Laurie Lacelle

The accused pleaded guilty to extortion under section 346(1.1) of the Criminal Code.

He threatened to disseminate intimate images of a young female complainant unless she engaged in sexual intercourse with him.

The Crown sought 9 to 12 months custody plus probation, while defence counsel sought a conditional sentence of 12 to 18 months or alternatively 90 days intermittent jail.

The central issue was whether the offence constituted a "serious personal injury offence" that would preclude a conditional sentence.

The court found that the threats, while abhorrent and extortionate, did not constitute violence or attempted violence as contemplated by the legislation, distinguishing the case from robbery or assault cases involving weapons.

The court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence with strict conditions including 12 months house arrest, followed by 21 months probation.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposing a suspended sentence and probation for multiple offences arising from escalating domestic violence, criminal harassment, uttering a death threat, assaults, and repeated breaches of judicial release orders against a former intimate partner and her associates.

The court held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by focusing narrowly on breaches of court orders and failing to give proper weight to denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, victim safety, and victim impact evidence.

Emphasizing the seriousness of predatory criminal harassment in a domestic context and Parliament's denunciatory approach to s. 264 of the Criminal Code, the court found that a penitentiary term was required.

The sentence appeal was allowed, the sentence was varied to 16 months' imprisonment after credit for pre-trial custody, probation was maintained and expanded to include counselling, and the firearms prohibition order was replaced.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against two child complainants and sought a proportionate sentence reduction if one conviction were overturned.

The court rejected challenges to the jury charge on reasonable doubt, held that any error in admitting two prior discreditable incidents was harmless, and found no reviewable prejudice arising from the treatment of prior statements.

On the second complainant's count, the court upheld admission of a videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code notwithstanding a delay of approximately two years, relying on the evidentiary record explaining delayed disclosure by a timid child witness.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The accused appealed sexual offence convictions arising from allegations by two complainants tried together before a jury.

The Court of Appeal held that, after the trial judge refused the Crown's similar fact application, the jury had to be expressly instructed not to use the evidence across counts and not to reason from bad character or propensity.

Those limiting instructions were not given, and the court rejected reliance on the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) because the evidence was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered on the remaining counts, and the Crown's sentence leave application was dismissed as moot.

The Crown appealed an order staying an assault prosecution after a charge screening form incorrectly indicated that the matter would proceed summarily.

The Court of Appeal held that the notation was merely an administrative error and did not amount to a binding election, particularly because the charge had been laid outside the limitation period for summary proceedings.

The court further held that the subsequent decision to proceed by indictment caused no prejudice or hardship capable of justifying a stay of proceedings.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice.

Three appellants challenged convictions for criminal harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code and two also appealed sentence.

The court rejected constitutional arguments that the provision was unconstitutionally vague, imposed impermissible constructive liability, or violated freedom of expression contrary to ss. 7 and 2(b) of the Charter.

The court also dismissed case-specific evidentiary, unreasonable verdict, indictment timing, and standard of proof arguments.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted to two appellants, but both sentence appeals were dismissed.