Frédéric P. Huard

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

This endorsement addresses the scope of the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) involvement in a family law matter.

The OCL sought to expand its order to include a section 112 clinical assessment for both children, not just the older child, citing identified parenting issues and the high-conflict nature of the case.

The respondent mother opposed the expansion for the younger child, arguing he was not the subject of current litigation and that the court lacked jurisdiction without a formal motion to vary.

The court found that a Motion to Vary involving both children was already pending, initiated by the mother in 2020 with the father's response addressing both children.

Additionally, the court affirmed its authority under section 112(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to request such a report on its own initiative.

The court ordered the OCL's involvement to be expanded to include a section 112 report for both children, deeming it necessary to determine a parenting arrangement in their best interests.

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judge's order concerning equalization payment, occupation rent, spousal support, and allocation of liabilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings, which were owed deference.

The court also noted the appellant's non-disclosure of significant assets, which further undermined the grounds for appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and decided to adjourn the matter to a new appeal date.

The appellant was ordered to file a reply factum by a specific deadline and to pay costs thrown away to the respondent.

The applicant father brought a motion for temporary equal parenting time and joint decision-making responsibility.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the father's affidavit lacked sufficient evidence regarding the children's best interests under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and improperly sought final relief on a temporary basis without a strong evidentiary record.

The court ordered temporary child support on consent, specified the father's parenting time, and mandated that he take the children to their extracurricular activities.

Costs of $3,500 were awarded to the respondent mother.

The parties sought costs following a motion and cross-motion regarding parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The applicant mother sought $8,398.27 in costs, while the respondent father sought $18,146.03.

The court found that success was divided, with the father being only slightly more successful but having engaged in some unreasonable litigation conduct.

Considering all circumstances, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicant father was successful on an urgent motion regarding the choice of school for the parties' daughter.

He sought full recovery costs of $9,519.12, while the respondent mother argued for minimal or no costs, submitting a bill of costs for $4,265.75.

The court found the father was the successful party and entitled to costs, but noted the mother's position was reasonable and she had made a formal offer to settle.

Considering the single issue, the time spent, and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the father costs of $3,000 inclusive of HST.

The parties brought an urgent motion to determine the choice of school for their 12-year-old daughter entering Grade 7.

The moving party mother sought to enroll the child in a French Immersion program, while the responding party father sought enrollment in a homogeneous French school.

The child had attended a homogeneous French school for the past five years.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court considered factors including the benefits of French-only education, the child's academic success in her previous French school, and the importance of maintaining the status quo.

The court ordered that the child attend the homogeneous French school.

The applicant brought a motion to change a 2009 final order regarding equalization, alleging a mistake in the valuation of her pension.

The applicant claimed her actuary was provided incorrect information regarding her pension buyback status, resulting in an overvaluation of her pension and a lower equalization payment from the respondent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the pension administrator provided the incorrect information to the actuary, and concluding that the mistake was not mutual and did not negate the common intention of the parties at the time of the settlement.

Following a motion where the respondent was successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs of $8,772.10 based on an offer to settle, while the applicant argued for a reduced award of $2,500 payable at the end of the proceedings.

The court found the respondent was entitled to costs and that his offer to settle was reasonable, but reduced the quantum to $6,000 plus HST for proportionality.

The costs were ordered payable following the trial or comprehensive resolution of the matter.

Following an eighteen-day family law trial where the applicant's claims to set aside domestic contracts were dismissed, the respondent sought full recovery costs of $102,603.73.

The court considered the parties' offers to settle, finding the respondent made an offer triggering Rule 18(14) consequences.

The court rejected allegations of bad faith but found both parties engaged in unreasonable behaviour, particularly the respondent's failure to provide full financial disclosure regarding his businesses.

The court ordered the applicant to pay costs of $53,750, reflecting partial indemnity prior to the respondent's offer and substantial indemnity thereafter, with a reduction for the respondent's disclosure failures.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary an interim child support order, arguing his income had decreased after he accepted a promotion to a managerial position that did not offer overtime pay.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing the father was intentionally under-employed to avoid paying child support.

