Laurie Lacelle

The plaintiff sought to recover $100,000 loaned to a failed exotic dance bar and restaurant business in Brockville, claiming the defendant Tim Beale personally guaranteed the loan and was a silent partner in the business.

The defendant denied both allegations, claiming he was merely an investor who also lost money when the business failed.

The court found the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff made a demand for payment in September 2014 but did not commence litigation until April 2017, exceeding the two-year limitation period.

Additionally, on the merits, the court found insufficient evidence to prove the defendant guaranteed the loan or was a silent partner.

The action was dismissed.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit evidence of the accused's other discreditable conduct in a double murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused in recorded intercepts and threatening text messages sent weeks after the murders.

The court reviewed the legal principles governing the admissibility of similar fact and propensity evidence, ultimately finding that the probative value of the proposed evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The court considered a mid-trial application by the Crown under section 652 of the Criminal Code for a jury view of the scene of a double homicide.

The application was dismissed.

The court found that the Crown had not established a "very real and demonstrable advantage" to the jury’s understanding of the evidence that would result from a view, and that the risk of confusion and logistical hurdles outweighed any potential benefit.

The court relied on leading authorities, including R. v. Johnson and R. v. Golov, and noted that photographs and video evidence already provided the jury with sufficient information.

The Crown brought a second application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, during re-examination, following material inconsistencies between her trial evidence and prior recorded statements.

The defence opposed, arguing the Crown was improperly expanding its application and that the issues should have been anticipated in chief.

The court held that the inconsistencies arose only during cross-examination and permitted the Crown to cross-examine on these points in re-examination, finding it was within the scope of proper re-examination and in the interests of justice.

This decision concerns the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements by a key Crown witness, Justina Murray, in the trial of Gregory Anthony Beasley for two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit Ms. Murray’s video-recorded out-of-court statements for their truth, as her trial evidence was inconsistent and she did not adopt material aspects of her prior statements.

The court analyzes the necessity and reliability requirements for admitting such hearsay under the principled exception, referencing leading authorities including R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The court finds the statements admissible, concluding that the procedural safeguards (including video recording, opportunity for cross-examination, and, in one case, an oath) were sufficient to ensure reliability, and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This decision concerns a Crown application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, Justina Murray, in a double murder trial.

The court found that Ms. Murray’s trial evidence was inconsistent with her prior recorded statements and permitted the Crown to cross-examine her.

The ruling addresses the legal principles governing such applications, the existence of inconsistencies, the Crown’s purpose in calling the witness, and the probative value of the prior statements.

The decision concerns a defence motion to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin and Nico Soubliere, to James Brooks, suggesting an intention to rob another drug dealer for Percocets.

The court found the statements admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the statements were substantively reliable and relevant to the issue of the identity of the shooter.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, and that the circumstances in which the statements were made supported their reliability.

The court considered the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased, Carl Delphin, to his girlfriend, Ruth Anne Villeneuve, in a double homicide prosecution.

The Crown sought to admit these statements as evidence of Delphin’s intention to act as “backup” for Nico Soubliere, who was meeting with the accused.

The court reviewed the state of mind exception and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, ultimately finding that the statements were not sufficiently reliable and were made under circumstances of suspicion.

The application to admit the statements was denied.

This decision addresses the voluntariness of a police statement by the accused, Gregory Beasley, in a double homicide prosecution.

The court considered whether the police's provision of alcohol to the accused during a custodial interview rendered the statement involuntary or created oppressive circumstances.

After reviewing the evidence and legal principles, the court found that the statement was voluntary and admissible, as the accused had an operating mind, was not subject to threats or inducements, and the provision of alcohol did not amount to oppression or police trickery under the law.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his involuntary transfer from a medium-security to a maximum-security penitentiary.

The transfer was based on allegations of an inappropriate relationship with staff and contraband introduction.

The applicant argued the transfer was unlawful due to procedural unfairness, specifically the Correctional Service of Canada's failure to disclose the Security Reclassification Scale (SRS) scoring matrix.

The court found that the non-disclosure of the SRS scoring matrix constituted a major breach of the duty of disclosure, rendering the transfer procedurally unfair and unlawful.

The application was granted, and the transfer decision quashed.

Katrina Gilmour, found guilty of fraudulent conduct, applied to re-open her case, alleging that TD Bank records used in her trial were unreliable and required full discovery.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss this application, arguing it was manifestly frivolous.

The court granted the Crown's motion, dismissing Gilmour's application to re-open.

