Deanna Paolucci

The applicant mother brought a Motion to Change seeking sole decision-making responsibility and an order that the respondent father's parenting time remain professionally supervised.

The father had engaged in a persistent pattern of pressuring the children to make false allegations of abuse against the mother and her new partner, leading to multiple unfounded CAS and police investigations.

The court found that the father's ongoing behaviour, driven by unaddressed mental health issues and an unfounded belief that the children were being abused, posed a significant risk of emotional harm to the children.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility, ordered that the father's parenting time remain supervised, and issued a restraining order against the father.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to strike the respondent father's pleadings, vary interim support, sell the jointly owned home, and change the child's school.

The court dismissed the requests to strike pleadings and change the child's school, finding it in the child's best interests to remain in his current school.

Interim support was maintained, though section 7 expenses were adjusted to reflect the parties' incomes.

The court ordered the sale of the home on consent, with proceeds to be divided equally.

Costs were awarded to the respondent father on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered a motion by the applicant father, Kemi Andrew Emberson, for an interim order that the parties’ two children move to Ottawa to reside with him and attend school there.

The respondent mother, Trystian Elizabeth Hilton, opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the litigation history, the parties’ circumstances, and the children’s chronic school absences.

The court refused the mother’s request for leave to file late responding materials and ultimately dismissed the father’s motion, finding insufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances to justify changing the children’s primary residence on an interim basis.

The court ordered an expedited trial and increased the father’s parenting time pending trial.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion to amend a temporary parenting order, seeking supervised parenting time for the father due to his alleged incitement of the children to make abuse allegations against her and her new husband.

The court found the matter urgent, determined that the father's conduct constituted emotional harm to the children, and ordered supervised in-person and virtual parenting time for the father, with the mother retaining decision-making responsibility.

The court also ordered disclosure of police and CAS records and set out a process for further proceedings and costs.

This motion concerned an interim parenting schedule for a 2.5-year-old child following the separation of unmarried parents.

The applicant father sought increased parenting time, which the respondent mother opposed, proposing a more gradual reintroduction.

The court applied the "best interests of the child" principle under the Children's Law Reform Act, noting that the "tender years" doctrine no longer applies and breastfeeding is one of many factors.

The court considered the geographic distance between the parents, the mother's mental health issues and associated release order, and the mother's uncooperative approach to facilitating parenting time.

While acknowledging the mother as the primary caregiver pre-separation, the court ordered a structured, gradually increasing parenting schedule for the father, including weeknight visits in the mother's area and weekend visits at a midpoint location.

The motion was adjourned for continuation in several months to assess the schedule's effectiveness and allow for further evidence.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a summary judgment motion seeking custody of three children with their paternal grandmother due to the mother's untreated substance addiction, mental health issues, and chaotic lifestyle.

The father and paternal grandmother supported the Society's motion.

The mother opposed, seeking shared decision-making and parenting time.

The paternal grandmother also brought a cross-motion for a change of the youngest child's surname.

The court granted the Society's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and placed the children in the paternal grandmother's custody with specific supervised access for the mother.

The paternal grandmother's cross-motion for a name change was dismissed as moot.

The applicants, maternal grandparents, sought an interim contact order for their three grandchildren under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondents, the biological parents, had terminated all contact in October 2021, alleging the grandparents repeatedly tried to undermine their relationship with the children and caused psychological distress.

The court denied the grandparents' motion for interim relief, finding that the parents' decision to terminate contact was not arbitrary but was a reasoned, incremental response motivated by the children's emotional needs, given the grandparents' consistent disregard for boundaries and attempts to interfere with parental authority.

The court emphasized the high deference owed to parental decision-making unless parents are found to be acting arbitrarily.

In a return motion concerning a high-conflict family law matter, the respondent mother sought to maintain sole decision-making and no contact for the applicant father with their eldest child, Abi, due to the father's alienating behavior.

The mother also sought primary care of their younger child, Sammy, and sole decision-making for Sammy on health and tutoring, plus an order for the father to pay half of reunification counseling costs.

The court found the father lacked sufficient insight into his manipulative conduct that contributed to Abi's estrangement.

The court maintained the temporary order granting the mother sole decision-making for Abi and prohibiting father's contact, contingent on the father's meaningful engagement in reunification counseling.

The week-about parenting schedule for Sammy was maintained, but the father was ordered to take Sammy to appointments, and both parents were restricted on phone usage for Sammy.

The father was ordered to pay half of the reunification counseling costs.

This family law trial concerned a motion to change a prior custody order, with both parents seeking sole decision-making authority and primary residence of their two children.

The court found the respondent father incapable of meeting the children's educational, medical, and psychological needs, supporting their relationship with the mother, or communicating and cooperating on matters affecting them.

The father was found to have fostered a strong, unsubstantiated fear of the mother in the children.

In contrast, the applicant mother demonstrated a commitment to addressing her own mental health and tirelessly advocating for the children's well-being and access to services.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority and primary residence, with the father's parenting time suspended and to continue as supervised, pending a further hearing to determine final parenting time.

Following a twelve-day trial on a motion to change regarding parenting and relocation, the successful party sought costs of $91,098.07.

The opposing party argued for each party to bear their own costs due to divided success and financial hardship.

The court found the moving party was clearly successful and entitled to costs, but declined to award full indemnity costs as the judgment was not more favourable than the offer to settle on all issues.

The court awarded costs of $45,000, applying reductions for the unnecessary use of second counsel and the opposing party's dire financial circumstances.

Following a 10-day trial where the applicant mother was awarded legal guardianship of the parties' 18-year-old son, the mother sought costs of $52,132.65.

The respondent father opposed, arguing each party should bear their own costs due to the mother's alleged unreasonable behaviour.

The court found the father's conduct was far more obstructive and unreasonable, though not meeting the threshold for bad faith.

The court awarded the mother costs of $35,000 payable forthwith, noting the father's ability to pay.

The Father brought a motion to change previous parenting orders, seeking primary residence and final decision-making authority, and opposing the Mother's planned relocation to Australia with the children.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the Mother's unsubstantiated allegations of abuse against the Father, which led to CAS involvement, and a complete breakdown in communication.

The court determined it was not in the children's best interests to relocate to Australia, as they required stability and there were serious concerns the Mother would not support their relationship with the Father.

The Father was granted primary residence and final decision-making authority, while the Mother was granted graduated unsupervised parenting time.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary care and custody order to place a child with his biological father, J.W., under an interim supervision order.

The child's parents, K.T. and E.M., sought the child's return to K.T.'s care under an interim supervision order.

The court found the child was at risk of emotional harm due to exposure to adult conflict between the parents.

However, given that the parents were now living separately, the court determined that the child could be adequately protected by an interim supervision order returning the child to K.T.'s care, with terms reflecting the Society's notice of motion.

The Society's request for placement with J.W. was dismissed, and the child was returned to the mother, K.T., under supervision.

This trial decision addressed the sole remaining issue of a parenting plan for three daughters following the parents' separation.

The court considered the children's best interests, including their views (obtained through a judicial interview with the eldest child), the parents' differing parenting styles, and the history of care.

The mother was granted primary care and final decision-making authority for medical and educational matters, with joint decision-making for major extracurricular activities and religious upbringing.

The father was granted increased, but not equal, parenting time, including specific regular and holiday schedules.

The court emphasized the need for both parents to improve communication and cooperation.

The parties attended a Trial Management Conference for a motion to change a U.S. parenting and child support order.

The court found the parties were unprepared for trial, having failed to confer, prepare a joint Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form, or address significant jurisdictional issues regarding the adult disabled child and the foreign divorce.

The court ordered a further TMC and directed the parties to exchange will-say statements, requests to admit, and research on jurisdiction.

The father moved for a stay pending appeal of an order requiring him to provide a notarized copy of his severely autistic child's passport and OHIP card to the mother.

The mother, a Ghanaian diplomat, required the documents to obtain a travel visa to return to Canada and resume equal parenting time.

The court admitted fresh evidence from an immigration lawyer but ultimately dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no irreparable harm to the father and that the balance of convenience and the child's best interests favoured the mother returning to Canada.

The appellant father appealed a final custody and access order that granted joint custody and gradually increased the respondent mother's access to their child.

The appellant also brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the child's recent regressive behaviour.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test and consisted largely of uncorroborated hearsay.

The court also dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing the child's best interests, the mother's history of substance abuse, and the parties' ability to communicate.

The applicant sought costs for successful urgency and jurisdictional determinations, and for a partially successful motion to stay a trial judgment pending appeal.

The respondent sought costs for her success on the stay motion.

The court found mixed success, with the applicant prevailing on urgency and jurisdiction, and the respondent on the joint decision-making aspect of the stay.

Neither party fully succeeded on parenting time.

The court awarded the applicant $2,750 and the respondent $1,250, resulting in a net payment of $1,500 to the applicant, deferred until the appeal's disposition.

The court declined to award costs for preparing costs submissions due to deficiencies in both parties' bills and the applicant's improper disclosure of an offer to settle.

The applicant sought to stay a Final Order awarding joint legal custody and increased parenting time to the respondent, pending an appeal.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay in parenting cases, considering whether the appeal raised a serious issue, if irreparable harm would occur, and the balance of convenience, with the child's best interests as the overriding factor.

While the appeal did not raise a serious issue regarding joint decision-making or the general increase in contact, it did meet the threshold for specific residential arrangements due to fresh evidence of the child's increased anxiety and regressive behaviors post-order implementation, exacerbated by COVID-19 changes.

The motion to stay joint decision-making was dismissed, but a partial, time-limited stay was granted for future incremental increases in the respondent's overnight access and summer holiday access, allowing the child more time to adjust.

The applicant father sought an urgent motion to stay a custody and parenting order pending an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The preliminary issue was whether the Superior Court of Justice retained jurisdiction to hear the stay motion after an appeal had been launched.

The court found that Rule 63.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, grants concurrent jurisdiction to both the trial court and the appeal court for such motions.

The respondent mother failed to demonstrate why the Superior Court should not exercise its concurrent jurisdiction.

Consequently, the court asserted jurisdiction and scheduled the applicant's motion for a stay.