Saba Ahmad

The moving parties brought motions to quash part of an application for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction and to strike out certain expert evidence.

The underlying application challenged a decision by the Minister of Natural Resources regarding the Abitibi River Water Management Plan and sought a declaration that the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act regime is unconstitutional for failing to trigger the duty to consult.

The Divisional Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to hear the broad constitutional challenge and transferred that portion of the application to the Superior Court.

The motion to strike evidence was adjourned to the panel hearing the judicial review.

The court assessed damages for the applicant, Vineet Khanna, arising from the respondents' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The court rejected claims for rescission and damages in lieu of specific performance, finding the property was not unique and that the applicant failed to prove fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court awarded damages based on the difference between the purchase price and the market value at the date of breach, as well as for extension fees, temporary accommodation, and moving/storage expenses, but denied "equitable interest" and limited some claims due to insufficient evidence.

The applicant, Vineet Khanna, brought a motion to stay the defence of the respondents on the basis that the respondents failed to disclose a Mary-Carter type agreement.

The court reviewed the facts and relevant case law, ultimately finding that the Minutes of Settlement in question were not a Mary-Carter type agreement that changed the adversarial position of the parties.

The court held that immediate disclosure was not required and that the applicant was not prejudiced by any delay in disclosure.

The motion was dismissed.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating their tenancy and ordering payment for damages.

The tenants had failed to attend the initial Board hearing and their request for a review was dismissed.

The Divisional Court found that the tenants' appeal was an abuse of process due to their failure to pay rent, delay, and non-compliance with court directions.

The court also found the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit as it did not raise a genuine question of law.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

This is a costs endorsement following the disposition of three appeals.

The parties settled the issue of costs by agreement.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of $13,750, all inclusive, to the respondents.

The appellant, Voreon Inc., appealed the dismissal of three applications arising from a business relationship breakdown.

Two appeals concerned real estate developments (Higher Living and Eminence Living) and the interpretation of a Settlement Agreement versus a shareholders agreement regarding promissory notes.

The third appeal (MHH appeal) involved a mortgage's validity, a set-off claim for a promissory note, and the transfer of condominium units.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Higher Living and Eminence Living appeals, affirming the application judge's finding that the Settlement Agreement superseded the shareholders agreement and discharged the promissory notes.

However, the MHH appeal was allowed in part, remitting the issues of the $64,135 set-off note and the transfer of the parking/storage units to the Superior Court for adjudication, citing unaddressed issues and a palpable error regarding party status.

The appellants, parents of a brain-injured son, appealed a trial judge's decision on the passing of accounts for a trust they administered.

The trial judge found significant mismanagement, including a failure to account for over $165,000, fabrication of receipts, and improper cash administration, ordering them to repay funds, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The appellants challenged the disallowance of expenses, the failure to consider quantum meruit/equitable set-off, the denial of legal fee indemnity, and prejudgment interest calculation.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the accounts should not have been passed given the breaches and that no trustee compensation should have been awarded.

The Court of Appeal largely affirmed the trial judge's findings, making only minor adjustments for calculation errors, and dismissed the cross-appeal, emphasizing the high onus on trustees to account and the deference owed to trial judges' factual findings in such complex cases.

The appellant landlord appealed a Small Claims Court decision that applied the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act to a claim for residential rental arrears.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the six-year limitation period under section 17 of the Real Property Limitations Act applies to claims for rent between a landlord and tenant.

The court increased the judgment for rental arrears from $8,400 to the full claimed amount of $21,600 and awarded costs to the appellant.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal the order of Koehnen J. dated June 9, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The parties, former spouses, owned an apartment building as joint tenants.

Their divorce agreement gave the appellant a right of first refusal to buy out the respondent's interest, contingent on securing financing and escrowing funds for tax liability.

The appellant failed to exercise this right within the 90-day deadline due to a disagreement over the tax calculation.

The respondent successfully applied for the sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The appellant appealed, arguing the judge misapprehended the dispute as a partition matter rather than a contract dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law and confirming the appellant's right of first refusal had lapsed.

