Helen Song

The applicant auto dealership sought a declaration that it was the rightful owner of numerous classic vehicles that were allegedly stolen by a fraudster and sold to innocent purchasers.

The respondent purchasers argued they acquired good title under the Sale of Goods Act and Factors Act, and relied on vehicle permits issued by Service Ontario.

The court held that a vehicle permit under the Highway Traffic Act does not confer legal ownership superior to a prior valid title.

However, finding that material facts remained in dispute regarding whether the fraudster acted as a mercantile agent for the dealership, the court ordered a trial of an issue to hear viva voce evidence on the relationship between the parties.

Deborah Omolade Oguntoyinbo pleaded guilty to numerous fraud-related charges and breaches of release orders spanning several years.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 6 years imprisonment, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of 18-24 months.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, citing the defendant's extensive criminal record of over seventy prior convictions (predominantly fraud-related), her persistent and flagrant breaches of release conditions (including cutting off a GPS monitor), and a lack of demonstrated rehabilitation efforts.

Emphasizing specific deterrence and denunciation, the judge imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, along with significant restitution orders totaling over $86,000 to multiple victims who suffered financial and personal harm, including new Canadians and small business owners.

The court also granted credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh custodial conditions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that he should have a new trial due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that trial counsel failed to properly perfect a section 11(b) Charter application and failed to inform him of his right to testify on the Charter application.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while trial counsel's failure to file transcripts for the section 11(b) application fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice as the trial judge ultimately allowed the application to proceed.

The court also found that the appellant failed to establish that he was not informed of his right to testify, and even if he had been, it would not have changed the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault causing bodily harm following an incident where he was shot at, chased his attackers in a vehicle, and engaged in a physical altercation with one of them.

The trial judge found the appellant acted in self-defence initially but used excessive force once the attacker was subdued, and concluded the bodily harm occurred during this latter phase.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge's conclusion regarding when the bodily harm occurred was unreasonable, as it could have happened during the car crash or the initial lawful struggle.

The court set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituted a finding of guilt for common assault, and imposed an absolute discharge.

The applicant, who was convicted of an indecent act and assaulting a police officer, applied under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel on his summary conviction appeal.

He claimed he was indigent and suffered from physical and mental health issues that prevented meaningful participation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was not indigent, the issues on appeal were not complex, and he was capable of effectively advancing his grounds of appeal without legal assistance.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80.

He argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his lost evidence application regarding unrecorded 911 calls, finding the roadside screening demand was made 'forthwith', and concluding his right to counsel was not breached despite a delay in implementation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings that the 911 recordings never existed, the brief delay in the breath demand was justified by the officer managing the collision scene alone, and privacy for a phone call to counsel could not be provided until arrival at the police station.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time was violated.

The trial, originally scheduled for two days, took over five months to complete in the Ontario Court of Justice, resulting in a net delay of 18 months and 2 days.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred in characterizing the appellant's self-represented status and court scheduling issues as exceptional circumstances.

The appeal was granted and the charges were stayed.

The appellant was convicted of causing unnecessary suffering and abandoning an animal in distress after dumping a live puppy in a garbage bin.

He appealed his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his trial lawyer failed to properly prepare him and his witnesses, compromised their relationship, and misunderstood the law.

He also sought an extension of time to appeal his sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application for an extension of time, finding no reasonable explanation for the delay.

The court also dismissed the conviction appeal, concluding the appellant failed to establish the material facts underlying his claims of ineffective assistance and that trial counsel's strategic decisions fell within the standard of reasonable professional judgment.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge refused to hold a voir-dire to assess the competency of a conditionally accredited Amharic interpreter.

The trial judge insisted that a fully accredited interpreter was mandatory and invited the Crown to call no evidence when one could not be provided.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that there is no constitutional right to a fully accredited interpreter, only a competent one, and that the trial judge was obligated to conduct a voir-dire to determine competency under section 14 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent had fled a car accident and was found hiding in her parents' shed after police conducted a warrantless search of her own home next door.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's finding that the warrantless search of the respondent's home violated s. 8 and was sufficiently connected to the discovery of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on a 19-year-old first offender who pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

The sentencing judge had imposed the discharge without giving the Crown notice or an opportunity to make submissions, which the appeal court found to be an error in principle.

However, upon conducting a fresh assessment, the appeal court concluded that a conditional discharge was the fit and appropriate sentence given the offender's youth, lack of record, genuine remorse, and positive rehabilitative steps.

The appeal was dismissed and the conditional discharge was upheld.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were taken 'as soon as practicable' by making improper inferences about a 16-minute delay, and erred in finding his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol without expert correlation evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences regarding the delay were reasonable and grounded in common sense, and that the finding of impairment was supported by the evidence of bad driving, physical indicia of alcohol consumption, and breath test results.

The appellant, Jan Talaga, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment.

The core issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in denying a mistrial and instead re-opening the trial after finding that Talaga was deprived of effective assistance of counsel regarding his right to testify.

The trial judge had initially convicted Talaga, then set aside the verdict to allow him to testify, and subsequently re-convicted him.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's discretionary decision, considering the narrowness of the disputed issues, the lack of prior adverse credibility findings against Talaga, and the circumstantial nature of the Crown's case.

The court found no reversible error in the trial judge's decision to continue the trial rather than declare a mistrial, emphasizing that a mistrial is an extraordinary remedy reserved for the "clearest of cases."

The appellant appealed his assault conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a W.D. analysis, providing insufficient reasons regarding self-defence, and failing to impose a conditional discharge.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, faithfully applied the substance of W.D. principles, and reasonably concluded that a conditional discharge was contrary to the public interest given the violent nature of the assault and the need for general deterrence.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) analysis and providing insufficient reasons.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her credibility findings were entitled to deference, and she properly applied the W.(D.) principles and provided adequate reasons.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The application was based on grounds including judicial bias, misapprehension of evidence, and an unfit sentence.

The court applied the three-part test from s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, finding that the appeal grounds were not frivolous, there was no flight risk, and detention was not necessary in the public interest, particularly given the significant portion of the sentence that would be served before the appeal could be heard.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the "Me Too" movement altered the balance in favour of enforceability.

The appellant, M.R., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, arguing that his right to an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter was infringed.

His Swahili interpreter was only partially accredited and made several significant errors during his testimony, which M.R., who had some English proficiency, corrected.

The trial judge declined a renewed objection to the interpreter, relying on M.R.'s ability to self-correct.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on the appellant to safeguard his own constitutional right to a competent interpreter and by failing to conduct a further inquiry into the interpreter's competence despite clear indications of inaccuracies.

The court emphasized that the right to a competent interpreter is unqualified and a denial of this right is inherently prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of criminal harassment, arguing that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence by placing a higher burden on his testimony than on the complainant's.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's reasons, which relied on the W.(D.) and J.J.R.D. frameworks for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The court found that the trial judge properly instructed herself, gave considered reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence, and did not engage in uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his 2017 convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed because he was unaware they would render him inadmissible to Canada.

The court dismissed the application, finding it moot because the Immigration Appeal Division had recently granted a conditional stay of his removal order.

The court also noted the application would have been dismissed regardless due to the applicant's significant delay in bringing the application and serious credibility issues with his evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had excluded the refusal evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding multiple breaches of the respondent's rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) following his arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by misapprehending material evidence regarding the implementational component of s. 10(b), applying the wrong legal test to the strip search, failing to conduct the required temporal analysis for evidence obtained prior to a breach, and misapplying jurisprudence on the seriousness of a refusal offence.

A new trial was ordered.