D. Smith

The plaintiff, Erwin Banfi, brought a motion for approval of a class action settlement and class counsel fees against multiple municipal and provincial defendants concerning alleged increased flood risk and reduced property values due to overdevelopment in Oakville.

The action, initially premised on property diminution, shifted focus due to difficulties in proving causation and quantifying individual damages.

The proposed settlement involved a $500,000 payment by defendants to the Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation for a flood education and protection program for class members, and class counsel fees of $495,000.

The court approved the cy-près settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the litigation's challenges and the material benefit provided to class members.

Class counsel fees and a $5,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff were also approved.

Allan Clayton Eggleton was found guilty of 17 counts, including drug trafficking (fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine) and numerous firearms offences.

He absconded prior to sentencing, leading the Crown to successfully apply for sentencing in absentia under s. 475(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the dangerous nature of the drugs, the unlawful possession of loaded firearms, and the offender's lengthy criminal record and disregard for court orders.

Mitigating factors, including a difficult upbringing and Indigenous heritage, were noted but largely negated by his absconding.

The court imposed a total sentence of 10 years imprisonment, comprising consecutive sentences for weapons and drug offences, along with mandatory ancillary orders for DNA and a lifetime weapons ban.

The accused, Kugaruban Somasundaram, brought a pre-trial application challenging the admissibility of his blood alcohol readings (BAC) on the grounds that his s. 10(b) Charter rights (right to counsel) were breached.

The court found that the accused's right to consult with counsel was breached because he spoke to a paralegal, not a lawyer, and the police, specifically the booking sergeant, were aware of this but did not inform the accused or facilitate a consultation with a lawyer.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court found the state conduct serious and the impact on the accused's Charter rights significant, leading to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary care and custody order to place a child with his biological father, J.W., under an interim supervision order.

The child's parents, K.T. and E.M., sought the child's return to K.T.'s care under an interim supervision order.

The court found the child was at risk of emotional harm due to exposure to adult conflict between the parents.

However, given that the parents were now living separately, the court determined that the child could be adequately protected by an interim supervision order returning the child to K.T.'s care, with terms reflecting the Society's notice of motion.

The Society's request for placement with J.W. was dismissed, and the child was returned to the mother, K.T., under supervision.

The defendant municipality moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim under Rule 25.11, arguing they improperly pleaded evidence and irrelevant facts.

The plaintiffs, land developers, sued for breach of contract and bad faith regarding a subdivision development.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding that where bad faith is alleged, the requirement to provide full particulars under Rule 25.06(8) overrides the prohibition against pleading evidence, and the impugned paragraphs properly detailed the alleged bad faith conduct.

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

The defendants submitted written requests to dismiss the self-represented plaintiff's claim under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the statement of claim to be incomprehensible, indefensible, and incapable of a coherent response.

The court concluded that the claim was frivolous and an abuse of process on its face, and dismissed the action.

In the context of CCAA proceedings for Sears Canada, the Monitor brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement with several former landlords regarding the valuation of their claims.

The landlords disputed the Monitor's calculation of their claims under the agreed Landlord Claim Formula and sought disclosure of the underlying calculations.

The court held that the landlords were entitled to the disclosure and could dispute the calculations, but only using the sources permitted by the formula.

Additionally, the court ordered one landlord, Primaris, to repay $10,000 it had unilaterally withheld for legal fees when returning a mistaken payment.

The court ruled on a defence application for a mistrial and the probative value of after-the-fact conduct in an aggravated assault jury trial.

The defence sought a mistrial due to alleged improprieties in Crown counsel's closing address, specifically regarding the credibility of a Crown witness.

The defence also requested a "no probative value" instruction for the accused's flight and disposal of the firearm, arguing it was equally consistent with illegal firearm possession as with the aggravated assault.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the Crown's comments on witness credibility, while concerning, could be remedied by jury instruction and did not impact the accused's credibility.

The court also denied the "no probative value" instruction for after-the-fact conduct, distinguishing the case from *R. v. Chambers* and finding the accused's flight disproportionate to the admitted firearm possession, thus allowing the jury to infer guilt regarding the shooting.

The accused, Nerville Ferdinand, was charged with aggravated assault.

During his jury trial, the Crown sought to advance an alternative theory of liability based on transferred intent, arguing that Ferdinand intended to shoot a third person ("Jimbo") but accidentally hit the victim, Tristan Kelly.

The defence objected, arguing there was no evidentiary basis for this theory.

The court applied the "air of reality" test for theories of liability, similar to that for defences, which requires a limited weighing of evidence to determine if a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict based on the theory.

