Timothy John Lee Phelan

The plaintiff, Terrence Manuel, brought a claim against Lafarge Canada Inc. for damages arising from alleged workplace sexual harassment.

Manuel was terminated and signed a release.

Lafarge moved for summary judgment to enforce the release and dismiss the claim, while Manuel cross-moved to invalidate the release on grounds of lack of capacity, duress, and unconscionability.

The court granted Lafarge's motion and dismissed Manuel's, finding insufficient admissible evidence to support Manuel's claims of diminished capacity or that the release was signed under duress or was unconscionable.

The court emphasized the plaintiff's failure to provide qualified expert medical evidence linking his alleged psychological symptoms to the harassment or demonstrating a lack of capacity.

This appeal concerned the dismissal of a proposed class action against Capital One and Amazon Web following a data breach.

The motion judge had struck the appellants' pleadings without leave to amend and dismissed their certification motion, finding the case 'doomed to fail'.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming that the pleadings failed to disclose viable causes of action for data misuse (intrusion upon seclusion, misappropriation of personality, conversion, breach of confidence/trust/fiduciary duty) and data breach (negligence, statutory claims).

The Court also upheld the decision to deny leave to amend the pleadings, citing repeated opportunities and the defective nature of the claims.

The appellants' motion for an extension of time to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, a trust company, sought summary judgment to enforce a compensation agreement for its services as attorney for property under a continuing power of attorney.

The defendant, who had revoked the power of attorney, disputed the quantum of fees, arguing that compensation should be determined by the Substitute Decisions Act rather than the contractual agreement.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the express compensation terms in the validly executed agreement superseded the statutory compensation scheme under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the enforceability of the contract or the calculation of fees based on the agreed-upon formula.