Laurie Lacelle

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant builder for breach of contract after the defendant unilaterally terminated agreements of purchase and sale for two new homes.

The defendant relied on an early termination condition in Schedule 'I' regarding the registration of a plan of subdivision.

The court found that Schedule 'I' was inconsistent with the mandatory Tarion Addendum and was therefore null and void.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the defendant breached the contracts and resold the properties at a profit, and awarded the plaintiffs $440,200 in damages based on the difference between the contract prices and the actual resale prices on the closing dates.

The plaintiff sought to recover $100,000 loaned to a failed exotic dance bar and restaurant business in Brockville, claiming the defendant Tim Beale personally guaranteed the loan and was a silent partner in the business.

The defendant denied both allegations, claiming he was merely an investor who also lost money when the business failed.

The court found the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff made a demand for payment in September 2014 but did not commence litigation until April 2017, exceeding the two-year limitation period.

Additionally, on the merits, the court found insufficient evidence to prove the defendant guaranteed the loan or was a silent partner.

The action was dismissed.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a double murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused in recorded intercepts and threatening text messages sent weeks after the murders.

The court reviewed the legal principles governing the admissibility of similar fact and propensity evidence, ultimately finding that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The court considered a mid-trial application by the Crown under section 652 of the Criminal Code for a jury view of the scene of a double homicide.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the Crown had not established a "very real and demonstrable advantage" to the jury’s understanding of the evidence that would result from a view, and that the risk of confusion and logistical hurdles outweighed any potential benefit.

The court relied on leading authorities, including R. v. Johnson and R. v. Golov, and noted that photographs and video evidence already provided the jury with sufficient information.

The Crown brought a second application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, during re-examination, following material inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior recorded statements.

The defence opposed, arguing the Crown was improperly expanding its application and that the issues should have been anticipated in chief.

The court held that the inconsistencies arose only during cross-examination and permitted the Crown to cross-examine on these points in re-examination, finding it was within the scope of proper re-examination and in the interests of justice.

This decision concerns the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by a key Crown witness, Justina Murray, in the trial of Gregory Anthony Beasley for two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit Ms. Murray’s video-recorded out-of-court statements for their truth, as her trial evidence was inconsistent and she did not adopt material aspects of her prior statements.

The court analyzes the necessity and reliability requirements for admitting such hearsay under the principled exception, referencing leading authorities including R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The court finds the statements admissible, concluding that the procedural safeguards (including video recording, opportunity for cross-examination, and, in one case, an oath) were sufficient to ensure reliability, and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a Crown application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, in a double murder trial.

The court found that Ms. Murray’s trial evidence was inconsistent with her prior recorded statements and permitted the Crown to cross-examine her.

The ruling addresses the legal principles governing such applications, the existence of inconsistencies, the Crown’s purpose in calling the witness, and the probative value of the prior statements.

The decision concerns a defence motion to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin and Nico Soubliere, to James Brooks, suggesting an intention to rob another drug dealer for Percocets.

The court found the statements admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the statements were substantively reliable and relevant to the issue of the identity of the shooter.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, and that the circumstances in which the statements were made supported their reliability.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin, to his girlfriend, Ruth Anne Villeneuve, in a double homicide prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as evidence of Delphin’s intention to act as “backup” for Nico Soubliere, who was meeting with the accused.

The court reviewed the state of mind exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, ultimately finding that the statements were not sufficiently reliable and were made under circumstances of suspicion.

The application to admit the statements was denied.

The accused, Gregory Beasley, was charged with two counts of first-degree murder.

The defence brought a motion seeking direction to cross-examine the officer-in-charge regarding investigative hearsay about other individuals and organized crime figures who may have had motives to harm the victims.

The defence conceded that this evidence did not meet the strict test for third-party suspect admissibility due to a lack of evidence regarding opportunity.

Justice Lacelle dismissed the motion, holding that the proposed evidence was irrelevant and that its potential prejudice, including distracting the jury and opening the door to the accused's own organized crime links, far outweighed its probative value.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of a police statement by the accused, Gregory Beasley, in a double homicide prosecution.

The court considered whether the police's provision of alcohol to the accused during a custodial interview rendered the statement involuntary or created oppressive circumstances.

After reviewing the evidence and legal principles, the court found that the statement was voluntary and admissible, as the accused had an operating mind, was not subject to threats or inducements, and the provision of alcohol did not amount to oppression or police trickery under the law.

On a Crown application in a sexual assault prosecution, the court granted testimonial accommodations permitting the complainant to testify by CCTV and with a support person present.

