David R. Aston

The court issued supplementary reasons to clarify the precise start date and length of cohabitation for spousal support calculations.

The applicant contended cohabitation began in January 1992, while the respondent asserted May 1995.

The court determined that cohabitation commenced in October or November 1994, resulting in a cohabitation period of 21.5 years.

This clarification was deemed necessary because the length of cohabitation impacts the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) "without children" formula, which became relevant after child support obligations ended.

This family law trial addressed property division and spousal support for unmarried spouses after a 20+ year cohabitation.

The court found a "joint family venture" existed from late 1994, recognizing the applicant's significant non-financial contributions and career sacrifices.

The family home and joint investments were ordered to be equally divided, with the respondent paying the applicant an equalization payment.

The court imputed income to the applicant for spousal support purposes due to inconsistent job search efforts post-separation, but also acknowledged her past caregiving responsibilities.

Indefinite spousal support was awarded to the applicant at the midpoint of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range, and child support termination dates were confirmed.

This application concerned a dispute over a loan agreement and a supplementary security agreement involving pledged shares.

The applicants sought a declaration that the transfer of pledged shares to the respondents was null and void, or alternatively, relief under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) or equitable relief from forfeiture.

The court found that the applicants had defaulted on the loan agreement, and the respondents acted within their contractual rights under the security agreement to transfer the shares upon default, without needing to comply with PPSA notice requirements for disposal.

The court also denied equitable relief from forfeiture due to the applicants' conduct and lack of evidence of ability to pay.

The application was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery with an imitation firearm and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 85 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the R. v. Nur framework, determined a proportionate sentence of five months' incarceration, and found that the mandatory minimum of one year consecutive (resulting in a 17-month sentence after considering pre-trial credit) was grossly disproportionate, thus violating the defendant's s. 12 Charter rights.

The mandatory minimum was declared of no force and effect, and a sentence of 5 months imprisonment (less 38 days credit) plus probation was imposed.

This is a motion for leave to appeal an order certifying a class action proceeding, specifically challenging the certification of oppression-based common issues.

The moving parties (Baffinland Iron Mines and three individual defendants) argued that previous decisions precluded class proceedings based on oppression claims due to the need for individual shareholder expectation assessments.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the original order.

The court held that the motions judge correctly applied appellate precedent that oppression claims do not necessarily require explicit evidence of each individual shareholder's expectations at the certification stage, provided common shareholder expectations are objectively reasonable and specifically pleaded.

This child protection trial concerned two boys, N. and D., who had been in the child protection system since infancy due to parental drug addiction and domestic violence.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended society care (crown wardship), while the father, maternal grandmother, and paternal grandparents each proposed alternative plans of care.

The court found that none of the respondents could provide a stable and safe environment due to ongoing drug addiction, emotional volatility, and persistent family conflict that placed the children in loyalty binds.

The maternal grandmother was found to have actively undermined the father's access and court orders.

The paternal grandparents were deemed deluded about their son's capacity.

The court granted the Society's request for extended society care, emphasizing the children's long-term best interests for stability and insulation from conflict, and leaving access decisions to the Society's discretion.

This family law application, initiated in 2010, proceeded to trial in 2017 to resolve outstanding issues of equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, s.7 child support expenses, and a lump sum spousal support claim.

The court made specific findings on asset valuations for equalization, resulting in an equalization payment owed by the applicant to the respondent.

Post-separation adjustments were also confirmed as owed by the applicant.

For child support, the respondent was ordered to contribute to specific extraordinary expenses, including music lessons, tutoring, art therapy, and certain uninsured prescription costs.

A lump sum spousal support of $12,000 was awarded to the applicant, credited against her payments to the respondent, recognizing her efforts to regain self-sufficiency after a significant back injury and surgery post-separation.

A divorce order was also granted.

This costs endorsement followed a high-conflict custody trial that settled on its seventh day.

The respondent mother sought substantial costs, and the court, applying Family Law Rule 24, determined she was more successful on the weighty issues despite mixed success on others.

The court considered the three purposes of costs (indemnity, settlement, sanction) and the parties' litigation conduct, including the father's pursuit of "unfounded" allegations and his initiative in settling.

The applicant father was ordered to pay $50,000 in costs to the respondent mother.

The applicant mother sought a temporary order to vary access provisions to allow her to relocate with the child to Kelowna, B.C., citing dire financial straits and employment opportunities.

The respondent father had also brought motions for joint custody, a shared parenting schedule, and a child assessment.

The court granted the mother's request for temporary relocation, finding it to be in the child's best interests, particularly given the father's limited recent involvement and the impending trial.

The father's motions for joint custody and a shared parenting schedule were adjourned, and his other requests were dismissed.

The plaintiff moved to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck due to outstanding undertakings and incomplete trial readiness requirements.

The court applied the test requiring a reasonable explanation for delay and absence of non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

Although some delay involved difficulties obtaining documents and funding an expert report, the court found the delay largely attributable to the plaintiff and not reasonably explained.

The court also accepted that the long passage of time since the underlying events raised concerns about fading witness recollection.

