Saba Ahmad

The court assessed damages for the applicant, Vineet Khanna, arising from the respondents' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The court rejected claims for rescission and damages in lieu of specific performance, finding the property was not unique and that the applicant failed to prove fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court awarded damages based on the difference between the purchase price and the market value at the date of breach, as well as for extension fees, temporary accommodation, and moving/storage expenses, but denied "equitable interest" and limited some claims due to insufficient evidence.

The applicant, Vineet Khanna, brought a motion to stay the defence of the respondents on the basis that the respondents failed to disclose a Mary-Carter type agreement.

The court reviewed the facts and relevant case law, ultimately finding that the Minutes of Settlement in question were not a Mary-Carter type agreement that changed the adversarial position of the parties.

The court held that immediate disclosure was not required and that the applicant was not prejudiced by any delay in disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following the disposition of three appeals.

The parties settled the issue of costs by agreement.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of $13,750, all inclusive, to the respondents.

The appellant, Voreon Inc., appealed the dismissal of three applications arising from a business relationship breakdown.

Two appeals concerned real estate developments (Higher Living and Eminence Living) and the interpretation of a Settlement Agreement versus a shareholders agreement regarding promissory notes.

The third appeal (MHH appeal) involved a mortgage's validity, a set-off claim for a promissory note, and the transfer of condominium units.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Higher Living and Eminence Living appeals, affirming the application judge's finding that the Settlement Agreement superseded the shareholders agreement and discharged the promissory notes.

However, the MHH appeal was allowed in part, remitting the issues of the $64,135 set-off note and the transfer of the parking/storage units to the Superior Court for adjudication, citing unaddressed issues and a palpable error regarding party status.

The appellants, parents of a brain-injured son, appealed a trial judge's decision on the passing of accounts for a trust they administered.

The trial judge found significant mismanagement, including a failure to account for over $165,000, fabrication of receipts, and improper cash administration, ordering them to repay funds, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The appellants challenged the disallowance of expenses, the failure to consider quantum meruit/equitable set-off, the denial of legal fee indemnity, and prejudgment interest calculation.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the accounts should not have been passed given the breaches and that no trustee compensation should have been awarded.

The Court of Appeal largely affirmed the trial judge's findings, making only minor adjustments for calculation errors, and dismissed the cross-appeal, emphasizing the high onus on trustees to account and the deference owed to trial judges' factual findings in such complex cases.

Following a 14-day trial on an application to pass accounts where the applicant trustees were ordered to repay $150,531.14 to the trust, the respondent sought $567,157.64 in substantial indemnity costs.

The court found the respondent was the successful party and entitled to costs.

However, the court declined to award enhanced costs, finding that while the applicants failed to keep proper records and created documents to reconstruct the accounts, their conduct was not reprehensible or scandalous.

The court also found the respondent's costs claim was disproportionate and unreasonable due to over-lawyering and unreasonable litigation conduct.

The court awarded the respondent $90,000 in costs inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The applicants, parents and trustees of a trust established for their son following a serious brain injury, applied to pass their accounts.

The trust received $418,675.25 over 17 years, but the trustees administered it entirely in cash and lacked receipts for most disbursements.

The court found that the trustees failed to keep proper records and included fictitious loans and unpaid services in the accounts.

While some expenses were allowed, the trustees failed to account for $165,531.14.

After deducting $15,000 for trustee compensation, the court ordered the trustees to repay $150,531.14 to the trust.

The applicants brought three applications against their former business partner and his related corporations, seeking payments under various promissory notes and shareholders agreements related to joint real estate development projects.

The respondents argued that the parties had previously entered into a binding Settlement Agreement that superseded the notes and agreements.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Settlement Agreement was a binding contract, not merely an agreement to agree, and that the respondents' conduct did not amount to a repudiation that the applicants had accepted.

The court held that the applicants were limited to the payouts and terms agreed upon in the Settlement Agreement.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting the respondent commissions on the sale of two properties.

The motion judge found that the appellant Zaman had executed a valid buyer representation agreement and rejected his defenses based on dyslexia, alleged oral amendments, and failure to disclose commissions.

On appeal, the appellants argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because a counterclaim for negligence was inextricably intertwined with the claim.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the counterclaim was not inextricably intertwined with the claim and was premised on the validity of the buyer representation agreement itself.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

The applicant brought an application to determine its fee under a Sales Representation Agreement after introducing the respondent to an investor for a real estate development project.

The respondent argued the transaction was a sale, which would make the fee clause unenforceable as the applicant was not a registered broker under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The court found the transaction was in substance an investment, triggering the alternative fee clause.

The court awarded the applicant $1,800,000 and granted a charge on the property to secure payment.

Benjamin Cochrane, a beneficiary of a trust established after a childhood accident, brought a motion seeking the removal of his father, William Cochrane, as litigation guardian, the removal of his parents, William and Carol Cochrane, as trustees, an accounting of the trust, and compensation for alleged misappropriation.