The judge found that Gilmour failed to articulate a sufficient basis for how the records were unreliable or how re-opening the case would change the trial outcome, emphasizing the rigorous standard for re-opening a case post-conviction and the need to protect trial efficiency and finality.

Stephen John LeClair pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography and one count of accessing child pornography.

The Crown sought a 4-year prison sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day or a 12-month jail sentence.

The court considered the large volume and vile nature of the child pornography, the severe victim impact, and the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the offender's remorse, low risk of reoffending, and prior good character, the court found that an alleged acquired brain injury did not reduce moral culpability.

The court concluded that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offences and the need for a strong denunciatory and deterrent message.

A sentence of 3.5 years in custody was imposed.

The applicants brought a preliminary motion (Seepa motion) seeking an order for document production, including medical records and lawyer's files, to ascertain the validity of the deceased's will.

They raised concerns about testamentary capacity, suspicious circumstances, and undue influence.

The respondents opposed, arguing the estate was modest and privacy interests outweighed the need for production, suggesting a resulting trust claim was more appropriate.

The court found the applicants met the low evidentiary threshold for document production, noting the deceased's age, the circumstances of will preparation by a non-lawyer relative, a prior Facebook post by a respondent indicating dementia, and alleged isolation of the applicants.

The motion was granted.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a denied motion by the defendant, Diana Tilbert, to set aside a default judgment.

The plaintiff, Kimberly Gillespie, sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity or no costs, citing professional negligence by her former counsel.

The court, applying Rule 57.01(1), found the plaintiff to be the successful party on the motion.

While acknowledging the defendant's prior ineffective representation, the court determined that the defendant's own delay in acting did not warrant the plaintiff bearing her own costs.

The court rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding no malicious or unreasonable conduct by the defendant that warranted judicial rebuke.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence obtained by police following a vehicle stop.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including an unlawful search of the vehicle without grounds (s. 8), unlawful detention and arrest of the passenger (s. 9), persistent questioning (s. 8), failure to provide rights to counsel upon initial arrest (s. 10(b)), and failure to file a report to a justice (s. 8).

The court determined that the police conduct, particularly the search without grounds, was a major departure from Charter standards and had a significant impact on the accused's rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court concluded that admitting the evidence, including a handgun and ammunition, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded it.

The accused, Katrina Gilmour, was charged with multiple offenses including fraud and identity theft against Christopher Lariviere.

The Crown alleged Gilmour defrauded Lariviere of significant funds by fabricating medical conditions (brain tumour, need for surgery/medication) and false property arrears, and used his identity to obtain propane accounts and a loan.

Gilmour denied the allegations, claiming Lariviere offered money and that she had genuine medical issues.

The court found the complainant credible and the accused's testimony unbelievable, inconsistent, and illogical.

The court found Gilmour guilty on counts of fraud over $5,000 (medical and property arrears), forgery of a Superior Court document, fraud on Stinson, fraud on Lend Direct, and making a false document for Superior Propane.

The Family and Children’s Services of Renfrew County brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that two children were in need of protection and for extended society care.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing that there was a genuine issue for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidentiary record, which largely consisted of inadmissible hearsay and conflicting accounts, did not permit a fair and just resolution of the issues without a full trial.

The decision emphasized the significant credibility issues and the Charter rights engaged in child protection proceedings, reinforcing that evidentiary standards are not relaxed for summary judgment motions in this context.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements from a deceased declarant, Lori Parker, against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who is charged with manslaughter and other offences.

The court considered two material aspects of Parker's statements to her then-husband, Robert Parker: (1) that she gave the accused information about the victim, Henrietta Knight, having money and plotted with him to steal it; and (2) that the accused threatened her family if she disclosed this.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the first statement substantively reliable due to a lack of motive to fabricate and strong corroboration from the accused's own statements to an undercover officer.

Consequently, the first statement was admitted for the truth of its contents.

However, the second statement regarding threats was deemed unreliable due to a plausible motive for fabrication (to prevent Robert Parker from going to the police) and lack of corroboration, and was therefore admitted only for the fact that it was said, not for its truth.

The mother was previously found in contempt of court for breaching parenting orders and alienating the child from the father.

At the penalty hearing, the court found the mother had not purged her contempt and continued to act unilaterally.

The court declined to change the child's primary residence or impose a jail sentence, finding a motion to change was the appropriate vehicle for custody issues.

Instead, the court ordered the mother to pay a $2,000 fine, reimburse the father $4,725 for reunification counselling, complete a high-conflict parenting course, and pay full indemnity costs of $16,314.38.