Melinda Graham

The applicant children's aid society sought an order for Crown wardship with no access regarding a 19-month-old child.

The child was apprehended at birth due to the mother's substance abuse and the parents' history of child protection involvement.

The father argued that the child's Métis heritage was not properly considered by the society.

The court found that the society made reasonable efforts to involve the Métis community, which declined to participate and supported adoption.

The court determined the child was in need of protection due to the mother's chronic drug addiction and the parents' inability to maintain a safe home.

The court ordered Crown wardship with no access, directing the society to ensure future placements educate the child on his Aboriginal heritage.

The applicant children's aid society apprehended a child at birth and sought Crown wardship.

The respondent father, who identified as Métis, brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the definitions of 'Indian', 'Native person', and 'Native child' in section 3(1) of the Child and Family Services Act violated section 15(1) of the Charter by excluding Métis children.

The court found that the definitions created a distinction based on analogous grounds that perpetuated disadvantage for Métis children and their families.

The court declared the definitions invalid but suspended the declaration for 10 months to allow the legislature to amend the Act.

The court also granted an individual remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter, ordering that the child be treated as an Indian or Native child for the purposes of the proceedings.

Following a family law motion concerning parenting time for an infant child, the court addressed liability for costs.

The responding party on the motion sought full recovery costs on the basis that he had been more successful overall, while the other party argued that success was mixed and that any costs should be minimal.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the discretionary principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court found that both parties had adopted unreasonable positions and that the ultimate order represented a middle‑ground outcome.

The court also considered the absence of a formal offer to settle by the moving party and the limited financial means of the other party.

In these circumstances, the court exercised its discretion to order that each party bear their own costs.

The parties entered into a marriage contract to exclude the appellant's farm property from equalization.

The respondent later applied to set aside the contract, and the trial judge did so under s. 56(4)(a) of the Family Law Act, finding the appellant failed to make proper disclosure regarding the property's composition and value.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the mistaken belief about the property consisting of one parcel instead of two was an innocent, common mistake.

The respondent had independent legal advice, understood she was giving up claims to the entire property, and was aware of the uncertainties regarding its value, meaning there was no failure to disclose warranting the setting aside of the contract.

The moving party, who acted as the appellant's trial counsel, sought leave to intervene in the appeal.

The trial judge had been highly critical of the moving party's conduct, finding he deliberately suppressed information.

The moving party argued this misapprehended the evidence and harmed his professional reputation.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the protection of a proposed intervenor's integrity is a sufficient interest to engage Rule 13.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, especially when no other remedies are practically available.