Jordana Heather Goldlist

The accused brought a facial challenge under s. 8 of the Charter to a search warrant that led to the discovery of a loaded firearm in her bedroom closet.

She argued the warrant could not have issued because the information in the ITO, derived from a single intercepted call 47 days prior, was stale-dated.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the passage of 47 days did not render the information stale given the nature of the item and the context of the intercepted call.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the firearm would still be found at the residence.

The accused was arrested for possession of a weapon and obstruct justice.

While detained, he made an unsolicited utterance about stabbing someone in the park.

The investigating officer, aware of a recent stabbing in that park, proceeded to ask the accused questions about the stabbing without re-advising him of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The court found that the accused's jeopardy had changed, triggering a duty to re-advise him of his rights, which the officer failed to do, resulting in a s. 10(b) breach.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the utterance was admissible, as the breach was on the lower end of seriousness, had minimal impact, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a stranger in an LCBO parking lot following a verbal dispute over social distancing.

The Crown sought a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the public nature of the shooting and the devastating impact on the victim's family, alongside mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a life sentence with a 14-year period of parole ineligibility, along with mandatory weapons prohibition, DNA, and non-communication orders.

The Crown applied to admit an utterance made by the accused to police during his arrest for an unrelated weapons offence, in which he admitted to stabbing someone days prior.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused was experiencing a mental health crisis, lacked an operating mind, and was not cautioned.

The court found that while the accused displayed signs of a mental health condition, he possessed the requisite cognitive ability to understand he was speaking to police and that his statements could be used against him.

The court also found the accused had been cautioned multiple times.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting an unarmed 17-year-old victim five times in a residential neighbourhood.

At the time of the offence, the offender was bound by multiple court orders, including a probation order imposed earlier that same day.

The court considered the offender's difficult upbringing, exposure to systemic anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions as mitigating factors.

However, given the unprovoked nature of the public shooting, the use of a firearm, and the offender's blatant disregard for court orders, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 17 years.

The accused challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at his apartment, alleging it violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused argued there were no reasonable grounds to believe he was the individual referred to by a confidential informant, that he resided at the searched location, or that evidence would be found there.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding that the police had established reasonable grounds based on the informant's credible and corroborated information, vehicle registration records, driver's licence information, and CCTV footage showing the accused's presence at the apartment.

The court rejected the accused's arguments and dismissed the Charter application.

This decision addresses multiple Charter breaches arising from the detention, search, and arrest of Omar Yaqubi in Toronto's Entertainment District.

The court found breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, including arbitrary detention without reasonable suspicion, unlawful search without safety justification, and failure to promptly inform and facilitate the right to counsel.

The court excluded the evidence obtained during the unlawful detention and search pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

Alternatively, a stay of proceedings was directed due to the loss of critical evidence caused by police muting body-worn cameras and failure to preserve key witness information, impairing the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The accused admitted shooting the deceased during an unlawful street transaction but argued that he acted in self-defence or, alternatively, lacked the mens rea for murder.

Applying the modified W.(D.) framework and the Supreme Court's self-defence analysis under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, the court rejected the accused's account as not credible and accepted eyewitness and video evidence showing the deceased was backing away with his hands up when the shooting began.

The court held there was no reasonable basis for a belief that force was being used or threatened, and in any event the later shots, including a return shot after the accused had already retreated, had no defensive purpose and were unreasonable.

On the totality of the circumstantial evidence, the court found the accused intended to kill or cause bodily harm he knew was likely to cause death and convicted him of second degree murder.

The accused, Afrah Mohamed, was charged with unauthorized possession of a firearm and ammunition.

He brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, which was dismissed.

The central issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition found during a search.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove constructive possession, as the evidence did not establish the accused's knowledge and control of the items beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after shooting the victim in a liquor store parking lot following a brief verbal altercation over social distancing.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, arguing that a combination of provocation (a racial slur and a brandished knife) and marijuana intoxication negated the specific intent for murder.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible, finding that he deliberately followed the victim out of the store with a drawn, illegal handgun to confront him.

The court held that the Crown disproved the defences of provocation and intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt, and found the accused guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender, Jesse Egan, was sentenced for possession of fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking (110.64 grams).

