and psychiatric evidence regarding his risk of violent recidivism.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, finding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a high likelihood of violent recidivism.

However, the court found that the offender met the criteria for a long-term offender designation, as there was a substantial risk of violent reoffending and a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The court delivered reasons for its ruling on limiting a previously declared mistrial and for convictions on certain charges.

The Crown sought to limit the mistrial, initially declared due to prosecutorial non-disclosure regarding a material witness, to only those charges involving the complainant (June 9 and 23, 2016 offences).

The defence opposed, arguing the mistrial should apply to all charges, including those from July 13, 2016, which involved weapons possession upon arrest.

The court granted leave to the Crown to argue for a limited mistrial, finding it would not render the trial unfair.

The court then provided reasons for convicting the accused on the July 13, 2016 offences, concluding that the impugned prosecutorial conduct was unrelated to these charges and did not taint them.

Consequently, the convictions for the July 13, 2016 offences remained, and the mistrial was limited to the June 9 and 23, 2016 offences.

The accused, A.G., applied for bail under s. 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code following convictions and a subsequent ruling of abuse of process by the Crown leading to an intended mistrial.

The application was a reverse onus situation as the accused was on release at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing a pattern of non-compliance with previous bail orders and the gravity of the offences.

The court dismissed the bail application, finding that detention was warranted on both secondary grounds (substantial likelihood of committing further offences) and tertiary grounds (to maintain confidence in the administration of justice), despite the complainant's recantations and the presumption of innocence applied for the bail hearing.

Donald Barber appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied a stricter scrutiny standard to his testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the appellant's testimony regarding being 'sucker-punched in the face,' which was a material error affecting the assessment of credibility.

This misapprehension was deemed substantial and played an essential role in the trial judge's reasoning, leading to an unfair trial.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code and wilfully failing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to section 254(3).

The accused admitted to operating his vehicle while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was transporting an injured friend to hospital and then returning home to protect his sister from imminent danger.

The court rejected the necessity defence, finding no clear and imminent peril to the sister and that reasonable legal alternatives existed.

On the breath sample charge, the court found the accused wilfully failed to provide a sample through malingering rather than incapacity, and that voluntary intoxication does not constitute a reasonable excuse.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.