Adil Alykhan Abdulla

The plaintiffs, who are elderly homeowners, brought an action alleging a large-scale mortgage fraud scheme perpetrated by the defendants.

During an injunction motion, the plaintiffs moved to remove the defendants' counsel, Mr. Fischhoff, arguing he was a material witness regarding a disputed conversation with the plaintiffs about the impugned mortgages.

Mr. Fischhoff brought a cross-motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding that Mr. Fischhoff was a material witness to a critical disputed fact and could not cross-examine the plaintiffs on his own communications with them.

The cross-motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel was dismissed as entirely without merit.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for injunctive relief regarding alleged systemic mortgage fraud linked to a specific company's sales tactics.

The court continued prior interim orders on consent and granted additional interim relief requiring the defendant to seek court leave before enforcing any residential mortgages originated by the implicated company.

The court also ordered the defendant to notify mortgagors of legal assistance options upon seeking enforcement.

The issue of whether defense counsel must be removed from the record for being a potential witness was adjourned to a case conference.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a class action on behalf of Indigenous children living off-reserve who have been through Ontario's child welfare system, along with their caregiving parents and grandparents, and Indigenous children who have experienced gaps and delays in accessing essential services such as education and health services.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the claim lacked a viable cause of action, failed to establish an identifiable class, lacked common issues, and was not a preferable procedure for resolution.

The court held that the claim impugned broad government policies and funding decisions rather than specific wrongful acts, raising justiciability concerns.

The court also found that the representative plaintiffs could not succeed as they were attempting a collateral attack on valid court orders.

This appeal concerns the applicability of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to "Database Defendants" (entities that collect and store personal information) when a data breach occurs due to the alleged negligence or recklessness of the defendant, but the actual intrusion is committed by independent third-party hackers.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as defined in Jones v. Tsige, requires an act of intrusion by the defendant itself, not merely a failure to prevent intrusion by others.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim, which alleged Equifax's failure to protect data from hackers, did not disclose a viable cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion against Equifax.

The plaintiffs commenced a third separate action in Toronto against neonatal care professionals and a hospital for injuries sustained by a newborn, having already commenced two actions in Brampton for the same injuries arising from a car accident and birthing care.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Toronto action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs should have sought leave to add them to the existing Brampton actions.

The court agreed, finding the separate action was a tactical maneuver to avoid the leave requirement and potential limitation period defences.

The court stayed the Toronto action pending a motion to amend in Brampton, while strongly criticizing the parties for engaging in costly and delaying procedural disputes contrary to the culture shift mandated by Hryniak.