The Crown sought 6-8 years imprisonment, classifying him as a mid-level trafficker, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation due to the pernicious nature of fentanyl and the national opioid crisis.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years house arrest followed by three years probation, highlighting the offender's significant rehabilitative efforts since his arrest, including overcoming addiction, starting a business, and supporting his young family, and arguing his addiction stemmed from a prior injury.

The court found a conditional sentence unfit given the quantity and danger of fentanyl, and the offender's prior criminal record.

While acknowledging the offender's commendable rehabilitation and applying credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions (Downes and Duncan credit), the court imposed a penitentiary sentence of five years, reduced to four years and ten months after credit.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

Michael Roberts sought certiorari to quash his committal for first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge erred by finding evidence of planning and deliberation where none existed, and requested committal for second-degree murder instead.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision for jurisdictional error, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's actions before and after the shooting, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation, even if other inferences were possible.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, upholding the committal for first-degree murder.

A group of media organizations applied under section 119 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act for access to the unredacted youth criminal court records of eight young persons charged with second degree murder.

The Crown and the young persons opposed the application, citing the young persons' heightened privacy interests and fair trial rights.

The court found that while the media had a valid interest in the records, granting access to the entire unredacted file at this early stage was not desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice due to the risk of irreversible harm from inadvertent dissemination of private information.

The court granted partial access to redacted records, including the charging informations and bail release orders, with identifying information removed.

This ruling addresses whether section 276 of the Criminal Code, which governs the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity, applies to proceedings involving human trafficking and sexual services offences.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on such activity without a section 276 application, arguing these offences are not explicitly enumerated.

The court, preferring a broad interpretation consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in R. v. Barton and R. v. J.J., held that section 276 applies to offences that have "some connection" to those listed.

Given the systemic biases against sex workers and the legislative intent to protect complainant dignity and privacy, human trafficking and sexual services offences are deemed to have such a connection.

Therefore, the accused is required to bring a section 276 application to introduce such evidence.

Devonte Skye-Davis, charged with manslaughter, brought an application alleging a conflict of interest within the Hamilton Crown Attorney's Office.

This arose because his former defence counsel joined that office.

The applicant argued that the office lacked proper procedures to protect confidential information at the time of the former counsel's arrival.

The Crown contended that safeguards were later implemented and no confidential information was discussed.

The court applied the two-part test from Macdonald Estate v. Martin, finding that while no actual disclosure occurred, the lack of institutional safeguards at the outset created an unacceptable appearance of injustice.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for a different standard for Crown offices.

The Hamilton Crown Attorney's office was found to be in a conflict of interest, and the prosecution was ordered to be continued by a Crown from outside that office.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit non-expert recognition evidence from the father and stepmother of one of the accused, who viewed video surveillance of the suspects.

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible as the witnesses did not definitively identify the accused and their evidence was tainted by police.

The court held that the witnesses' long knowledge of the accused and their observations regarding clothing and physical characteristics were relevant to identification, and the evidence was admissible, with its weight to be determined by the jury.

In a first-degree murder trial, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The alleged errors included misstating evidence, introducing unelicited evidence, mocking defence counsel and witnesses, and improperly commenting on the burden of proof.

The court reviewed each alleged impropriety, finding some instances of improper conduct but concluding that, individually or cumulatively, they did not fatally wound the trial process or deprive the accused of a fair trial to the extent that a mistrial was warranted.

The motion was dismissed, with the court indicating that corrective instructions would be given to the jury.

Defence counsel for Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Wright brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging that Crown counsel adduced impermissible bad character evidence ("snitches get stitches") during re-examination of a witness, thereby wounding trial fairness.

The Crown argued the re-examination was appropriate given the cross-examination.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the defence was prejudiced by a prior ruling limiting cross-examination on a witness's inconsistent statements, this could be remedied by allowing further cross-examination.

The court concluded that the "snitches get stitches" evidence, while potentially prejudicial, did not rise to the level requiring a mistrial, especially with proper jury instructions, and did not constitute a "catastrophic" defect to trial fairness.

The accused, Evan Wright, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from evidence at trial, arguing its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court ruled that convictions post-dating the offence are admissible.

It refused to "read down" an aggravated assault conviction but decided to limit cross-examination to only the aggravated assault conviction, excluding two weapon possession convictions.

This decision was based on concerns about propensity reasoning and the potential for imbalance, given the nature of the current charges and the lack of a criminal record for the Crown's main witness.