Stefano G. Tripodi

The appellant appealed a warrant of committal issued for failing to pay approximately $3.5 million in child and spousal support arrears.

He also brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding the documents failed the Palmer test as they were either available at the time of the default hearing, irrelevant, or not credible.

The Court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied the two-part test for a warrant of committal by finding the appellant failed to comply with the default order and failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

The appellant appealed an order of committal and brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the motion, with written reasons to follow.

The court ordered costs of $20,000 payable forthwith to the Family Responsibility Office and directed the reissuance of the warrant of committal, lifting the previous stay.

The defendant brought a motion for an independent medical examination (IME) of the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff alleged an inability to mitigate damages due to a mental health condition, claiming this would prevent mitigation for up to 26 months.

The court, acknowledging the unusual nature of an IME in wrongful dismissal cases, found it appropriate given the plaintiff's prolonged assertion of inability to mitigate.

The motion was granted, conditional on the plaintiff's inability to mitigate extending beyond 12 months from the date of termination, balancing the employer's right to test such assertions against potential abuse.

The applicant was successful on a motion for a certificate of pending litigation and in defeating a cross-motion to stay the application.

In determining costs, the court rejected the applicant's revised costs outline, which substantially increased the hours claimed and was submitted after the fact, relying instead on the initial costs outline to protect the integrity of the process.

The court awarded the applicant $30,000 in partial indemnity costs, which included full indemnity costs for an unreasonable motion brought against the applicant's representative.

The applicant brought an application to determine its fee under a Sales Representation Agreement after introducing the respondent to an investor for a real estate development project.

The respondent argued the transaction was a sale, which would make the fee clause unenforceable as the applicant was not a registered broker under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The court found the transaction was in substance an investment, triggering the alternative fee clause.

The court awarded the applicant $1,800,000 and granted a charge on the property to secure payment.

The moving party sought leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) regarding a commercial property, claiming an interest based on a Sales Representation Agreement.

The responding party brought a cross-motion to stay or dismiss the application, arguing the moving party was an unregistered broker under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act (REBBA) and operated under an unregistered business name contrary to the Business Names Act (BNA).

The Master dismissed the cross-motion, finding the transaction was part of an ongoing business venture rather than a simple real estate trade, and that the business name non-registration was inadvertent.

The Master granted the CPL, noting the moving party established a triable issue regarding its interest in the property, but ordered the CPL postponed to existing and construction financing to avoid harming the development project.

The plaintiff subcontractor sought payment for drywall, taping services, and materials supplied on a window replacement project and enforced a construction lien after the contractor failed to pay the full invoiced amount.

The defendant contractor alleged deficiencies, incomplete work, and resident complaints, but adduced no reliable evidence of complaints, no proof of deficiency damages, and no evidence that the subcontractor was given an opportunity to cure.

The court found the verbal contract covered taping the sides of the windows, with separate additional patching work for a fixed extra price, and rejected the defendant’s set-off claim.

Judgment was granted for the unpaid balance, with prejudgment interest, lien relief, and substantial indemnity costs from the date of the plaintiff’s offer.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his 2012 claim, which the motion judge found was res judicata and an abuse of process due to a 2006 settlement and release.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that any new claims post-dating the 2006 settlement must be brought in a new statement of claim.

The Court also granted leave to appeal the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs order but dismissed the costs appeal, awarding the respondents $20,000 in costs for the appeal.

Following dismissal of a plaintiff’s appeal from a master's order, the court determined the issue of costs.

The appellant failed to provide written costs submissions despite being granted additional time to do so.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, while also claiming partial indemnity costs.

The court concluded that the appeal had been pursued in an unnecessarily aggressive and overly technical manner, requiring additional work by the respondents.

Costs were awarded against the appellant on a reduced partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order that set aside an amended statement of claim delivered while the defendants' motion to strike was outstanding.

The plaintiff had aggressively sought default judgments without notice despite knowing the defendants were represented and actively defending.

The court upheld the Master's reliance on the established practice requiring leave or consent to amend a pleading in the face of a motion to strike.

The court also noted that the Rules of Professional Conduct must be read with the Principles of Civility, and adopting technical interpretations of the Rules of Civil Procedure to deny a represented defendant the right to be heard is not condoned.

The appeal was dismissed.

In ongoing commercial litigation involving claims and counterclaims among several corporate and individual parties, the court issued a procedural endorsement concerning the filing of costs submissions.

The judge directed counsel for the principal parties to appear before the court to address issues relating to how costs submissions should be filed in the matter.

The endorsement did not determine entitlement to costs but required counsel to attend and address the procedural issue before the court.

The defendants by counterclaim moved to set aside a noting in default, a default judgment for $806,000, and writs of execution obtained by the plaintiff by counterclaim.

The court considered the test under the Rules of Civil Procedure for setting aside default judgments, requiring prompt action, a plausible explanation for the default, and an arguable defence on the merits.

The court found the moving parties acted expeditiously after discovering the default, that the failure to respond resulted from an oversight where a warning letter was mistakenly filed before counsel reviewed it during ongoing settlement discussions, and that there was an arguable defence tied to allegations of breach of non‑compete obligations.

The court also found it unreasonable for opposing counsel to obtain default judgment and execute writs without effective notice while engaged with counsel for the moving parties.

In the interests of justice, the default judgment was set aside and the writs withdrawn.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposing three months for contempt and an additional six months for the permanent loss of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in law for the six-month sentence for loss of evidence and struck it down.

However, the court upheld the three-month sentence for contempt, noting the trial judge's sustainable findings that the contempt was egregious and intentional.