Applying the post-2015 wording of ss. 486.2 and 486.1 of the Criminal Code, the court held that the relevant threshold is whether the order would facilitate the giving of a full and candid account or otherwise serve the proper administration of justice, not whether exceptional circumstances or necessity were shown.

The court accepted evidence from a treating psychotherapist that the complainant experienced intense anxiety and dissociation when discussing the alleged offences and found those accommodations would reduce distress and make it easier to testify.

The court rejected the submission that credibility assessment or jury fairness would be materially impaired by video testimony.

On a voluntariness voir dire in a prosecution involving sexual assault, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment allegations, the court held that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's videotaped police statement was voluntary.

Applying the established voluntariness framework and the operating mind doctrine, the court found there were no threats, inducements, oppression, or police trickery, and that the accused had spoken with duty counsel and understood he did not have to speak.

The court rejected the argument that anxiety, cerebral palsy, ADHD, depression, or a missed dose of medication undermined the accused's capacity to make a meaningful choice.

The statement was admitted at trial.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to dismiss a habeas corpus application filed by an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender.

The inmate sought relief regarding his sentence and parole inadmissibility, alleging tainted evidence at his sentencing and Charter violations.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the application, finding it frivolous under Rule 6.11(2) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because habeas corpus cannot be used to challenge parole inadmissibility or revisit sentencing issues, as these do not constitute an unlawful continued deprivation of liberty reviewable by this remedy.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his involuntary transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security penitentiary.

The transfer was based on allegations of an inappropriate relationship with staff and contraband introduction.

The applicant argued the transfer was unlawful due to procedural unfairness, specifically the Correctional Service of Canada's failure to disclose the Security Reclassification Scale (SRS) scoring matrix.

The court found that the non-disclosure of the SRS scoring matrix constituted a major breach of the duty of disclosure, rendering the transfer procedurally unfair and unlawful.

The application was granted, and the transfer decision quashed.

Sentencing of a youthful first offender who pleaded guilty to multiple online exploitation offences involving 12 victims, including luring adolescents for child pornography, transmitting and possessing child pornography, obtaining intimate images by false pretences, publishing intimate images without consent, and mischief to data.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives, particularly for offences involving victims under 18, while still giving significant weight to youth, guilty plea, remorse, rehabilitation, family support, and restraint.

Applying the sequential sentencing approach and the totality principle, the court found that a conditional sentence was unavailable and unfit, and reduced an aggregate eight-year structure to a fit global sentence of five years' imprisonment.

Ancillary DNA, SOIRA, non-communication, and s. 161 orders were also imposed.

Katrina Gilmour, found guilty of fraudulent conduct, applied to re-open her case, alleging that TD Bank records used in her trial were unreliable and required full discovery.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss this application, arguing it was manifestly frivolous.

The court granted the Crown's motion, dismissing Gilmour's application to re-open.

The judge found that Gilmour failed to articulate a sufficient basis for how the records were unreliable or how re-opening the case would change the trial outcome, emphasizing the rigorous standard for re-opening a case post-conviction and the need to protect trial efficiency and finality.

Stephen John LeClair pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography and one count of accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought a 4-year prison sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day or a 12-month jail sentence.

The court considered the large volume and vile nature of the child pornography, the severe victim impact, and the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the offender's remorse, low risk of reoffending, and prior good character, the court found that an alleged acquired brain injury did not reduce moral culpability.

The court concluded that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for a strong denunciatory and deterrent message.

A sentence of 3.5 years in custody was imposed.

The applicants brought a preliminary motion (Seepa motion) seeking an order for document production, including medical records and lawyer's files, to ascertain the validity of the deceased's will.

They raised concerns about testamentary capacity, suspicious circumstances, and undue influence.

The respondents opposed, arguing the estate was modest and privacy interests outweighed the need for production, suggesting a resulting trust claim was more appropriate.

The court found the applicants met the low evidentiary threshold for document production, noting the deceased's age, the circumstances of will preparation by a non-lawyer relative, a prior Facebook post by a respondent indicating dementia, and alleged isolation of the applicants.

The motion was granted.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a denied motion by the defendant, Diana Tilbert, to set aside a default judgment.

The plaintiff, Kimberly Gillespie, sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity or no costs, citing professional negligence by her former counsel.

The court, applying Rule 57.01(1), found the plaintiff to be the successful party on the motion.

While acknowledging the defendant's prior ineffective representation, the court determined that the defendant's own delay in acting did not warrant the plaintiff bearing her own costs.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding no malicious or unreasonable conduct by the defendant that warranted judicial rebuke.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff.