Andrew Jia

The applicant husband and respondent wife built a real estate corporate empire during their marriage.

Following their separation, the wife claimed her mother beneficially owned the subject corporations and relied on a 2007 marriage contract to exclude the assets from net family property.

The court found the husband was the beneficial owner of four of the corporations and a 50% owner of the fifth, determining the mother was merely a nominee.

The court also set aside the marriage contract, finding the parties had abandoned it by mutual agreement in 2008.

The wife's post-separation actions to seize control of the corporations were found to be oppressive under the Business Corporations Act.

The purchaser of a pre-construction condominium unit sought to rescind the agreement of purchase and sale after the developer added three stories to the building.

The parties proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator found in favour of the developer and determined his jurisdiction arose from the parties' consent under the Arbitration Act, 1991, not the Ontario New Homes Warranties Plan Act (ONHWPA).

The purchaser brought proceedings to the Divisional Court for judicial review and appeal.

The developer moved to quash the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that because the arbitrator determined his jurisdiction was under the Arbitration Act, 1991, that Act governed the appeal routes.

Since the purchaser had waived his appeal rights in the arbitration agreement, the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction.

The applicant purchaser sought judicial review of an arbitrator's costs award that ordered him to pay the respondent vendor's legal fees on a substantial indemnity basis following a dismissed arbitration over a cancelled condominium project.

The Divisional Court found it had jurisdiction because the arbitration was mandatory under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The Court held the arbitrator's costs decision was unreasonable and internally inconsistent, as it failed to properly apply the specific costs regime in the Tarion Addendum which presumes the vendor pays the purchaser's reasonable legal expenses absent just cause.

The costs award was quashed and remitted to the arbitrator for reconsideration.

The applicant, Hugh Kuang, sought an order for $4,110,000.00 in interim legal costs and disbursements to fund an upcoming trial under the Ontario Business Corporations Act and the Family Law Rules.

The respondents resisted, arguing that a prior consent order providing $1,000,000.00 did not establish the applicant's ongoing entitlement to interim funding.

The court determined that the prior consent order resolved the issue of entitlement, leaving only the questions of compliance and quantum.

Finding the applicant's proposed budget excessive but recognizing the complexity of the litigation, the court granted the motion in part and ordered the corporate respondents to pay $2,725,000.00 in four staged payments.

This endorsement addresses two motions arising from a cybertheft of approximately $9.7 million from the applicant's bank account at the respondent bank.

The applicant, FACTOR, sought additional productions from the Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), alleging a parsimonious approach to disclosure.

BNS, supported by other respondents, sought to convert the application into an action, citing material facts in dispute and complex issues.

The court largely granted FACTOR's production requests, ordering BNS to provide more details from its internal investigation, session logs (with confidentiality), and internal alert system details (with a secure mechanism).

The court also ordered the additional respondents, James Campagna and 10426377 Canada Inc., to produce all relevant documents.

The motion to convert the application to an action was dismissed as premature, with the court noting that the necessity of conversion could be revisited once the respondents deliver their full evidence.

The appellant's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against real estate agents was dismissed on summary judgment due to being commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The appellant argued she did not discover the material facts until later.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the discoverability period begins when the plaintiff knows or ought to have known the material facts, not the legal conclusion.

The court noted the appellant had previously pleaded the agents were her agents in a prior action, indicating knowledge of the material facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an action under the anti-SLAPP regime (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The defendants, who successfully moved for dismissal, sought full indemnity costs totaling over $148,000.

The plaintiff argued against full indemnity, citing various factors including the nature of the litigation, power imbalances, and procedural delays.

The court, exercising its discretion, found that full indemnity was not appropriate and awarded partial indemnity costs of $60,000 to the individual defendants and $30,000 to Cybermedia, considering the specific circumstances and issues raised by the plaintiff.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, former Executive Chairman of a non-profit organization, sued the defendants over WeChat messages and a published declaration alleging election manipulation, financial opaqueness, and by-law violations.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the expressions related to a matter of public interest, the defendants had valid defences including justification and fair comment, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the minimal harm suffered by the plaintiff.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated May 26, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The court awarded costs of $3,000 inclusive to the responding party, payable within thirty days.

The plaintiff law firm sought an interlocutory injunction against a former employee to prevent client solicitation and disclosure of confidential information.

The court applied the three-part test for injunctive relief, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the employment contract and breach, irreparable harm due to difficulty quantifying lost referrals, and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The injunction was granted, restricting the defendant from soliciting clients, disclosing confidential information, and requiring her to forward client communications to the plaintiff firm.

Costs for the motion were reserved to the trial judge, except for a third party (Grillo Law) who was awarded partial indemnity costs for successfully excluding privileged evidence.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, arguing it was brought beyond the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff contended the claim was discoverable later due to alleged fraudulent concealment of the defendants' agency status.

The court found the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts earlier, as evidenced by her pleadings in a prior related action.

The court dismissed the action as limitation barred, emphasizing that knowledge of material facts, not legal conclusions, triggers the limitation period.

The appellant, an Ontario public service employee, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal regarding a pension plan amendment.

Upon promotion to a management position, the appellant transferred from the OPSEU Pension Plan to the Public Service Pension Plan.

A 2013 amendment to the OPSEU Plan eliminated the payout of 'Excess Commuted Value' upon such transfers.

The appellant argued the amendment was void under the Pension Benefits Act for reducing an accrued pension benefit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's findings that the excess payment was not a 'pension benefit' and had not 'accrued' at the time of the amendment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time was violated.

The trial, originally scheduled for two days, took over five months to complete in the Ontario Court of Justice, resulting in a net delay of 18 months and 2 days.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred in characterizing the appellant's self-represented status and court scheduling issues as exceptional circumstances.

The appeal was granted and the charges were stayed.

The plaintiff moved for an order extending the time to serve a statement of claim in a construction lien action.

The claim was not served within the 90-day period prescribed by the Construction Act due to inadvertence.

The court granted the extension, finding the six-week delay was not inordinate and caused no prejudice to the defendants.

However, as the motion was an indulgence necessitated by the plaintiff's inadvertence, the court awarded costs to the responding defendant.

The plaintiffs requested a three-month adjournment of a scheduled mini-trial following the discharge of their counsel due to a breakdown in the lawyer-client relationship.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, citing a history of delay and prejudice.

The court balanced the interests of the parties and the administration of justice, noting the lengthy procedural history, the plaintiffs' familiarity with the case, and the prejudice of further delay.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, ordering the mini-trial to proceed as scheduled.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for damages arising from an incident where the defendant pushed the plaintiff, fracturing his teeth.

At the hearing, the plaintiff sought an adjournment to cross-examine the defendant.

The court denied the adjournment, noting that Rule 76 prohibits cross-examination on affidavits for summary judgment motions.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding the evidentiary record inadequate, including the plaintiff's reliance on inadmissible apology evidence and insufficient proof of damages, concluding that a summary trial was the appropriate procedure.