Jordana Heather Goldlist

The accused challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at his apartment, alleging it violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused argued there were no reasonable grounds to believe he was the individual referred to by a confidential informant, that he resided at the searched location, or that evidence would be found there.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding that the police had established reasonable grounds based on the informant's credible and corroborated information, vehicle registration records, driver's licence information, and CCTV footage showing the accused's presence at the apartment.

The court rejected the accused's arguments and dismissed the Charter application.

This decision addresses multiple Charter breaches arising from the detention, search, and arrest of Omar Yaqubi in Toronto's Entertainment District.

The court found breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, including arbitrary detention without reasonable suspicion, unlawful search without safety justification, and failure to promptly inform and facilitate the right to counsel.

The court excluded the evidence obtained during the unlawful detention and search pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

Alternatively, a stay of proceedings was directed due to the loss of critical evidence caused by police muting body-worn cameras and failure to preserve key witness information, impairing the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The accused, Afrah Mohamed, was charged with unauthorized possession of a firearm and ammunition.

He brought a Charter application to exclude evidence, which was dismissed.

The central issue at trial was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in constructive possession of the firearm and ammunition found during a search.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove constructive possession, as the evidence did not establish the accused's knowledge and control of the items beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The offender, Jesse Egan, was sentenced for possession of fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking (110.64 grams).

The Crown sought 6-8 years imprisonment, classifying him as a mid-level trafficker, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation due to the pernicious nature of fentanyl and the national opioid crisis.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years house arrest followed by three years probation, highlighting the offender's significant rehabilitative efforts since his arrest, including overcoming addiction, starting a business, and supporting his young family, and arguing his addiction stemmed from a prior injury.

The court found a conditional sentence unfit given the quantity and danger of fentanyl, and the offender's prior criminal record.

While acknowledging the offender's commendable rehabilitation and applying credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions (Downes and Duncan credit), the court imposed a penitentiary sentence of five years, reduced to four years and ten months after credit.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

Michael Roberts sought certiorari to quash his committal for first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge erred by finding evidence of planning and deliberation where none existed, and requested committal for second-degree murder instead.

The Superior Court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision for jurisdictional error, applying the "scintilla of evidence" test.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's actions before and after the shooting, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference of planning and deliberation, even if other inferences were possible.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, upholding the committal for first-degree murder.

This ruling addresses whether section 276 of the Criminal Code, which governs the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity, applies to proceedings involving human trafficking and sexual services offences.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on such activity without a section 276 application, arguing these offences are not explicitly enumerated.

The court, preferring a broad interpretation consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in R. v. Barton and R. v. J.J., held that section 276 applies to offences that have "some connection" to those listed.

Given the systemic biases against sex workers and the legislative intent to protect complainant dignity and privacy, human trafficking and sexual services offences are deemed to have such a connection.

Therefore, the accused is required to bring a section 276 application to introduce such evidence.

Devonte Skye-Davis, charged with manslaughter, brought an application alleging a conflict of interest within the Hamilton Crown Attorney's Office.

This arose because his former defence counsel joined that office.

The applicant argued that the office lacked proper procedures to protect confidential information at the time of the former counsel's arrival.

The Crown contended that safeguards were later implemented and no confidential information was discussed.

The court applied the two-part test from Macdonald Estate v. Martin, finding that while no actual disclosure occurred, the lack of institutional safeguards at the outset created an unacceptable appearance of injustice.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for a different standard for Crown offices.

The Hamilton Crown Attorney's office was found to be in a conflict of interest, and the prosecution was ordered to be continued by a Crown from outside that office.

In a first-degree murder trial, the defence brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the Crown's closing address to the jury.

The alleged errors included misstating evidence, introducing unelicited evidence, mocking defence counsel and witnesses, and improperly commenting on the burden of proof.

The court reviewed each alleged impropriety, finding some instances of improper conduct but concluding that, individually or cumulatively, they did not fatally wound the trial process or deprive the accused of a fair trial to the extent that a mistrial was warranted.

The motion was dismissed, with the court indicating that corrective instructions would be given to the jury.

In a murder trial, the defendants brought motions regarding the admissibility of evidence.

Philip Fitzpatrick sought to admit antemortem statements by the deceased concerning a dispute over counterfeit money and guns, arguing relevance to witness credibility and narrative.

Evan Wright sought to cross-examine a witness on the deceased's drug trafficking activities, also arguing narrative.

The Crown opposed both.

The court dismissed the application for antemortem statements under the state of mind exception, finding them not relevant and highly prejudicial, though allowing limited questioning on the deceased being ripped off and taking guns.

