Jordana Heather Goldlist

Philip Fitzpatrick, jointly charged with murder, brought a K.G.B. application to admit two police statements made by his mother, Cheryl Hall, for the truth of their contents regarding the shooter's identity.

The Crown was not opposed if the statements were edited and Ms. Hall could be cross-examined.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity due to Ms. Hall's recantation/unwillingness to adopt her prior statements, and threshold reliability due to procedural safeguards (availability for cross-examination, videotaping) and circumstantial guarantees (statements made hours after shooting, no influence, no leading questions, no motive to lie).

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth, to be shown to the jury in their entirety with appropriate edits, and permitted the Crown to cross-examine Ms. Hall on the identification and her state of mind.

In a murder trial, the defendants brought motions regarding the admissibility of evidence.

Philip Fitzpatrick sought to admit antemortem statements by the deceased concerning a dispute over counterfeit money and guns, arguing relevance to witness credibility and narrative.

Evan Wright sought to cross-examine a witness on the deceased's drug trafficking activities, also arguing narrative.

The Crown opposed both.

The court dismissed the application for antemortem statements under the state of mind exception, finding them not relevant and highly prejudicial, though allowing limited questioning on the deceased being ripped off and taking guns.

The court also dismissed the application to admit evidence of the deceased's drug trafficking, finding it irrelevant and highly prejudicial, noting the jury already had sufficient information about the deceased's background.

The Crown sought to commit three defendants for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jordan Henry.

The incident occurred outside a New Year's Eve party following an altercation.

The court, after a preliminary inquiry, found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit two defendants (Mohamed Shokri and Zakaria Hassan Adam) for first-degree murder, and one defendant (Abdikadir Abdi) for second-degree murder.

The decision analyzed the test for committal, treatment of circumstantial evidence, distinction between inference and speculation, and the elements of planned and deliberate first-degree murder and party liability.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence seized under a search warrant and utterances made upon arrest, alleging breaches of s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant contained significant inaccuracies and misleading information regarding the applicant's residence at the searched unit, leading to a s. 8 breach.

A delay in providing access to counsel also constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct and significant impact on the applicant's privacy and counsel rights warranted exclusion of the evidence and utterances.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel for a young person charged with second degree murder, alleging a conflict of interest because counsel also represented a Crown witness on unrelated charges.

The witness had given a confusing police statement suggesting the accused might be involved, but later testified at the preliminary hearing that he had no direct communication with the accused.

Both the accused and the witness provided informed waivers consenting to the representation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no realistic risk of adversity in interest and noting that independent counsel could cross-examine the witness if necessary.

The applicant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for traffic violations, sought to exclude evidence of cocaine, fentanyl, and cash found on his person, alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10 Charter rights.

The police officer smelled marijuana, requested identification, discovered an outstanding warrant for the applicant, and arrested him.

Subsequent searches at the roadside and police station revealed the drugs.

The court found the initial detention and request for identification were reasonable, the strip searches were justified by exigent circumstances and officer safety, and the delays in facilitating the right to counsel were practically necessary.

The motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) was dismissed.

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown sought detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found a substantial likelihood that the young person would commit a serious offence if released, given his prior criminal record and history of violence while in custody.

The court rejected the proposed plan of release, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable and incapable of providing adequate supervision.

Bail was denied and the young person was ordered detained in custody pending trial.

The accused brought an application to adjourn his joint jury trial for drug importation, scheduled to commence in less than three weeks, in order to retain counsel of choice.

The accused had previously discharged counsel and had been warned multiple times that the trial would proceed with or without counsel.

The court dismissed the adjournment application, finding that the accused had not acted diligently or in a bona fide manner to retain available counsel, and that the application was a deliberate attempt to manipulate the system to achieve a de facto severance from his co-accused.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that pervasive pre-trial publicity and community hostility in Brantford made a fair trial impossible.

The court reviewed the media coverage, social media comments, and community attendance at court appearances, finding that the publicity was not overwhelmingly hostile or prejudicial.

The court concluded that procedural safeguards, including an expanded challenge for cause, would adequately protect the applicant's right to a fair trial.

The application for a change of venue was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with cocaine trafficking offences, brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash search warrants for two residences and exclude the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found sufficient grounds for the warrant at the applicant's current residence, but insufficient grounds for his former residence due to stale information, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the s. 8 breach was at the less serious end of the spectrum and the reliable evidence was crucial to the prosecution of serious offences, thus admitting the evidence and dismissing the application.