The applicant political party sought judicial review of the Chief Electoral Officer's responses to its complaints regarding the exclusion of its candidates from third-party organized election debates.

The applicant argued that the exclusion constituted illegal campaign contributions and violated Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Chief Electoral Officer's disposition of the complaints did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision and did not affect any legal rights or privileges, and therefore was not subject to judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Following a 14-day trial on an application to pass accounts where the applicant trustees were ordered to repay $150,531.14 to the trust, the respondent sought $567,157.64 in substantial indemnity costs.

The court found the respondent was the successful party and entitled to costs.

However, the court declined to award enhanced costs, finding that while the applicants failed to keep proper records and created documents to reconstruct the accounts, their conduct was not reprehensible or scandalous.

The court also found the respondent's costs claim was disproportionate and unreasonable due to over-lawyering and unreasonable litigation conduct.

The court awarded the respondent $90,000 in costs inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The applicants, parents and trustees of a trust established for their son following a serious brain injury, applied to pass their accounts.

The trust received $418,675.25 over 17 years, but the trustees administered it entirely in cash and lacked receipts for most disbursements.

The court found that the trustees failed to keep proper records and included fictitious loans and unpaid services in the accounts.

While some expenses were allowed, the trustees failed to account for $165,531.14.

After deducting $15,000 for trustee compensation, the court ordered the trustees to repay $150,531.14 to the trust.

The applicants brought three applications against their former business partner and his related corporations, seeking payments under various promissory notes and shareholders agreements related to joint real estate development projects.

The respondents argued that the parties had previously entered into a binding Settlement Agreement that superseded the notes and agreements.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Settlement Agreement was a binding contract, not merely an agreement to agree, and that the respondents' conduct did not amount to a repudiation that the applicants had accepted.

The court held that the applicants were limited to the payouts and terms agreed upon in the Settlement Agreement.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting the respondent commissions on the sale of two properties.

The motion judge found that the appellant Zaman had executed a valid buyer representation agreement and rejected his defenses based on dyslexia, alleged oral amendments, and failure to disclose commissions.

On appeal, the appellants argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because a counterclaim for negligence was inextricably intertwined with the claim.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the counterclaim was not inextricably intertwined with the claim and was premised on the validity of the buyer representation agreement itself.

The appellants' home was destroyed by fire and rebuilt by the respondent contractor, paid through the appellants' insurer.

The final insurance cheque of $24,828.48 was made payable only to the appellants, who kept the funds.

The respondent sued in Small Claims Court for breach of contract and won.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding they owed the funds to the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the final payment was intended to cover the respondent's approved final invoice.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

Two proposed privacy class actions arising from hospital employees’ unauthorized extraction of patient contact information for RESP sales leads were refused certification.

The court held that, on the actual evidentiary record, the disclosure of contact information alone, without disclosure of medical records or other objectively private information, could not support the tort of intrusion on seclusion because there was intrusion but no legally sufficient seclusion and no objectively highly offensive invasion.

Although certain claims, including a PHIPA s. 65 claim and some negligence theories against the hospitals and rogue employees, were arguable at the pleadings stage, there were no viable common issues and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

Small Claims Court proceedings or PHIPA-related processes were found more proportionate for any remaining individualized claims.

The appellant developer appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering it to pay the respondent purchaser $15,000 for breach of contract.

The dispute arose after the purchaser sought to terminate a condominium purchase agreement.

The parties signed an incentive letter promising the purchaser $15,000 upon the project's closing, and later signed a mutual release.

On appeal, the developer argued the release terminated its obligations under the incentive letter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in interpreting the incentive letter, noting the release did not cover the incentive letter, and upholding the trial judge's refusal to allow the developer to raise the unpleaded release defence at trial.

The applicant brought an application to determine its fee under a Sales Representation Agreement after introducing the respondent to an investor for a real estate development project.

The respondent argued the transaction was a sale, which would make the fee clause unenforceable as the applicant was not a registered broker under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The court found the transaction was in substance an investment, triggering the alternative fee clause.

The court awarded the applicant $1,800,000 and granted a charge on the property to secure payment.