The court found no direct evidence of intent to shoot Jimbo and concluded that the circumstantial evidence, even viewed most favorably to the Crown, did not reasonably support an inference of transferred intent, as it would require speculation and contradiction of witness testimony regarding aiming direction.

The Crown was therefore prohibited from advancing this alternative theory to the jury.

The plaintiff sued the Toronto Police Services Board and two constables for damages, alleging excessive force during arrest and negligent investigation.

The court dismissed the claim in its entirety, finding that the force used by the constables was justified under s. 25 of the Criminal Code and that their investigation met the applicable standard of care, as there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court found the plaintiff's testimony lacked credibility and that his claims of injury and loss of income were not substantiated by the evidence.

Fabricio Calderon was sentenced for a home invasion involving the assault of residents and intent to steal.

Despite going to the wrong address, serious injuries were inflicted.

The court considered the objectives of sentencing for home invasions (protection, general deterrence, denunciation) and specific deterrence given the defendant's extensive criminal record.

Aggravating factors included the nighttime perpetration, weapon use, reference to a gun, severe victim injuries, high planning, group enterprise, and the defendant's prior armed robbery conviction and lifetime weapons prohibition.

Mitigating factors were a guilty plea and an apology.

The court imposed an 8-year penitentiary term, reduced by 45 months for pre-sentencing custody, leaving 51 months to serve, concurrent on another count.

Non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders were also issued.

Following an eight-day jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in general damages for assault by a police officer, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $86,655.32.

The defendants argued that no costs should be awarded as the damages fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court.

The court, exercising its discretion under Rule 57.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, denied the plaintiff's request for costs.

The judge found the case was not complex, the award was not close to the Small Claims maximum, and the plaintiff failed to adequately assess the quantum of damages, making the Superior Court an inappropriate venue for the action.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of breach of probation and was found not guilty of four additional counts following a three-day trial.

The defendant had been charged with child pornography offences in 2013 and 2014, and was released on conditions prohibiting attendance at public parks where children under 16 were present.

The breaches involved attending Canada's Wonderland, the Toronto Zoo, and a public park with his girlfriend's two children.

The Crown sought two years less a day; the defence sought 30 to 45 days.

The court imposed a sentence of five months imprisonment concurrent on each count, followed by 24 months probation with conditions including counselling and employment requirements.

The accused was charged with driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and possession of cannabis resin contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Goods and Substances Act.

On the impaired driving charge, the Crown relied on breath samples showing readings of 149 and 120 mg/100ml, which after truncation became 140 and 120 mg/100ml.

The defence argued that the 29 milligram difference between the raw readings raised a reasonable doubt about the instrument's proper functioning and that a third test should have been administered.

The court found no evidence tending to show malfunction or improper operation and convicted on the impaired charge.

On the possession charge, the accused claimed innocent possession, asserting he took the cannabis to prevent his son from seeing it and intended to destroy it.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the accused's testimony regarding how he knew the person who brought the drugs and rejected the innocent possession defence, convicting on the possession charge.

The defendant was charged with seven counts of breach of probation.

He pleaded guilty to three counts involving attendance at public parks or swimming areas where persons under 16 years were present.

The trial concerned the interpretation of bail conditions, specifically whether the defendant breached paragraph 5 of his release order by attending the Toronto Zoo, Canada's Wonderland, a cottage in Thornbury, and a local park while in the company of T.M. and her children under 16 years of age.

The Crown argued the defendant could not be in the company of T.M. when she had children under 16 present.

The defendant argued that if he was in the company of any of the other named persons in the release order, the exception to house arrest would apply.

The court found the defendant not guilty of all four remaining counts, holding that paragraph 5 was a provision dealing with house arrest exceptions, not a general prohibition on being in the company of children under 16 years.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

In a will challenge concerning allegations of undue influence over the deceased, the court considered the proper procedural framework for managing the litigation following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that proportionality principles should guide orders for directions in estate litigation and rejected the routine use of the traditional Estates List standard order for directions.

Instead, the court ordered limited documentary production, permitted written interrogatories in place of oral examinations for discovery, and scheduled a hybrid hearing using affidavit evidence with viva voce cross‑examination.

The court also transferred a related civil action to the Estates List and assumed case management of both proceedings to ensure a timely and cost‑effective resolution.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval for its counsel's fees totaling $255,955 for a 69-day receivership of a family farm.

The debtor opposed the fees as excessive.

The court found the receivership was relatively straightforward, the estate was modest, and the fees charged by senior Toronto counsel were disproportionate and inefficient.

The court reduced the approved fees to $157,500, applying local London rates.