Samantha Brown pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death, failing to comply with a recognizance, and possession of cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors including a prior impaired driving conviction, driving without a license while on bail, and an ongoing pattern of dangerous driving.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, sincere remorse, motivation for treatment, and family support.

The court balanced deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, imposing a sentence of six and a half years imprisonment (five years and three months after pre-sentence custody credit) for impaired driving causing death, with concurrent sentences for the other charges, and a five-year driving prohibition commencing at the end of imprisonment.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pretrial application to exclude his formal statement to police, alleging it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police interrogation techniques did not overbear the applicant's will.

However, the court found that the police breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to inform the applicant of the deceased's name or specific details of the murder charge, which prevented him from meaningfully instructing counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused requested that the partial defence of provocation be left with the jury.

The accused testified that the victim made threatening comments before the accused killed him.

The trial judge refused the request, finding no air of reality to the objective element of the defence.

The court held that the victim's comments, made while bound and confined by the accused, would not cause an ordinary person to lose the power of self-control.

The accused was charged with possession of a weapon or imitation thereof for a purpose dangerous to the public peace contrary to section 88 of the Criminal Code.

Police observed the accused in a parking lot with a group of males and suspected he had a gun based on his suspicious movements.

When police approached, an object fell from the accused's clothing.

The accused fled the scene and was apprehended after a foot chase.

The Crown proved identity and possession of a firearm or imitation thereof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the Crown failed to prove the essential element that the accused's possession was for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted.

This voir dire ruling addresses the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by Joshua Barreira to police following his arrest for first-degree murder.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to police oppression (cold, sickness, hunger, exhaustion, denial of right to silence) and inducements related to his wife and brother's arrests.

The court found no oppression, noting Barreira was a "savvy and experienced individual" who understood his rights and repeatedly attempted to negotiate a deal.

The court also determined that the idea of a false confession to protect family members was self-generated by Barreira, and the police officer's actions did not constitute improper inducements.

Consequently, the statements were deemed voluntary and admissible at trial, subject to editing out references to Barreira's criminal record.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, threatening death, unlawful confinement, and mischief over $5,000 following a prolonged attack on his former intimate partner in her home.

The court accepted a joint submission, sentencing the accused to two years in the penitentiary in addition to three years and 64 days of pre-sentence custody credit, followed by three years of probation.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter following the stabbing death of his friend during a physical altercation over a television.

The court found that the offender did not intend to cause death but used excessive force in self-defence by arming himself with a knife.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the use of a weapon and fleeing the scene, against mitigating factors such as his youth, employment history, and strict bail conditions, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years.

With credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions, the net sentence was 3 years and 10 months.

The offender pleaded guilty to importing 2.2 kg of cocaine and escaping lawful custody.

He acted as a courier, body-packing the drugs from Aruba.

The court considered the low purity of the cocaine (41%) and the offender's prior criminal record.

The court applied the Cunningham range, balancing the mitigating factor of low purity against the aggravating factor of his prior record.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 6 years' imprisonment, reduced to 4 years and 10 months after applying a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

A young person in custody at the Roy McMurtry Youth Centre was charged with three counts of unlawfully using violence with intent to provoke fear in justice system participants to impede them in their duties, three counts of criminal harassment, and one count of mischief to property under $5,000.

The charges arose from an incident where the accused became aggressive and belligerent after being denied telephone access, shouted at staff, clenched his fists, approached staff members, and threw a telephone receiver against a wall.

The court found that the accused's conduct, while disruptive and inappropriate, did not constitute violence as legally defined, nor did it constitute threatening conduct designed to instill fear.

The court distinguished between disruptive institutional misconduct and criminal behaviour.

The accused was acquitted on all counts except mischief to property, for which he was convicted.

On a Crown application in a murder prosecution, the court considered whether evidence that the accused possessed a knife similar to the murder weapon and had made a threatening statement about it was admissible as similar fact or discreditable conduct evidence.

Applying the governing similar fact framework, the court held the proposed evidence did not connect to the charged stabbing in any meaningful way and did not fit the recognized connecting factors.

The court also relied on analogous authority rejecting possession of non-murder weapons as circumstantial proof of homicide.

The prejudicial effect outweighed the limited probative value, and the application was dismissed.