The parents sought an adjournment, which was granted on terms.

The court removed William as litigation guardian, ordered William and Carol to provide a full accounting, and directed timely payment of annuity income to Benjamin.

Interim costs were awarded to Benjamin.

On appeal, the court concluded the appellant should have been successful at trial and awarded damages of $438,113 in addition to other relief.

The appellant had made a pre-trial Rule 49 offer to settle for $180,000.

The court determined the appellant was entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

However, because a significant portion of the trial involved testing claims the appellant made which the trial judge found to be untrue, and many of those findings were undisturbed on appeal, the costs award was adjusted to reflect that the trial was not an unqualified success for the appellant.

Following a prior trial decision and endorsement directing the parties to finalize draft orders expeditiously, counsel for the applicants forwarded draft orders to opposing counsel for approval as to form and content.

No response was received from counsel for the opposing party despite the court’s direction.

After reviewing the draft orders prepared by the applicants’ counsel, the court made a minor revision and signed both orders.

The signed orders were directed to be circulated to counsel together with the endorsement.

Following a trial decision dismissing a claim for a beneficial ownership interest in residential property, the unsuccessful claimant filed a notice of appeal and sought to prevent the release of sale proceeds pending appeal.

The moving party argued that an automatic stay applied under Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, requested an interim stay while seeking relief from the Court of Appeal.

The court rejected the argument that the order constituted a payment of money subject to an automatic stay, relying on appellate authority distinguishing the release of trust funds from a money judgment.

Nevertheless, the court granted a limited interim stay to permit the moving party to bring a stay motion before the Court of Appeal.

The interim stay was restricted to 50% of the sale proceeds and was conditional on the appeal motion being argued by a specified deadline.

The applicant son sought a declaration of beneficial ownership in his mother's residential property based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, claiming he made financial and physical contributions to the property over decades.

The court found significant credibility issues with all parties.

The court held that the son did not establish the elements of proprietary estoppel, as his evidence regarding his expectation of an interest in the property was inconsistent and any alleged promise was for an inheritance, not a present interest.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding that the son did not confer a net benefit on his mother, as the value of his rent-free accommodation far exceeded any financial contributions he made.

The application was dismissed with no costs awarded due to the unreasonable conduct of all parties.

The moving party sought to vacate an ex parte Mareva injunction freezing assets, arguing that the injunction had been obtained through material misrepresentations and failures of full and frank disclosure.

The court accepted that inaccuracies had been presented in the original application, including overstated assets, understated income, and failure to disclose proceeds from a home sale.

However, given ongoing concerns about the disappearance of significant funds and unresolved factual disputes, the court declined to set aside the injunction entirely.

Instead, the injunction was varied to permit the release of a portion of frozen funds reflecting assets the moving party credibly established were independently earned.

The court also dismissed the opposing party’s cross‑motion for additional funding and awarded costs to the moving party.

The applicant moved for judgment on a demand promissory note and related security, seeking payment of a liquidated debt and dismissal of any set‑off claims raised by the respondent.

The respondent asserted a contractual right of set‑off arising from a services agreement and also brought motions seeking security for a Mareva damages undertaking and security for costs.

The court held that the existence of significant factual disputes, including whether contractual set‑off applied and limitation issues, made the matter unsuitable for determination on motion.

The court also found insufficient evidence to justify security for the damages undertaking or security for costs.

Both motions were dismissed and the issues were directed to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought continuation of a Mareva injunction freezing the respondent’s assets in connection with a disputed promissory note and security agreement.

The respondent argued the injunction should be set aside due to material non‑disclosure on the original ex parte motion, including the applicant’s assignment of the security underlying the debt and the respondent’s asserted set‑off claim.

The court held that the potential weakness of the undertaking as to damages arising from the assignment should have been disclosed to the judge who granted the ex parte order.

Although the court declined to continue the Mareva injunction in its existing form, it found that some interim relief was justified to preserve the status quo pending a short trial.

The injunction was continued temporarily for ten days with limited permitted expenses and directions for proposals regarding payments and trial scheduling.

The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment declaring that no binding contract existed for a nationwide roll‑out of a stored value “Tim Card” payment system and that they had not misused confidential information obtained during a pilot program.

The defendants alleged that a binding agreement had been reached or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs breached confidentiality obligations and a duty to negotiate in good faith after abandoning negotiations and conducting an RFP process.

The court held that the evidence showed only an agreement in principle and ongoing negotiations, not a finalized contract, as material terms remained unresolved and the parties’ conduct did not demonstrate a binding commitment.

The court also found no misuse of confidential information, concluding that the operational data from the pilot project belonged to the restaurant chain and did not constitute protectable confidential information of the technology vendor.

However, genuine issues remained regarding whether the plaintiffs breached a contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith.