Markus F. Kremer

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a pre-approval order regarding a $500 million settlement in principle with the Loblaw defendants in a national class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread.

The court granted the order, amending the certification of the Ontario action for settlement purposes only, appointing the settlement administrator, and approving the notice plan and pre-approval notices to inform class members of the settlement and their opt-out or objection rights.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Rady J dated October 1, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action on behalf of independent distributors who contracted with the defendants to deliver fresh bread products.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants breached their contracts and the Arthur Wishart Act by participating in and concealing an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed viable causes of action, there was an identifiable class, the claims raised common issues, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiff was suitable.

The motion for certification was granted.

In Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings, LoyaltyOne, Co. and its Monitor sought a declaration that a Tax Matters Agreement (TMA) was not binding or was void as a transfer at undervalue (TUV), and sought to disclaim the TMA to secure a $96 million tax refund.

Bread Financial Holdings, Inc. (formerly ADS) cross-moved to set aside the disclaimer, asserting its entitlement to the refund under the TMA.

The court ruled that LoyaltyOne was bound by the TMA, the TMA was not void as a TUV, and the disclaimer was not approved.

The court found it premature to determine the specific nature of Bread's rights to the refund.

The appellants appealed a certification order in a price-fixing class action regarding packaged bread.

They argued the motions judge erred by excluding indirect purchasers who bought bread from non-defendant retailers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge properly settled the certification order to reflect his reasons and the nature of the single conspiracy pleaded, which required the product to pass through both a defendant producer and a defendant retailer.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal an order excluding from the class for certification persons who claim damages for purchases of packaged bread directly or indirectly sold by a defendant producer without being resold by a defendant retailer.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal on this issue and reserved costs to the panel hearing the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Morgan J. dated December 31, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded in favour of the plaintiffs in the amount of $15,000 all inclusive, payable jointly and severally by the defendants.

The appellant, an unqualified teacher who taught part-time credit courses between 1980 and 1989, sought retroactive pension credits from the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan.

The Financial Services Tribunal dismissed his application, finding he required a Letter of Permission (LOP) for each year of service to be eligible for credits, and that he failed to prove he had been granted any LOPs.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the LOP requirement, the burden of proof, and the pension board's fiduciary duties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal correctly applied the statutory requirements, properly placed the onus of proof on the appellant, and made no palpable and overriding error in its factual findings regarding the absence of LOPs and the board's conduct.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions to quash an appeal of a class certification order in a price-fixing conspiracy case involving packaged bread.

The plaintiffs (appellants) argued the certification order, which defined the class, effectively dismissed claims of excluded persons and was thus a final order appealable under the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendants (moving parties) contended it was a certification order governed by the Class Proceedings Act (CPA) and that, under the CPA's transitional provisions, the appeal should lie to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court found the certification order was a procedural order, not a final one, as it did not decide the ultimate merits of any claim.

Consequently, the appeal provisions of the CPA applied.

Furthermore, the court determined that the pre-2020 amendments to the CPA governed the appeal because the original proceeding was commenced before the amendments came into force.

The appeal to the Court of Appeal was therefore quashed.

The court held a case conference to settle the terms of a certification order following a decision to certify a class action regarding alleged price-fixing of packaged bread.

The court reviewed competing draft orders and approved the producer defendants' draft with specific amendments, including adjustments to the definition of packaged bread, the class definition, and the retention of constructive trust as a common issue.

The appellant, an Ontario public service employee, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal regarding a pension plan amendment.

Upon promotion to a management position, the appellant transferred from the OPSEU Pension Plan to the Public Service Pension Plan.

A 2013 amendment to the OPSEU Plan eliminated the payout of 'Excess Commuted Value' upon such transfers.

The appellant argued the amendment was void under the Pension Benefits Act for reducing an accrued pension benefit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's findings that the excess payment was not a 'pension benefit' and had not 'accrued' at the time of the amendment.

The appellant, Marvin Rubner, appealed a lower court decision that found no binding settlement agreement had been reached between him and his brother, Joseph Rubner, regarding their real estate business interests.

