Paul Riley

This costs endorsement follows an 8-day trial in a family law matter concerning parenting, decision-making, child support arrears, and equalization.

The applicant was substantially successful on the most important issues, including parenting capacity and the date of separation, but was unsuccessful on imputed income and equalization claims.

The respondent's unreasonable conduct, unstable personal circumstances, and unrealistic positions significantly complicated the proceedings.

The court awarded costs to the successful applicant but reduced the claimed amount due to excessive hourly rates charged by Toronto counsel and applied to an Ottawa matter.

Damages claims for family violence were rejected as inappropriate and unsettled in law.

The court considered whether a binding and enforceable settlement was reached between the parties following mediation and subsequent email exchanges.

The Applicant sought an order to enforce the settlement terms, while the Respondent argued that no binding agreement existed due to the absence of a signed document and unresolved essential terms.

The court found that the parties had reached consensus on all essential terms, as evidenced by their conduct and correspondence, and that the agreement was enforceable despite not meeting the formal requirements of a domestic contract under the Family Law Act.

The Applicant’s motion was granted, and a final order was issued in accordance with the settlement.

The Respondent, Ms. Enei, brought a motion for summary judgment on property issues, seeking findings of no genuine issue for trial regarding the Applicant's claims for unequal division of net family property, beneficial ownership of certain investment accounts (resulting trust), and unjust enrichment.

The Applicant, Mr. Enei, opposed and brought a cross-motion for various relief, including divorce severance, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, an accounting, disclosure, return of family dogs, and a temporary variation of spousal support.

The court granted Ms. Enei's summary judgment motion on the claims for unequal division and unjust enrichment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

However, the motion was dismissed regarding beneficial entitlement to investment accounts and equalization, as these issues raised credibility questions requiring a trial.

Mr. Enei's cross-motion was largely dismissed, except for the severance of the divorce and partial disclosure.

The court found Mr. Enei's allegations of excessive spending and diversion of funds by Ms. Enei unsubstantiated and his disclosure requests disproportionate.

This trial addressed divorce, decision-making, parenting time, child support (retroactive and prospective), date of separation, and equalization of net family property.

The court granted the Applicant mother sole decision-making authority, imputed the Respondent father's income at minimum wage for support purposes, and ordered retroactive child support arrears to be paid from funds held in trust.

Prospective child support was also based on imputed minimum wage.

The Applicant's claim for private school expenses was denied, and the court found that the Applicant owed the Respondent a modest equalization payment.

The long-term parenting schedule was deferred for further case management.

K.F. sought an extension of time to file her notice of appeal regarding a family law order concerning parenting, child, and spousal support.

The underlying trial involved allegations of domestic violence, coercive control, and sexual assault against J.J.W., which the trial judge rejected, finding K.F.'s evidence unreliable and that she had influenced their child's narrative.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The court found the proposed appeal lacked merit, appearing frivolous and vexatious, and that granting the extension would cause significant prejudice to the child and J.J.W. by hindering the reunification process and re-litigating previously rejected allegations.

This is a costs decision following a 10-day trial in a family law matter.

The Applicant father was substantially successful on primary issues including parenting and financial orders.

The court found the Respondent mother's conduct unreasonable due to her persistence in unsubstantiated abuse allegations, failure to make offers to settle, late abandonment of relocation relief, and non-compliance with court orders.

While bad faith was not established, the unreasonable conduct and the Applicant's reasonable offers to settle justified a costs award.

The court fixed costs on a substantial indemnity basis, deducting amounts related to criminal proceedings and significantly discounting law clerk fees for administrative tasks.

The Respondent was ordered to pay $130,000 in costs to the Applicant.

The parties separated and engaged in high-conflict family litigation.

The mother and her family influenced the young child to make false allegations of sexual abuse against the father, leading to criminal charges of which the father was ultimately acquitted.

The father was denied parenting time for over two years due to the allegations and the involvement of the Children's Aid Society.

The court found parental alienation occurred, though not necessarily with malice, and ordered a swift phased-in return to a 50/50 shared parenting schedule.

The court imputed income to the mother for child and spousal support purposes, ordered a brief continuation of spousal support, and dismissed the father's claim for malicious prosecution.

The Applicant mother sought Ontario jurisdiction for a parenting order for three children she removed from Nigeria without the father's consent.

The Respondent father sought the children's immediate return to Nigeria, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction.

The court found the children were wrongfully removed and retained, declined jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act, and ordered their immediate return to Nigeria, concluding that the Nigerian courts would prioritize the children's best interests despite allegations of domestic violence and concerns regarding LGBTQIIA+ issues.

The defendant, charged with speeding, brought two motions: a recusal motion against the judge and a Charter motion seeking disclosure of the investigating officer's training and qualifications, specific tests performed on the speed measurement device, and police standing orders governing speed enforcement, along with a stay of proceedings.

The recusal motion was dismissed as no reasonable apprehension of bias was established.

The court granted the disclosure aspect of the Charter motion, finding the requested information relevant to assess the reliability of the speed measurement evidence, particularly in light of the principles from York (Regional Municipality) v. McGuigan.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was not fully determined at this stage.

This is a costs endorsement following a ten-day family law trial.

The trial addressed decision-making responsibility and parenting schedules for two children, and the winding up of a family trust.

The respondent achieved substantial success on the primary issues of decision-making and residency for one child, and a shared parenting schedule for the other.

The applicant's conduct was deemed unreasonable, particularly her refusal to communicate and make settlement offers.

The court awarded the respondent 75% of his actual costs, totaling $78,768.00, finding the amount reasonable and proportionate given the respondent's success and the applicant's unreasonable behaviour.

The parties separated after a 23-year marriage and engaged in a high-conflict custody dispute over their two children, one of whom has severe special needs.

The applicant mother sought joint custody and an equal time-sharing schedule, while the respondent father sought sole decision-making authority and primary residence for the special needs child during the school week.

The court found that the mother was unable to co-parent effectively, communicate with professionals, or prioritize the children's needs over her animosity toward the father.

The court granted sole decision-making authority to the father, ordered primary residence with the father for the special needs child during the school week to ensure consistency, and ordered an equal time-sharing schedule for the younger child.

The father's request to wind up a family trust was dismissed without prejudice due to procedural issues.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was 60.5 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

While a previous s. 11(b) application was dismissed, finding the case complex and acknowledging transitional circumstances, a subsequent 11-month adjournment was caused by the unavailability of judges due to medical reasons and systemic resource shortages.

The court found that while judicial illness is a discrete exceptional circumstance, the extended 11-month delay was primarily attributable to scarce judicial resources, which does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and the applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of driving while suspended contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge had found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew his licence was suspended, applying a test requiring the Crown to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding that driving while suspended is a strict liability offence requiring only proof of the actus reus (that the accused was driving and that his licence was suspended).

The burden then shifts to the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he took all reasonable care, including that he reasonably believed his licence was not suspended.

The court found the accused's own admission that his licence was suspended, combined with the objective fact of suspension, precluded any reasonable belief to the contrary.

A conviction was entered with a $1,000 fine and six-month licence suspension.

The Crown appealed a decision by a Justice of the Peace who stayed charges of speeding and drive suspended against the respondent on the basis that the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to stay was just over 34 months.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in attributing responsibility for 17 months and 10 days of delay to the Crown, in finding that the respondent had not waived any delay through non-attendance, and in inferring prejudice from the delay.

The appellate court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no error in the lower court's application of the law to the facts.