The motion to restore the action to the trial list was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The applicant union sought a stay of a grievance arbitration hearing pending a judicial review application challenging interlocutory orders of the arbitrator, including an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court applied the test for a stay, considering whether there was a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience.

Although the threshold for a serious issue was barely met, the court found the merits of the judicial review weak and noted that the alleged prejudice to the grievor was mitigated by ongoing suspension without pay regardless of the stay and by the potential for retroactive compensation.

The balance of convenience favoured allowing the arbitration process to continue while the judicial review remained pending.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to grant a stay.

Following a successful application involving a claim for adverse possession, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs payable by the respondent.

Although the applicant was entitled to costs, the court found the bill of costs claimed on a partial indemnity basis to be excessive.

The court noted that much of the legal work predated the applicant’s property ownership and would have been incurred regardless of opposition, and that the respondent—who was self‑represented—acted reasonably and did not materially increase the applicant’s costs.

The court also criticized the involvement of numerous legal staff and duplication of work.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal portions of an earlier order concerning security for child support and related procedural matters involving a foreign support order.

The court considered whether failure to register a German support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 constituted a jurisdictional defect invalidating the earlier order.

The court held that any deficiencies in complying with the statutory procedure were procedural irregularities capable of being cured nunc pro tunc and not jurisdictional prerequisites.

The motion was characterized as a collateral attack on an earlier order that had not been appealed, and the court found no basis to interfere with the discretion exercised by the earlier judge.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

Following an earlier endorsement in which the court reserved jurisdiction regarding the wording of the formal order and did not address costs, the court issued a supplementary endorsement addressing procedural steps for settling the form of the order and determining costs.

The applicant submitted a draft order and costs submissions.

The court directed the respondent to provide written submissions on the form of the order and costs within 20 days.

The court retained jurisdiction to determine the issue of costs after receiving the respondent’s submissions.

Following an appeal involving a dispute between a corporate appellant and the provincial Minister of Revenue, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The parties agreed on a fixed amount for legal fees and disbursements payable to the respondent.

The court endorsed the agreement and ordered that the respondent recover the agreed costs.

The decision reflects the court’s approval of negotiated costs following the disposition of the appeal.

The defendant broadcaster brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of claims arising from the plaintiffs’ appearance on a television program pitching a board game.

The plaintiffs alleged that the broadcast segment misrepresented the original recording and advanced claims for breach of contract, defamation, negligence, and injurious falsehood.

The court held that a broadly worded Consent and Release signed by the participant barred all claims, including negligence and defamation, and that the language clearly authorized editing in the producer’s sole discretion.

The court rejected arguments that enforcement would be unconscionable or contrary to public policy and found no evidence supporting allegations of bad faith editing.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The appellant corporation appealed Ontario corporate tax assessments arising from interest income earned through refinancing transactions within a corporate group.

The appellant argued the interest constituted income from property and therefore fell outside the scope of Ontario taxation under the pre‑2005 Corporations Tax Act regime applicable to non‑Canadian incorporated corporations.

The court held that the interest income formed part of a business carried on in Canada because the corporation’s core purpose was to facilitate financing transactions within the corporate group and administer the resulting debt instruments in Canada.

As a result, the interest income constituted income from a business carried on in Canada within the meaning of s. 115 of the Income Tax Act and was taxable in Ontario.

The court upheld the Minister’s assessments and found it unnecessary to conduct a full GAAR analysis.

The plaintiff sought indemnity from a builder corporation and several individual investors for payments made to homeowners under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The claim relied on a Tarion standard-form indemnity agreement allegedly signed by the individual defendants.

The court found the individual defendants had only signed a single signature page that had been fraudulently inserted among unrelated financing documents by another defendant, and that earlier versions of the agreement submitted to the plaintiff were forgeries.

Although the defendants were careless in signing the document, the plaintiff’s own lack of diligence in accepting altered net worth statements and failing to verify the indemnitors contributed materially to the circumstances.

Balancing the competing principles from fraud and non est factum jurisprudence, the court held the defendants were not liable under the purported indemnity agreement.

The court determined costs following the disposition of a civil action involving claims, counterclaims, and third party proceedings.

The third party claims and counterclaims were deemed dismissed under Rules 24.04 and 24.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the plaintiff should indemnify the defendants for any costs payable to the third parties and awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants for defending the action and for the third party claims.

Costs were fixed for motions, third party proceedings, and the main action in favour of both groups of defendants, with reductions reflecting reasonable expectations and prior related litigation.

The parties brought competing motions to change support provisions in a divorce judgment issued in 2000.

The applicant sought the return of his passport and temporary relief from existing child and spousal support obligations after losing his employment and receiving employment insurance benefits.

The respondent opposed the passport release due to concerns the applicant would leave the jurisdiction and avoid support obligations.

The court accepted evidence that the applicant had made bona fide efforts to secure employment and had limited prospects in Canada.

The court granted the passport return and temporarily suspended spousal support while reducing child support based on the applicant’s current employment insurance income.