R. Charlebois

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm to one individual and aggravated assault against another, arising from a parking lot altercation outside a bar in Niagara Falls on February 22, 2017.

The Crown alleged the defendant punched both complainants during a melee involving multiple individuals.

The defendant denied punching the first complainant and claimed he struck the second complainant in self-defence while being attacked from behind.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the bodily harm to the first complainant, and that the evidence supported the defendant's claim of self-defence regarding the second complainant.

Both charges were dismissed.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused requested that the partial defence of provocation be left with the jury.

The accused testified that the victim made threatening comments before the accused killed him.

The trial judge refused the request, finding no air of reality to the objective element of the defence.

The court held that the victim's comments, made while bound and confined by the accused, would not cause an ordinary person to lose the power of self-control.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence against three accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The court deferred the decision on the admissibility of vehicle cleaning evidence, finding it premature to balance probative value against prejudicial effect until further trial evidence was presented.

However, the court granted the admission of evidence regarding alleged witness intimidation by one accused, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to proper jury instructions and prior identification evidence.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit thermal-imaging video evidence, lay opinion evidence from a surveillance technician interpreting heat signatures, and demonstration evidence.

The defence objected to the lay opinion and demonstration evidence, and requested the full unedited video.

The court reserved decision on the lay opinion evidence pending further qualification of the witness, disallowed the demonstration evidence due to its high prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value, and permitted the Crown to present an edited version of the thermal-imaging video, finding the timestamp sufficient to convey time gaps.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of cell phone evidence and the use of a PowerPoint presentation summarizing call detail records at a first-degree murder trial.

The court permitted non-expert telecommunications company representatives to testify about the "general rule" regarding cell phone location in relation to towers, acknowledging exceptions.

The court also allowed the use of a PowerPoint presentation as demonstrative evidence, provided it was amended to be neutral, fact-based, and accurate, with consistent formatting and scale for maps, and subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, indicted for first-degree murder, applied for an order requiring the Crown to produce criminal records and police occurrence reports for all Crown witnesses.

The Crown agreed to provide criminal records but opposed the production of occurrence reports, arguing they were not first-party disclosure and that the third-party disclosure procedure had not been followed.

The court found that occurrence reports from the investigating police service (NRPS) for nine specific Crown witnesses fell within the Crown's first-party disclosure obligation under *Stinchcombe* and *McNeil*, as credibility was a live issue and the reports related directly to the investigation.

However, the court declined to order disclosure from other police services, deeming them third parties, and dismissed the third-party disclosure application due to procedural non-compliance under *O'Connor*.

The Crown appealed a decision by a Justice of the Peace who stayed charges of speeding and drive suspended against the respondent on the basis that the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to stay was just over 34 months.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in attributing responsibility for 17 months and 10 days of delay to the Crown, in finding that the respondent had not waived any delay through non-attendance, and in inferring prejudice from the delay.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the lower court's application of the law to the facts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the parties agreed to a statement of facts establishing that the accused operated a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration between 150 and 195 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The sole issue was whether the accused possessed the necessary mens rea.

The accused testified that she believed her drink had been spiked with a date-rape drug, claiming she had no memory of consuming most of the alcohol and that her symptoms were inconsistent with voluntary alcohol consumption.

The court found the accused guilty, distinguishing the case from R. v. Sitarz on the basis that while the accused's belief was genuine, it did not raise a reasonable doubt as to her guilt.