Alexander Dugan Cameron

This was a costs endorsement following motions arising from a dispute over the sale of a joint venture and a related arbitration.

The plaintiff had sought summary judgment for more than $30 million, while the defendants brought a Rule 21 motion alleging res judicata and abuse of process and alternatively seeking a stay in favour of arbitration.

After the court rejected the res judicata and abuse of process arguments but granted a stay pending arbitration, both sides sought costs.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors and considering the divided success, the complexity of the proceedings, and the unreasonably high amount claimed, the court made no order as to costs.

Following the sale and dissolution of a mass spectrometry joint venture, the plaintiff sued for approximately half of alleged profits arising from deferred service contracts transferred to a third party.

The defendants argued the claim was barred by the prior arbitration concerning a separate inventory issue, or alternatively had to proceed to arbitration under a dispute resolution agreement governed by foreign law.

The court held that neither issue estoppel nor cause of action estoppel applied because the deferred service contract issue was expressly kept out of the earlier arbitration.

Applying the competence-competence principle, and in light of conflicting expert evidence on U.S. and New York law, the court found it was at least arguable that the dispute fell within the arbitration clause and stayed the action pending arbitration.

A joint venture partner sought disclosure of detailed payroll and employment records of the other partner’s employees working on a diamond mine project in order to audit joint venture expenditures.

The respondent refused, arguing disclosure would contravene the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) without employee consent.

The court held that while the applicant had a contractual right to audit and the information sought constituted personal information under PIPEDA, disclosure without employee consent would violate the statute absent a statutory exception.

Section 7(3)(c) of PIPEDA does not create a free‑standing jurisdiction for courts to order disclosure; rather, it applies only after an independent court order requiring production exists.

Because no such jurisdictional basis had been invoked, the application was dismissed without prejudice to renewal.

The plaintiff by counterclaim sought a 30‑day extension to file costs submissions following an earlier endorsement relating to a motion.

Counsel for certain responding parties took no position, while another responding party consented to the request.

The court granted the requested extension and set deadlines for both the delivery of the applicant’s costs submissions and any responding reply submissions.

The court also directed the parties to advise if the costs issue was resolved between them.

In ongoing commercial litigation involving claims and counterclaims among several corporate and individual parties, the court issued a procedural endorsement concerning the filing of costs submissions.

The judge directed counsel for the principal parties to appear before the court to address issues relating to how costs submissions should be filed in the matter.

The endorsement did not determine entitlement to costs but required counsel to attend and address the procedural issue before the court.

The defendants by counterclaim moved to set aside a noting in default, a default judgment for $806,000, and writs of execution obtained by the plaintiff by counterclaim.

The court considered the test under the Rules of Civil Procedure for setting aside default judgments, requiring prompt action, a plausible explanation for the default, and an arguable defence on the merits.

The court found the moving parties acted expeditiously after discovering the default, that the failure to respond resulted from an oversight where a warning letter was mistakenly filed before counsel reviewed it during ongoing settlement discussions, and that there was an arguable defence tied to allegations of breach of non‑compete obligations.

The court also found it unreasonable for opposing counsel to obtain default judgment and execute writs without effective notice while engaged with counsel for the moving parties.

In the interests of justice, the default judgment was set aside and the writs withdrawn.

The requester sought access to documents relating to advice given to the Minister of Finance regarding the effective date of amendments to the Corporations Tax Act.

The adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that the 'advice or recommendations' exemption under s. 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act did not apply because the documents did not suggest a single course of action and there was no proof they were communicated to the final decision-maker.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Minister's appeal, holding that the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 13(1) was unreasonable as it failed to protect the deliberative process and the range of options presented to a decision-maker.

The requester sought records relating to advice given to the Minister of Finance regarding amendments to the Corporations Tax Act.

The Ministry refused disclosure under s. 13(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, claiming the records contained advice or recommendations.

The adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding no evidence the records went to the final decision-maker and that they did not suggest a single course of action.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the adjudicator's interpretation unreasonable, holding that s. 13(1) protects the deliberative process, including drafts and options, without requiring proof of delivery to the ultimate decision-maker or a single recommended course of action.

The appellant discovered that the respondent, a fellow bank employee who was in a relationship with the appellant's former husband, had repeatedly accessed her private banking records without authorization.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's claim, finding that Ontario law did not recognize a tort of invasion of privacy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, formally recognizing the tort of intrusion upon seclusion in Ontario.

The court awarded the appellant $10,000 in damages, finding the respondent's deliberate and repeated actions were highly offensive and caused distress.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network sought leave to intervene as friends of the court in an appeal concerning whether the common law recognizes a tort of invasion of privacy.

The appellant supported the motions, while the respondent opposed them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions, finding that the proposed intervenors would not offer a significantly different perspective from the appellant and that permitting the interventions would cause injustice to the respondent by delaying the scheduled appeal and requiring new factums.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Adjudicator's order requiring the disclosure of six records under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant argued the records were exempt under s. 13(1) as they contained advice or recommendations of a public servant.

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision to release Records I to V, finding it reasonable that they did not contain a recommended course of action.

However, the court overturned the decision regarding Record VI, finding that the proposed redactions clearly contained advice and recommendations and were therefore exempt from disclosure.