Enoch Chukwuebuka Anekwe

This is a comprehensive family law trial decision addressing corollary relief issues in a 19-year marriage between a self-represented applicant and a respondent.

The court determined the parties' incomes for support purposes, imputing $40,000 to the applicant and $262,000 (2020-2022) and $247,716.19 (2023) to the respondent.

The decision addresses complex issues including the respondent's income from an Egyptian business venture, the applicant's earning capacity, child and spousal support obligations, equalization of net family property, post-separation adjustments, and the disposition of the matrimonial home.

The court found the respondent owned an Egyptian villa at separation and rejected claims regarding undisclosed business profits.

Spousal support was ordered on an indefinite basis under the Rule of 65, with set-off child support for two children and proportional section 7 expense contributions.

This motion addressed whether J.A. qualified as a "parent" of the child A.H.H. under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

The court examined the definitions of "settled intention" and "lawful custody" as per Section 74(1) of the CYFSA.

J.A. failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a settled intention to treat A.H.H. as his child, citing vague details, lack of consistent financial support, and failure to assert legal rights during periods of separation.

The court also found that J.A. did not have lawful custody, as there was no court order or written agreement.

Consequently, J.A.'s motion to be declared a parent was dismissed.

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judge's order concerning equalization payment, occupation rent, spousal support, and allocation of liabilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings, which were owed deference.

The court also noted the appellant's non-disclosure of significant assets, which further undermined the grounds for appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and decided to adjourn the matter to a new appeal date.

The appellant was ordered to file a reply factum by a specific deadline and to pay costs thrown away to the respondent.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for the production of police and medical records regarding the respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The parents consented to the release of police records but opposed the release of their medical records, citing significant privacy interests related to their complex medical care as transgender individuals.

The court dismissed the motion for medical records, finding no sufficient nexus between the Society's concerns about emotional health and the predominantly endocrinological treatment the parents received.

The court held that the parents' privacy interests and the need to maintain their therapeutic relationships outweighed the probative value of the records at this stage.

The applicant sought costs of $15,552.88 following a successful motion regarding parenting time and the sale of the home.

The respondent argued costs should be in the cause.

The court found the applicant was the successful party, though not fully successful, and had made a reasonable offer to settle.

The court fixed the applicant's costs at $10,000, inclusive of costs thrown away from a prior adjournment, with payment deferred until the final determination of the case due to income disparity and the holding of house sale proceeds in trust.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary care and custody order to place a child with his biological father, J.W., under an interim supervision order.

The child's parents, K.T. and E.M., sought the child's return to K.T.'s care under an interim supervision order.

The court found the child was at risk of emotional harm due to exposure to adult conflict between the parents.

However, given that the parents were now living separately, the court determined that the child could be adequately protected by an interim supervision order returning the child to K.T.'s care, with terms reflecting the Society's notice of motion.

The Society's request for placement with J.W. was dismissed, and the child was returned to the mother, K.T., under supervision.

The applicant sought an order for the respondent to vacate the family home or for its sale, shared decision-making authority, and increased unsupervised parenting time.

The respondent opposed and sought continued supervised contact and child support, also claiming a valid marriage or unjust enrichment for a trust claim on the home.

The court found the respondent's claims regarding marriage validity and unjust enrichment lacked sufficient merit to prevent the sale of the home.

The court ordered the sale of the home, with proceeds held in trust, and ordered the applicant to pay child support upon the respondent vacating.

While declining shared decision-making at this stage, the court increased the applicant's parenting time but maintained supervised exchanges and imposed conditions related to alcohol consumption and anger management, pending further review or an OCL report.

The respondent brought a motion to enforce a final consent order requiring the parties to resolve future spousal support disputes through arbitration.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing that the order itself was not a valid arbitration agreement and she preferred to proceed in court via a Motion to Change.

The court held that it has jurisdiction to enforce a consent order to arbitrate by compelling the parties to execute a compliant family arbitration agreement.

The court ordered the applicant to sign the arbitration agreement and stayed her court proceeding.

In a child protection proceeding, the child's caregivers brought a motion to remove the biological father as a party to the proceeding.

The biological father brought a cross-motion for interim parenting time or care of the child.

The court dismissed the motion to remove the biological father as a party, finding that he met the statutory definition of a parent and that removing him would be a denial of natural justice.

The court granted the biological father's motion for interim access, ordering supervised visits to foster a relationship between him and the child.

In a child protection proceeding, the child's caregivers brought a motion to remove the biological father as a party to the proceeding.

The biological father brought a cross-motion for interim parenting time or care of the child.

The court dismissed the motion to remove the biological father as a party, finding that he met the statutory definition of a parent and that removing him would be a denial of natural justice.

The court granted the biological father's motion for interim access, ordering supervised visits to foster a relationship between him and the child.