Imran Kamal

This decision concerns a dispute over the legal and beneficial ownership of lands surrendered by several First Nations to Canada in 1908, known as the Unsold Surrendered Lands (USL), including the Point Park and associated roads in Fort Frances, Ontario.

The Town of Fort Frances sought summary judgment declaring it the owner of these lands or, alternatively, a public trust or entitlement to damages.

The First Nations, Canada, and Ontario opposed, seeking dismissal of the Town’s claims.

The court found that the Agency One Reserve was a validly created reserve, that the 1908 Order-in-Council (OIC) did not convey the USL to the Town by fee simple or public trust, and that the Town’s claims to the lands, roads, and damages were without merit.

The Town’s motion was dismissed, and the counterclaim struck.

The Attorney General of Canada sought summary judgment to dismiss a claim by Atikameksheng Anishnawbek First Nation, arguing that their request to re-delineate reserve boundaries constituted a collateral attack and abuse of process on a 1889 judgment (Francis).

The First Nation argued the Francis decision was unfair as they were not an equal party.

The court dismissed Canada's motion, exercising its residual discretion to allow the claim to proceed to trial, emphasizing that while re-litigation doctrines are important, justice and reconciliation, particularly for Indigenous rights, can override them when there was a structural unfairness in prior proceedings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal from a Divisional Court order.

In the exercise of its discretion, the court ordered that all parties bear their own costs of the appeal.

The appellants, a group of First Nations, appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their application for judicial review.

They argued that Ontario's revocation of a forest management regulation (MNR-75) and amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act (Bill 197) breached the Crown's duty to consult and the honour of the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the duty to consult does not apply to the law-making process (Bill 197) and that the revocation of MNR-75 did not give rise to a duty to consult as the alleged adverse effects were speculative and equivalent protections remained in force through other legally binding instruments.

The Ontario Court of Appeal remitted the issue of the Huron plaintiffs' Stage One trial costs to the Superior Court for reconsideration, questioning the substantial difference in hours claimed compared to the Superior plaintiffs.

The court found the Huron plaintiffs' costs to be fair and reasonable, noting the added complexity of representing 21 First Nations, the extensive evidence led on the Anishinaabe perspective, the incorporation of Anishinaabe Ceremony and protocol, and the necessary creation of the Robinson Huron Trust to manage the litigation.

The court concluded that the costs were proportionate and within the reasonable expectations of the parties given the historical significance and complexity of the treaty claims.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton brought a motion seeking permission to proceed with a summary judgment motion in a complex child protection file involving three children.

The motion was heard via Zoom during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the urgency of child protection matters and the court's evolving protocols.

One respondent, K.K., who was self-represented, requested an adjournment to retain counsel.

The court granted the Society's request to proceed with the summary judgment motion, allowing K.K. a brief extension to file further materials and retain counsel, emphasizing the need for timely resolution for the children.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding involving three children.

The Society sought a custody order placing the oldest child with her biological father in Alberta, and Crown wardship with no access for the two younger children.

The mother and the father of the younger children opposed the motion, seeking a trial and the eventual return of the children to their care.

The court found that the parents had profound and unresolved issues including mental health struggles, substance abuse, and domestic violence, and had failed to make meaningful progress.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The oldest child was placed in her father's custody, and the younger children were made Crown wards with no access, as the parents failed to establish that access would be beneficial and meaningful or that it would not impair future opportunities for adoption.

The applicant children's aid society apprehended a child at birth and sought Crown wardship.

The respondent father, who identified as Métis, brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the definitions of 'Indian', 'Native person', and 'Native child' in section 3(1) of the Child and Family Services Act violated section 15(1) of the Charter by excluding Métis children.

The court found that the definitions created a distinction based on analogous grounds that perpetuated disadvantage for Métis children and their families.

The court declared the definitions invalid but suspended the declaration for 10 months to allow the legislature to amend the Act.

The court also granted an individual remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter, ordering that the child be treated as an Indian or Native child for the purposes of the proceedings.

In a child protection proceeding, the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather brought a motion for access to their five-year-old grandchild.

The mother had terminated their access after the child's father was arrested for alleged sexual offences against the child, believing the grandmother had coached the child's disclosure.

The Society took no position on the motion.

Applying the Chapman principles, the court found that a positive grandparent-grandchild relationship existed and that the mother's decision to terminate access was arbitrary and contrary to the child's best interests.

The court granted temporary access, initially supervised.