The court found that the father's new position was a legitimate career advancement that increased his base salary, and he was not intentionally under-employed.

The court granted the motion to vary child support based on the father's reduced income, resulting in a set-off amount payable by the mother.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for joint shared custody and equal parenting time of the parties' nine-year-old twins.

The respondent mother opposed, seeking an order for supervised access without overnights, citing recent allegations of domestic violence for which the father was criminally charged.

The court found no evidence of exceptional circumstances requiring supervised access, noting the Children's Aid Society had closed its file and the risk appeared to have dissipated after separation.

The court declined to order a week-on/week-off schedule due to insufficient evidence but granted the father unsupervised parenting time on alternating weekends and Wednesday evenings.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a temporary order regarding custody, child support, and spousal support.

He sought to change the primary residence of one child to himself, reduce his imputed income of $100,000 based on new financial disclosure, and increase the applicant mother's imputed income.

The court granted the change in primary residence but deferred the effective date to trial.

The court dismissed the motions to vary the imputed incomes, finding the father's new financial disclosure contradictory and lacking credibility, and the mother's income accurately reflected her circumstances.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion to reduce the applicant father's parenting time to supervised access, alleging the father failed to follow COVID-19 public health guidelines and that their child was at higher risk due to a cardiac condition.

The court found the child's cardiac condition did not place him at a higher risk of severe complications from COVID-19, relying on a recent cardiologist report.

However, the court found the father had breached some agreed-upon COVID-19 protocols.

The court dismissed the request for supervised access but ordered strict COVID-19 safety terms the father must follow to maintain his parenting time.

The applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement and an amending agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, alleging lack of financial disclosure, duress, and unconscionability.

The court found that while the respondent failed to provide full financial disclosure regarding his businesses, the applicant understood the agreements, did not diligently pursue disclosure, and received substantial benefits.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to set aside either agreement, upholding both domestic contracts.

Consequently, the applicant's corollary claims for equalization of net family property, retroactive child support, and retroactive and ongoing spousal support were dismissed.

The respondent's claim for child support was also dismissed as the agreements were upheld.

Following a trial where the maternal grandmother was awarded sole custody of the child, the respondents sought costs.

The applicant father argued each party should bear their own costs due to his limited means and the grandmother's alleged bad faith.

The court found the father's behaviour unreasonable during the litigation, which lengthened the process, but did not find bad faith.

Considering the father's ability to pay and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court ordered the father to pay costs of $15,000 to the grandmother and $3,000 to the mother, payable in monthly instalments.

In a family law proceeding involving the equalization of net family property, the applicant challenged the qualifications of the respondent's proposed expert witness on business valuation.

The court conducted a voir dire and applied the Mohan and White Burgess tests.

The court found that the proposed expert, an accountant without a Chartered Business Valuator designation, lacked the necessary specialized training and experience.

Furthermore, the court exercised its gatekeeping function to exclude the evidence, noting significant frailties in the expert's report, including its failure to state its purpose as a valuation, lack of a clear valuation date, and the expert's failure to sign the required acknowledgement of expert's duty.

The proposed expert's evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a final order granted at an uncontested trial for divorce and corollary relief.

The respondent had retained counsel after being served, but his counsel failed to file an Answer or attend the trial due to personal circumstances, including the illness and death of her mother.

The court applied Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules and the factors for setting aside a default order, finding that the respondent had a plausible explanation, moved promptly upon learning of the order, had an arguable case on the merits, and would suffer significant prejudice if the order stood.

The motion was granted and the order was set aside.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal support and contribution to special expenses.

The parties had previously executed a comprehensive separation agreement that terminated spousal support on January 1, 2017.

The applicant argued the agreement was unfair and failed to meet the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The court dismissed the motion for temporary spousal support, finding insufficient evidence to conduct a stage II Miglin analysis on an interim basis, noting the applicant's current income and that her financial difficulties largely stemmed from a failed business venture.