The court also dismissed the application to admit evidence of the deceased's drug trafficking, finding it irrelevant and highly prejudicial, noting the jury already had sufficient information about the deceased's background.

Philip Fitzpatrick, jointly charged with murder, brought a K.G.B. application to admit two police statements made by his mother, Cheryl Hall, for the truth of their contents regarding the shooter's identity.

The Crown was not opposed if the statements were edited and Ms. Hall could be cross-examined.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity due to Ms. Hall's recantation/unwillingness to adopt her prior statements, and threshold reliability due to procedural safeguards (availability for cross-examination, videotaping) and circumstantial guarantees (statements made hours after shooting, no influence, no leading questions, no motive to lie).

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth, to be shown to the jury in their entirety with appropriate edits, and permitted the Crown to cross-examine Ms. Hall on the identification and her state of mind.

The accused, Evan Wright, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from evidence at trial, arguing its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court ruled that convictions post-dating the offence are admissible.

It refused to "read down" an aggravated assault conviction but decided to limit cross-examination to only the aggravated assault conviction, excluding two weapon possession convictions.

This decision was based on concerns about propensity reasoning and the potential for imbalance, given the nature of the current charges and the lack of a criminal record for the Crown's main witness.

Defence counsel for Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Wright brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging that Crown counsel adduced impermissible bad character evidence ("snitches get stitches") during re-examination of a witness, thereby wounding trial fairness.

The Crown argued the re-examination was appropriate given the cross-examination.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the defence was prejudiced by a prior ruling limiting cross-examination on a witness's inconsistent statements, this could be remedied by allowing further cross-examination.

The court concluded that the "snitches get stitches" evidence, while potentially prejudicial, did not rise to the level requiring a mistrial, especially with proper jury instructions, and did not constitute a "catastrophic" defect to trial fairness.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant and utterances made upon arrest, alleging breaches of s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained significant inaccuracies and misleading information regarding the applicant's residence at the searched unit, leading to a s. 8 breach.

A delay in providing access to counsel also constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct and significant impact on the applicant's privacy and counsel rights warranted exclusion of the evidence and utterances.

Samantha Brown pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death, failing to comply with a recognizance, and possession of cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors including a prior impaired driving conviction, driving without a license while on bail, and an ongoing pattern of dangerous driving.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, sincere remorse, motivation for treatment, and family support.

The court balanced deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, imposing a sentence of six and a half years imprisonment (five years and three months after pre-sentence custody credit) for impaired driving causing death, with concurrent sentences for the other charges, and a five-year driving prohibition commencing at the end of imprisonment.

The accused was charged with possession of a weapon or imitation thereof for a purpose dangerous to the public peace contrary to section 88 of the Criminal Code.

Police observed the accused in a parking lot with a group of males and suspected he had a gun based on his suspicious movements.

When police approached, an object fell from the accused's clothing.

The accused fled the scene and was apprehended after a foot chase.

The Crown proved identity and possession of a firearm or imitation thereof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the Crown failed to prove the essential element that the accused's possession was for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted.

This voir dire ruling addresses the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by Joshua Barreira to police following his arrest for first-degree murder.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to police oppression (cold, sickness, hunger, exhaustion, denial of right to silence) and inducements related to his wife and brother's arrests.

The court found no oppression, noting Barreira was a "savvy and experienced individual" who understood his rights and repeatedly attempted to negotiate a deal.

The court also determined that the idea of a false confession to protect family members was self-generated by Barreira, and the police officer's actions did not constitute improper inducements.

Consequently, the statements were deemed voluntary and admissible at trial, subject to editing out references to Barreira's criminal record.

A young person in custody at the Roy McMurtry Youth Centre was charged with three counts of unlawfully using violence with intent to provoke fear in justice system participants to impede them in their duties, three counts of criminal harassment, and one count of mischief to property under $5,000.

The charges arose from an incident where the accused became aggressive and belligerent after being denied telephone access, shouted at staff, clenched his fists, approached staff members, and threw a telephone receiver against a wall.

The court found that the accused's conduct, while disruptive and inappropriate, did not constitute violence as legally defined, nor did it constitute threatening conduct designed to instill fear.

The court distinguished between disruptive institutional misconduct and criminal behaviour.

The accused was acquitted on all counts except mischief to property, for which he was convicted.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning charges of human trafficking, procuring for prostitution, and related offences against two accused.

The court applied the test from Arcuri to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to trial.

The judge found sufficient evidence on multiple counts relating to the exploitation of vulnerable women in the sex trade, including evidence of control, direction, and influence over complainants' movements and earnings.

The court committed both accused on various counts while discharging others where insufficient evidence was presented.