The application judge had concluded that Joseph's counsel had limited authority to negotiate only the minutes of settlement, not the "Deal Points" and that Marvin's counsel was aware of this limitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the application judge's interpretation of the agreement and application of the test for ostensible authority were questions of mixed fact and law, reviewable only for palpable and overriding error, which was not demonstrated.

Three cross-appeals arose from the interpretation of a 1985 environmental indemnity granted by the Province of Ontario to former pulp mill owners, their successors and assigns, in the context of the settlement of mercury contamination litigation brought by two First Nations.

The majority held that the indemnity did not cover first party regulatory compliance orders, as the motion judge made palpable and overriding factual errors, and the indemnity, properly read as a whole, was intended to cover only third party pollution claims.

The appeal of the Province was allowed; the appeals of the corporate successors were dismissed.

The dissent (Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.) would have dismissed the Province's appeal and allowed the appeal of Resolute, concluding the indemnity covered the Director's remediation order, that the fettering doctrine did not render the indemnity unenforceable, and that Resolute — as Great Lakes' corporate successor — was entitled to the indemnity's protection, but Weyerhaeuser was not, as neither an assignee nor a corporate successor of Great Lakes or Reed.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal involved four consolidated actions concerning personal liability of corporate directors and officers in the context of real estate development and mortgage transactions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusions on the legal issue of personal liability based on pleaded allegations and legal principles.

The costs decision addresses the appropriate costs awards for the successful and unsuccessful parties across the multiple appeals.

Four consolidated class actions brought by small investors who invested in syndicated mortgages promoted by Fortress Real Capital Inc. and Fortress Real Developments Inc. The investors alleged misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence.

The motion judge struck claims against individual respondents Jawad Rathore and Vincenzo Petrozza, and dismissed claims to enforce syndicated mortgages against Empire Pace (1088 Progress) Ltd. and ADI Developments entities.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of personal claims against Rathore and Petrozza but reversed the dismissal of mortgage enforcement claims against Empire Pace and ADI, finding that the motion judge erred in applying Rule 21 to matters requiring evidentiary findings regarding contract interpretation and disclosure.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

The appellants, survivors and family members of victims of the Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, brought a class action against Loblaws and Bureau Veritas seeking damages for negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that Bangladeshi law applied (not Ontario law), the claims were statute-barred under Bangladesh's one-year limitation period, and the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on all grounds.

The court also addressed a costs appeal, reducing the costs award by 30% to reflect the public interest component of the claims.

Two proposed privacy class actions arising from hospital employees’ unauthorized extraction of patient contact information for RESP sales leads were refused certification.

The court held that, on the actual evidentiary record, the disclosure of contact information alone, without disclosure of medical records or other objectively private information, could not support the tort of intrusion on seclusion because there was intrusion but no legally sufficient seclusion and no objectively highly offensive invasion.

Although certain claims, including a PHIPA s. 65 claim and some negligence theories against the hospitals and rogue employees, were arguable at the pleadings stage, there were no viable common issues and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

Small Claims Court proceedings or PHIPA-related processes were found more proportionate for any remaining individualized claims.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a declaration that Rouge Valley Health System was estopped from denying liability for various statutory and common law causes of action, based on an Order from the Information and Privacy Commissioner (PHIPA Order HO-013).

The court dismissed the motion, exercising its discretion under the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

It found that applying issue estoppel would be procedurally and substantively unfair given the magnitude of the class action ($400 million) against a public institution, and the informal, discretionary nature of the administrative tribunal's proceedings, which focused on its privacy law mandate rather than complex civil law.

The court also noted that such an application would be inimical to the due administration of justice by discouraging settlements with the Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a 1985 indemnity provided by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes and Reed covered the costs of complying with a 2011 Director's Order requiring remedial work at an abandoned mercury waste disposal site near Dryden, Ontario.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favour of Weyerhaeuser and Resolute, finding both were entitled to indemnification.

The appellate court was divided.

The majority (Brown and Lauwers JJ.A.) held that the 1985 indemnity did cover the costs of complying with the Director's Order, but found that Resolute had no legal interest in the indemnity because Bowater had assigned the full benefit to Weyerhaeuser in 1998.

The majority remitted the issue of Weyerhaeuser's rights as assignee to the trial court.

Justice Laskin dissented, arguing the 1985 indemnity covered only third-party pollution claims, not first-party regulatory compliance costs.