6 total
The court enforced a termination release and dismissed the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim due to a lack of admissible expert evidence proving incapacity, duress, or unconscionability.
The plaintiff, Terrence Manuel, brought a claim against Lafarge Canada Inc. for damages arising from alleged workplace sexual harassment.
Manuel was terminated and signed a release.
Lafarge moved for summary judgment to enforce the release and dismiss the claim, while Manuel cross-moved to invalidate the release on grounds of lack of capacity, duress, and unconscionability.
The court granted Lafarge's motion and dismissed Manuel's, finding insufficient admissible evidence to support Manuel's claims of diminished capacity or that the release was signed under duress or was unconscionable.
The court emphasized the plaintiff's failure to provide qualified expert medical evidence linking his alleged psychological symptoms to the harassment or demonstrating a lack of capacity.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a proposed class action against Capital One and Amazon Web Services following a data breach, finding the pleadings disclosed no viable causes of action.
This appeal concerned the dismissal of a proposed class action against Capital One and Amazon Web following a data breach.
The motion judge had struck the appellants' pleadings without leave to amend and dismissed their certification motion, finding the case 'doomed to fail'.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the pleadings failed to disclose viable causes of action for data misuse (intrusion upon seclusion, misappropriation of personality, conversion, breach of confidence/trust/fiduciary duty) and data breach (negligence, statutory claims).
The Court also upheld the decision to deny leave to amend the pleadings, citing repeated opportunities and the defective nature of the claims.
The appellants' motion for an extension of time to appeal costs was also dismissed.
Motion for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.
The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to each of the two responding parties.
The court granted summary judgment enforcing a compensation agreement for an attorney for property, finding it displaced statutory fee schemes.
The plaintiff, a trust company, sought summary judgment to enforce a compensation agreement for its services as attorney for property under a continuing power of attorney.
The defendant, who had revoked the power of attorney, disputed the quantum of fees, arguing that compensation should be determined by the Substitute Decisions Act rather than the contractual agreement.
The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the express compensation terms in the validly executed agreement superseded the statutory compensation scheme under the Substitute Decisions Act.
The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the enforceability of the contract or the calculation of fees based on the agreed-upon formula.
Motion to strike defence pleadings denied; MLT recommendation is not a final judicial decision for res judicata.
The plaintiff moved to strike numerous paragraphs of the defendants' statements of defence on the basis of res judicata or abuse of process, arguing the defendants were seeking to re-litigate findings made by the Mining and Lands Tribunal (MLT) regarding a hydroelectric dam approval.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that the impugned pleadings fairly responded to the plaintiff's allegations of delay and misfeasance.
Furthermore, the court held that the MLT decision was merely a recommendation to the Minister and not a final judicial decision capable of grounding res judicata.
The motion against the Independent Electricity System Operator was also dismissed as it was not a party to the MLT proceeding.
Appeal of penalty for municipal conflict of interest dismissed; reprimand upheld under broadened statutory discretion.
The Integrity Commissioner appealed a decision imposing a reprimand on a city councillor who breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by participating in a council meeting regarding a debt owed to a non-profit corporation of which he was a director.
The Commissioner argued the only appropriate penalty was removal from office.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that recent amendments to the Act broadened judicial discretion regarding penalties, and the application judge made no error in principle in imposing a reprimand given the mitigating factors.