Alexander Dugan Cameron

This appeal concerned the dismissal of a proposed class action against Capital One and Amazon Web following a data breach.

The motion judge had struck the appellants' pleadings without leave to amend and dismissed their certification motion, finding the case 'doomed to fail'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the pleadings failed to disclose viable causes of action for data misuse (intrusion upon seclusion, misappropriation of personality, conversion, breach of confidence/trust/fiduciary duty) and data breach (negligence, statutory claims).

The Court also upheld the decision to deny leave to amend the pleadings, citing repeated opportunities and the defective nature of the claims.

The appellants' motion for an extension of time to appeal costs was also dismissed.

This appeal concerns the applicability of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to "Database Defendants" (entities that collect and store personal information) when a data breach occurs due to the alleged negligence or recklessness of the defendant, but the actual intrusion is committed by independent third-party hackers.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as defined in Jones v. Tsige, requires an act of intrusion by the defendant itself, not merely a failure to prevent intrusion by others.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim, which alleged Equifax's failure to protect data from hackers, did not disclose a viable cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion against Equifax.

A solicitor firm moved for a charging order under section 34(1) of the Solicitors Act to secure approximately $360,000 in outstanding fees and disbursements incurred in both trial and appeal proceedings.

The client had initiated assessment proceedings against the solicitor.

The motion judge expressed uncertainty regarding the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to grant such charging orders, particularly regarding fees incurred in the Superior Court of Justice versus those incurred on appeal.

Finding the jurisdictional question to be significant and best determined by a panel, the motion was adjourned to a full panel of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for damages based on negligence, nuisance, and the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.

The trial judge found that the appellant had dumped thousands of truckloads of material on his rural property, improperly constructed a swale, and obstructed a culvert, all of which caused severe flooding to the respondent's neighbouring property over more than 12 years.

The trial judge awarded general damages of $250,000 and punitive damages of $125,000, totaling $390,000.

The appellant challenged only the damages awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable error in the general damages award and rejecting arguments that the punitive damages were excessive or unsupported by evidence.

The defendant, National Bank of Canada, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's Amended Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, specifically claims for intentional interference with economic relations and breach of the duty of good faith.

The court granted the motion to strike the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, but with leave to amend, finding the plaintiff failed to plead an unlawful act actionable by a third party.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the claim for breach of the duty of good faith, finding it was not plain and obvious that it could not succeed, but ordered the plaintiff to provide further particulars.

In ongoing commercial litigation involving claims and counterclaims among several corporate and individual parties, the court issued a procedural endorsement concerning the filing of costs submissions.

The judge directed counsel for the principal parties to appear before the court to address issues relating to how costs submissions should be filed in the matter.

The endorsement did not determine entitlement to costs but required counsel to attend and address the procedural issue before the court.

The defendants by counterclaim moved to set aside a noting in default, a default judgment for $806,000, and writs of execution obtained by the plaintiff by counterclaim.

The court considered the test under the Rules of Civil Procedure for setting aside default judgments, requiring prompt action, a plausible explanation for the default, and an arguable defence on the merits.

The court found the moving parties acted expeditiously after discovering the default, that the failure to respond resulted from an oversight where a warning letter was mistakenly filed before counsel reviewed it during ongoing settlement discussions, and that there was an arguable defence tied to allegations of breach of non‑compete obligations.

The court also found it unreasonable for opposing counsel to obtain default judgment and execute writs without effective notice while engaged with counsel for the moving parties.

In the interests of justice, the default judgment was set aside and the writs withdrawn.